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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Bank financing is the most important source of external financing for small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SME). Banks financed 29% of the total volume invested by German
SMEs in 2011. In contrast, only 11% of investment funding was provided by promotional
loans or other subsidies and another 6% provided by other funds, such as mezzanine capi-
tal or private equity (54% of total investment volume was provided by own/internal funds
(Schwartz, 2012)). In addition, any German firm has a main bank relationship in order
to participate in the financial transfer system. Firm bank relationship can vary from pure
financial transactions to very “close monitoring and implicit long-term contractual agree-
ments” (Berlin and Mester, 1998) often refered to as relationship oriented banking. Firms
can benefit for several reasons from relationship oriented banking, e.g. through improved
access to funds or relaxed collateral requirements (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Elsas and
Krahnen, 2002). But firms have to bear higher transaction costs providing information in
relationship oriented banking. Therefore, not all firms might ask for relationship oriented
banking.
The banking market can be very heterogenous and banks are characterized by different
degrees of relationship oriented banking. Banks need to invest in specialization in order
to add value to the firm, such as a relationship oriented bank (Boot and Thakor, 2000).
Those that invest more in specialization are better positioned to aggregate the outcomes of
the information production of other firms in the industry or region in their client portfolio,
i.e. information externalities (Stiglitz, 2002). The degree of their investment in special-
ization might depend on their governance structure or chosen business model. Resulting
differences in the banks’ portfolio composition or differences in the banks’ governance have
mainly been disregarded in the literature. The more recent literature has started to ac-
knowledge that banks are not identical. Most of these studies argue that the structure
of the hierarchy of banks differs which is approximated in empirical studies by bank size
(e.g. Berger and Black, 2011). The structure of the German banking market for example
shows that banks differ in many more aspects, such as the governance, the industry, or
the spatial specialization. These differences can have potential effects on the firm-main
bank relationships.
The German banking market is highly spatially diversified with more than 2,000 banks,
all active as universal banks (offering all kinds of banking services). Probably the most
important factor is that German banks differ in their governance structure and can be
1
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classified into three groups: Sparkassen, cooperative banks, and private banks. Both
Sparkassen and cooperative banks emerged as a response to the social tensions in the late
nineteenth century accompanying the industrial revolution. Sparkassen mostly started
as a part of the financial administration of the municipalities and were only allowed to
take deposits to ensure wealth building for the poor. At the beginning of the last cen-
tury Sparkassen were reorganised as independent institutions under the supervision of the
municipalities. A Sparkasse can offer all kinds of banking services but its spatial area of
business is restricted according to the so–called “regional principle”. Landesbanken are the
central banks of Sparkassen and also have business clients themselves. Landesbanken are
jointly owned by the regional Sparkassen associations and federal states (Bundesla¨nder).
At the same time, cooperative banks based on the ideas of Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch
and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen were founded. Cooperative banks in the commercial sec-
tor are called Volksbanken and in the agricultural sector Raiffeisenbanken. The philosophy
of the cooperatives banks was to put their members in the position of being able to help
themselves. The cooperative banks have taken deposits from and granted loans only to
members in the early beginning. Since the 1970’s cooperative banks also provide all kinds
of banking services to non-members (Born, 1976). In contrast to other European coun-
tries, such as Italy, Sparkassen and cooperative banks have not been privatised. Although
Sparkassen and cooperative banks compete with private banks, they still have a mandate
or a mission statement to support the regional economy.
Figure 1.1: Bank mergers in Germany by bank type (1991-2011)
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3In the last two decades the German banking market consolidated vastly. The time
series index in figure 1.1 shows the number of banks in the years 1991 to 2011 relative to
the base year 1991. All the mergers took place within each of their own banking sectors.
The total number of banks was reduced by over a half (black line). Most mergers took place
within the sector of cooperative banks (orange line), followed by mergers of Sparkassen
(red line). In terms of the size of the merged bank, the largest merger occurred in the
private banking sector (Commerzbank with Dresdner Bank in 2008/2009; blue line). The
temporary increases of the number of private banks can be explained by market entries of
foreign banks.
Figure 1.2: Location of bank headquarters in Germany (2011)
• Top 4 Banks • Other Private Banks • Sparkassen and Landesbanken • Cooperative Banks ♦ major cities
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, 2013; Geodata: google maps.
Although, a large number of banks merged, the German banking market remains highly
fragmented regionally. Figure 1.2 shows the locations of bank headquarters in Germany
in 2011 by bank type. Private banks, indicated in blue, are located in major cities. The
headquarters of the Top 4 banks are located in Frankfurt (Deutsche Bank and Com-
merzbank), Bonn (Postbank), and Munich (HypoVereinsbankUnicredit). Headquarters of
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Sparkassen and cooperative banks are located all over Germany, even in rural areas. In
southern Germany the density of cooperative banks is high. The low bank density in
Eastern Germany can be explained by the political situation in the former German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) and transformation after reunification. In the 1950’s Sparkassen
were officially independent but were organised centrally by the GDR’s ministry of financial
affairs. In the 1970’s the number of Sparkassen was reduced and cooperative banks were
forced to transfer accounts to local Sparkassen. After the German reunification in 1990
many Sparkassen and cooperative banks in Eastern Germany were inefficient and merged
to larger units.
In the Sparkassen and cooperative banking sector, banks’ spatial business areas gen-
erally do not overlap. Bank size is therefore restricted to the local (firm) population.
The regional distribution and the number of banks of each bank type result in different
distributions of bank size. In figure 1.3, I present the distribution of bank size in terms
of the number of firm-main bank relationships (ln). The Top 4 banks have by far the
highest number of bank relationships (between 70,000 and 160,000 firm-main bank rela-
tionships). On average, Landesbanken had 6000 firm-main bank relationships. Sparkassen
(mean 2400) are larger than cooperative banks (mean 500), whereas both bank types have
outliers in both directions. Private banks that do not belong to the Top 4 banks are rela-
tively small (mean 200). These are mostly banks specialised in private wealth management
which run the service of firms as a secondary business or foreign banks.
Figure 1.3: Bank size distribution by bank type (2011)
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5Spatial distribution of a bank’s business area also influences the bank’s portfolio struc-
ture. The industry composition of the portfolio of banks with restricted business areas
is more likely to reflect the industry composition of the local economy. Although these
banks can give specific industries higher or lower weights in their portfolio. The industry
specialization is restricted to the pool of firms within their business area. Banks special-
ized in certain industries but without business area restrictions might be less capable of
gathering local knowledge.
Banks of different types also seem to attract certain types of firms. In figure 1.4, I
present the market share in terms of firm-main bank relationships by bank type and firm
size. The market shares in the groups of small firms with less than 50 employees (column 1
to 4) are relatively stable. Sparkassen have the largest market share varying between 43%
and 48%, followed by cooperative banks (26% - 30%). The market share of large banks
varies between 20% and 22%. As firm size increases the market shares of non-private
banks decrease. In the largest firm size class, private banks have a market share of more
than two third of all main-bank relationships.
Figure 1.4: Market shares in main-bank relationships by bank type and firm size (2011)
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The described differences of bank characteristics potentially affect their business client’s
access to and conditions of bank financing. Banks that are more experienced e.g. in a
clients industry might be more capable of processing firm information and monitoring
projects. Clients of those banks might have easier access to funds. Specialized banks can
also be expected to be more capable of evaluating projects that are in distress and make
more efficient liquidations. Bank’s specialization is influenced by its governance. Banks
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with a mandate to support distressed but viable firms would need to invest more in spe-
cialization. Firms might consider that specialization comes with additional transaction
costs and self select a bank type according their preferences.
Taking all these heterogeneity of banks into account in this thesis, I provide a detailed
analysis of firm-main bank relations and the role of bank and bank portfolio characteristics
within the context of relationship banking. The thesis is a collection of three empirical pa-
pers on firm-main bank relationships. One of the main objects of investigation throughout
all chapters is the effect of the characteristics of the main bank on the firms. A special in-
terest lies in the governance regime of the bank, i.e. whether it is a private or a non-private
bank. Chapter 2 contains an empirical investigation on the role of banks when firms are
financially distressed. In chapter 3, I investigate the effect of banks’ industry expertise
and diversification on firm’s Research and Development (R&D) intensity. In chapter 4, I
explore the firm’s selection of its main-bank relationship.
The reason why these differences have mostly been disregarded in the literature is
mainly due to data limitations which do not allow studying both, i.e. firms and their
main-bank relations in detail. Studies analyzing the German banking market either use
information from banking supervisor authorities or publicly available balance sheet infor-
mation. Information maintained by banking supervisory authorities contains bank balance
sheet information, sums lent to industry classes, and information about interventions in
bank management by the bank supervisory authorities. These data do not contain infor-
mation on the firm-main bank link. In other cases this information is highly selective (e.g.
Millionenevidenzzentrale by the Deutsche Bundesbank contains only information on firms
asked for loans of more than 3 million Euros). Publicly available balance sheet informa-
tion, e.g. provided by BankScope, does not cover the complete banking sector. Especially
small Sparkassen and cooperative banks are missing. Although these banks are small,
their aggregate has a significant market share of SME finance in Germany (see Figure
1.4).
The data set used in this thesis overcomes the gap between detailed information on
both sides, on the side of firms and on the side of banks. The MUP covers nearly all
firms active in Germany. The MUP is maintained by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) but the data is collected by Creditreform, Germany’s largest rating
agency. Next to firm characteristics, such as firm age, industry coding, and ownership,
the data also contains information on a firm’s bank relationships, whereat the main-bank
relationship is identified. I constructed a panel of all banks including branches that can
be directly linked to the firm-main bank relationships in the MUP. Based on that link,
I aggregated information that helps to describe the banks’ portfolio, e.g. with respect to
industry specialization or the regional banking market. The resulting ZEW bank panel
consists of all universal banks active in Germany with detailed information on the portfolio
characteristics of each bank for the years 2000–2011.
I supplemented firm level data provided in the MUP with detailed information col-
lected in two surveys, the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and the KFW/ZEW Start-up
Panel. The MIP is a panel data set of mainly mature firms that allow studying innova-
tion activities of firms. The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is a computer assisted telephone
interview of newly established firms. It contains information from the start of business
7regarding entrepreneurial characteristics, firm’s investment, innovation activities, and fi-
nancing. Firms are tracked for several years. Firms in both data sets are stratified from the
MUP and can directly be linked to firm observations in the MUP. The generated datasets
allow to provide answers to the following research questions: Does survival of financially
distressed firms depend on their main bank relationship? Do main banks that are special-
ized in the firm’s industry eases a firms’ access to funds financing R&D projects? Does
a firms main bank choice depend on firm risk or the entrepreneurs demand for liquidity
insurance?
In summary, the three analyses yield the following results,
- Firms with a main bank relationship to a private bank have a higher probability of
becoming financially distressed.
- The type of the firm’s bank relationships does not affect the probability of default of
financially distressed firms.
- Financially distressed firms’ probability of market exit increases with the size of the
bank that serves as the firm’s main bank relationship.
- Financially distressed firms’ probability of market exit increases with the number of
bank relationships.
- Firms have a higher probability of becoming financially distressed, if their main bank
suffers from a high ratio of market exit within its portfolio. But, financially distressed
firm’s probability of market exit reduces with the share of market exits in the bank’s
portfolio.
- A bank’s industry market share positively affects R&D intensity of high-tech firms. But
an increasing industry portfolio share reduces the R&D intensity of high-tech firms.
- R&D intensity of high-tech firms decreases as the size of its main bank increases.
- High-tech firms have a lower R&D intensity if their main bank is a non-private than a
private bank.
- Newly established firms for which banks support in financial distress is of utmost im-
portance are more likely to choose non-private bank. But, there is no indication
that bank choice is affected by the firm’s probability of default at the start of the
business.
- Newly established firms that ask for bank finance in their initial year are more likely to
choose a non-private bank.
- Newly established firms for which favorable market conditions are of utmost importance
are more likely to choose a private bank.
- Banks with a high market share in the firm’s district and those that are specialized in
the firm’s industry are more likely to be chosen.
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These results of the analysis lead to very important insights into the functioning of
the relationship between various types of banks and their business clients. First, a bank’s
capability of offering relationship oriented banking depends on its own characteristics that
goes beyond its hierarchal structure. Firms with a relationship to a Sparkasse or cooper-
ative bank are less likely to become financially distressed. A potential explanation is that
non-private banks are more willing to absorb financial shocks from their customers and
firms are in the position to pay their bills in time. There is no robust evidence that the
the institutional background of the main bank also influences the firm’s survival probabil-
ity. I find “perversive incentives” similar to Peek and Rosengren (2005) that banks with
difficulties in their loan portfolio are more likely to keep distressed firms alive. However,
I also show that firms with a relationship with such a bank are more likely getting finan-
cially distressed in the first place. The results also confirm, that banks need to invest in
specialization in order to add value to their clients (Boot and Thakor, 2000). The finding,
that firms R&D investment is positively related with the bank’s industry experience can
be interpreted that those banks are more capable of evaluating new, uncertain projects.
However, banks also need to diversify their portfolio in order to compensate idiosyncratic
industry shocks and firms R&D intensity reduces with an increase of the industry share
in the bank’s portfolio.
Second, not all firms ask for relationship oriented banking. Depending on preferences
or business model, a firm demands a different degree of relationship oriented banking. The
results suggest that the firms can distinguish the bank’s business model by its type. Public
mandate or mission statements of non-private banks might make entrepreneurs belief that
these banks are more likely to help in an episode of financial distress. Private banks
instead, might be considered as much tougher in renegotiations. Furthermore, firms are
more likely to select banks with a high regional market share and industry specialization.
Firms therefore might take into consideration that those banks have a better knowledge
of the regional market and the firm’s industry and are more capable of evaluating the
project.
Chapter 2
The Role of Banks When Firms
are Financially Distressed
2.1 Introduction
Firm–bank relationships are special in reducing information asymmetries between bor-
rowers and lenders. Banks gain proprietary information when screening and monitoring
borrowers (Fama, 1985). Compared to holders of publicly traded debt, banks have more
incentives to use their own resources in order to evaluate the viability of firms (Diamond,
1984; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). As a consequence, banks make more efficient
decisions on liquidation versus renegotiation of firms (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).
In addition, banks have access to private information observing the behavior of firm man-
agement and can influence the firm’s decisions (Fama, 1985). This allows banks to ”lean
against the wind” and keep with their customers when they are most in need (Petersen
and Rajan, 1995). But banks differ with respect to the composition of their business client
portfolio and institutional background, which influences their ability and strategy to deal
with financially distressed firms.
In this study, I analyze the influence of the main bank characteristics on the survival
rate of financially distressed firms. In particular, I focus on the following questions: Does
the firm survival probability increase with its main bank’s ability to process soft infor-
mation? How do difficulties within the bank’s portfolio affect the survival of financially
distressed firms? Do firms with multiple bank relationships have coordination difficulties
and exit the market with a higher probability? How does local banking market competition
affect a bank’s ability to support financially distressed firms?
There is a growing literature on banking and financing of small and medium sized enter-
prises. While most studies are concerned with the access to finance, lending technologies,
and terms and conditions, only a few studies have focused on financial distress and bank
relationships. Dahiya et al. (2003) analyzed the effect of a firm’s failure on the value of
the bank. Studies on the recovery rates of distressed firms have tried to measure the effect
of firm or entrepreneurial characteristics on loss given default (e.g. Grunert and Weber,
2009). The studies most related to this one focus on banks’ role in reducing the costs of
financial distress in Japan during the 1990s (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Fukuda et al.,
2009; Shimizu, 2012). Compared to those studies, my data set allows analyzing the effects
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for all firm sizes under “normal” economic conditions.
For the empirical analysis, I use data on German firm–bank relationships to address
these questions. The data set represents a 10% random sample of German firms and covers
semiannual firm observations of the years 2000 to 2005. The data is collected by Creditre-
form, the largest German credit bureau. The data set contains firm characteristics such as
the firm’s industry, location, date of incorporation, main and further bank relationships.
It was supplemented with information from the ZEW Bank Panel concerning bank type,
bank portfolio, and local banking market characteristics.
My main findings are that firms with a main relationship with a smaller bank are
more likely to survive. Those banks tend to be more capable of processing soft informa-
tion. This type of information can be important for efficient liquidations of financially
distressed firms. Firms with multiple bank relationships have a lower probability of sur-
viving. Increasing local banking market competition also reduces the firm’s probability of
surviving. I find “perversive incentives” similar to Peek and Rosengren (2005) that banks
with difficulties in their loan portfolio are more likely to keep distressed firms alive. How-
ever, I also show that firms with a relationship with such a bank are more likely to become
financially distressed in the first place. A bank’s institutional background does affect the
firm’s distress probability. Firms with a relationship with a Sparkasse or cooperative bank
are less likely to become financially distressed. There is no robust evidence that the the
institutional background of the bank also influences the firm’s survival probability.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I introduce the hypotheses regarding
the relationship between firm–bank relationships and the survival of financially distressed
firms. In Section 2.3, I describe the German banking market and discuss potential influ-
ences due to institutional differences of German banks. In Section 2.4, I present the data
set and the empirical model. In Section 2.5, I present the results of the probit model of
the market exit of financially distressed firms. In Section 2.6, I employ a heckprob model
in order to control for potential selection biases. In Section 2.7, I discuss the results and
present further robustness checks. I conclude in Section 2.8.
2.2 Hypotheses
I build on several strands of the literature to derive hypotheses on the effect of a bank’s
ability to process soft information, bank loan defaults, multiple bank relationships and
local banking market concentration on a financially distressed firm’s probability of market
exit.
Soft information processing Banks can use different types of information when it
comes to financing or to renegotiating contracts (Berger et al., 2001; Main, 2006; Jimenez
et al., 2009). Stein (2002) distinguishes between hard and soft information. Hard infor-
mation can be verified, such as financial data or ratings. In contrast, degrees of trust or
character assessment can be described as soft information. It is produced by an agent, e.g.
a bank clerk, and cannot be directly verified by others. This type of information becomes
especially valuable once a firm is financially distressed and needs to restructure its debt.
Stein (2002) argues that banks are not alike in their ability to process soft information.
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More complex or hierarchically organized banks are less able to process soft information.
In the case of financially distressed firms soft information can have two effects. Either
bad hard information is supported and the firm gets liquidated, as it would without consid-
ering soft information, or soft information attenuates the bank’s decision. The liquidation
rate of financially distressed firms should therefore decrease with the main bank’s ability
to process soft information.
Hypothesis 1 Financially distressed firms’ probability of survival increases with its main
bank’s ability to process soft information.
Bank loan default rate The capacity of a bank to absorb financial shocks from a
firm in its portfolio by providing additional financing is restricted once the bank itself
suffers substantial losses. One should therefore expect that the probability of market exits
of financially distressed firms increases with the bank’s rate of loan defaults. In contrast,
Peek and Rosengren (2005) find that distressed Japanese banks keep financing weak firms.
They argue that troubled banks have an incentive to avoid the realization of additional
losses on their own balance sheet by allocating funds to borrowers in financial distress.
By avoiding or delaying the firm’s bankruptcy the bank is not required to report such
non-performing loans. Peek and Rosengren (2005) observed this phenomenon in Japan
during a period of economic crisis. I test whether this holds under “normal” economic
conditions for banks in a bank-based system.
Hypothesis 2 Financially distressed firms financed by banks which suffer losses have a
lower probability of closing than financially distressed firms financed by banks that do not
suffer from losses.
Multiple bank relationships Close relationships between a firm and its bank pro-
vide incentives for information production and monitoring, and allow for intertemporal
transfers (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Boot and Thakor, 2000). Sharpe (1990) and
Rajan (1992) argue that with repeated lending, a single bank relationship may not be
optimal. Superior information enables a single bank to extract monopoly rents. If this
hold-up problem is too severe, firms can reduce banks’ bargaining power using multiple
bank relationships. But for firms in financial distress, multiple bank relationships can be
problematic for two reasons. First, there is a free-rider problem in monitoring that leads to
inefficiencies in renegotiation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Rajan (1992) argues that an
increase in the number of bank relationships decreases the probability that a single bank
is pivotal in renegotiation and increases the cost of renegotiation. Second, there is a risk
of coordination failure, which increases with the number of lenders (Thakor, 1996). Co-
ordination is even more difficult if creditors are less concentrated (Bris and Welch, 2005).
Brunner and Krahnen (2008) find that for distressed firms in Germany, the probability of
coordination problems increases with the number of bank relationships, and decreases in
the concentration of bank debt. They also find that the length of a workout plan increases
and the likelihood of turnaround decreases with the number of banks coordinating.
Hypothesis 3 Financially distressed firms with multiple lenders have a higher probability
of closing than financially distressed firms with only one lender.
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Local banking market competition Banks need to invest in expertise in order to
act as a relationship lender and add value to borrowers (Boot and Thakor, 2000). An
important kind of added value for firms in financial distress is that banks with expertise
make more efficient liquidations (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Those banks are
better able to evaluate firm liquidation vs. going–concern value. This allows identifying
viable firms, rather than liquidating any distressed firm. Supporting those distressed
but viable firms is an implicit intertemporal contract. A monopolistic bank can charge
low payments during the period of financial distress and extract future surpluses. In a
competitive environment, banks cannot expect to participate in future firm’s profits. Once
recovered, firms switch if the bank charges a rate above the competitive level (Petersen and
Rajan, 1995). Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that increased interbank competition hurts
banks’ profits more from transaction than relationship lending. Relationship orientation
can therefore partially insure banks against pure price competition. But banks have less
incentives to invest in expertise as the degree of banking market competition increases.
Boot and Thakor (2000) further argue that relationship lending is more important in
competitive markets, as it provides less added value to borrowers. Banks in markets
with a high degree of competition would make less efficient liquidations and financially
distressed firms’ survival probability would be lower.
Hypothesis 4 The probability of the market exit of a financially distressed firm increases
with the degree of competition in the local banking market.
2.3 The German Banking Market
I test the hypotheses presented above with a data set on financially distressed German
firms. Bank ownership structure, and therefore governance, can provide banks with dif-
ferent risk taking incentives. Creditors and depositors demand higher interest rates as
compensation for an increased risk level. Creditors and depositors of protected banks
have lower incentives to monitor and punish banks’ risk taking behavior (Flannery, 1998).
Merton (1977) argues that bail out guarantees therefore limit this disciplinary effect of
markets, and banks have incentives to increase risk. But owners have a charter value that
reflects future income or influence. Owners with a high charter value tend to limit bank
risk taking in order not to lose their influence in the bank (Keeley, 1990). Those differ-
ences in governance can have direct and indirect effects on banks’ dealing with financially
distressed firms. Theoretical considerations do not suggest the direction of the overall
effect (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). Because banking systems
and bank governance differ across countries, I describe the German banking system and
the potential effects of the bank type on the survival of financially distressed firms.
The German banking system is often described as a “three pillar system”, consisting of
private, Sparkassen/Landesbanken, and cooperative banks, all of them active as universal
banks (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004; Engerer and Schrooten, 2004). Table 2.1 presents the
number of banks active in the years 2000–2005 by bank type. Table 2.10 in the Appendix
provides an overview of bank types and how banks are assigned to either groups.
The Sparkassen sector consists of Sparkassen and Landesbanken. Sparkassen are
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Table 2.1: German banking market by bank type, 2000–2005
Bank Type Year of observation
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Non-private banks 575 550 534 504 489 475
Sparkassen 562 537 520 491 477 463
Landesbanken 13 13 14 13 12 12
Cooperative banks 1,796 1,621 1,491 1,395 1,338 1,296
Private banks 498 478 463 438 420 415
Large banks 4 4 4 4 5 5
other commercial banks 494 474 459 434 415 410
Total 2,869 2,649 2,488 2,337 2,247 2,186
Note: The following banks are classified as large banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank,
Postbank, HypoVereinsbank (since 2004 after international mergers); Building societies, real estate spe-
cialized banks, and public banks with special purposes (e.g. Central Bank, development banks, etc.) do
not have main bank relations with businesses and are excluded from the analysis throughout the paper.
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (2012)
owned by the district or municipality, while Landesbanken are jointly owned by a federal
state and that state’s Sparkassen association.1 Throughout the years of observation,
Sparkassen and Landesbanken banks had a bail out guarantee.2 It is argued that these
guarantees weakened bank market discipline and increased banks’ risk taking (Fischer
et al., 2011). Local authorities hold the majority of the board of supervisors and the
boards’ chair is usually linked with the position of the district administrator (e.g., a city
mayor). Local politicians would lose their influence on the bank’s lending strategy when
it is in need of a merger due to high risk taking. The political influence is regulated by the
Sparkassen act and should ensure that Sparkassen achieve their mandate to provide finance
and financial services to the people, companies, and authorities within the business area
(e.g., article 6 SpG (2005), Engerer and Schrooten (2004)). In their mission statement,
Sparkassen promises to support firms “in critical periods [...] as long as economically
justifiable” (DSGV, 2008).
Table 2.2: Market shares within the German banking market by bank type (2000–2005)
Bank type Total Business Main bank relation
Assets Lending all small firms medium firms large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-private banks 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.29
Sparkassen 0.20 0.27 0.46 0.47 0.41 0.23
Landesbanken 0.27 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06
Cooperative banks 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.06
Private banks 0.37 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.46 0.64
Large banks 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.47
other commercial banks 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.16
Note: Market shares are estimated based on the total sum of bank total assets (column 1), credit volume of to
domestic enterprises and self-employed persons (column 2) and main bank relations (columns 3-6) related to firm
size. Firm size is classified as follows: <100 employees as small firms; >100 & <1,0000 employees as medium
firms; ≥ 1,000 & ≤50,000 employees as large firms.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011 (Columns (1)-(2)); ZEW Bank Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2011 (Columns
(3)-(6)); author’s own calculations.
1Some Landesbanken are jointly owned by two or more federal states. HSH Nordbank (Hamburg) is
the only Landesbank with a minority stake of a private investor (since 2006).
2The so-called Gewa¨hrtra¨gerhaftung and Anstaltslast provided an unlimited cover for the owners in
case of the bank’s distress, that led to lower refinancing costs compared to private banks. For competitive
reasons, both were abolished within the transition period from 19.07.2001 to 18.07.2005, while banks’ risk
from financial contracts are covered until 2015.
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In 2005 the Sparkassen had total assets averaging 2.2 billion Euros. Table 2.2 shows
that Sparkassen had the second largest market share in terms of total assets (column 1)
and the largest in terms of credit volume to domestic enterprises and self-employed persons
(column 2). Nearly half of all firms have their main bank relationship with a Sparkasse
(column 3). Landesbanken have the largest market share in terms of total assets. However,
only few and especially large firms have their main relationship with a Landesbank.
Cooperative banks are owned by individuals holding cooperative shares. Market
discipline is also reduced for cooperative banks, since shareholders are usually required to
make additional though restricted payments in case of insolvency. The aim of cooperative
banks is “promote the acquisition and the business of members” (Engerer, 2006). So
members of a corporate society, who are at the same time customers, have a high stake
in the bank and their charter value should reduce risk taking. The lending strategy of
cooperative banks is quite similar to that of Sparkassen and Hakenes and Schnabel (2010)
state that under most circumstances, cooperative banks can perform the same functions
as the Sparkassen. In 2005, they had on average 451 million Euros in total assets. Their
market share of business lending was 17 %, and their share of the number of main bank
relationships to enterprises, 27%.
Large banks and other commercial banks are in general private banks. Mostly, these
banks operate in the legal form of a public stock company or a limited liability company.
Owners’ liability is limited by their shares. There are no restrictions on private banks’
lending policies (Engerer, 2006) except overall banking regulation. In the period 2000–
2005, private banks had on average a market share in business lending of 33%. The market
share of the five largest banks accounts for 19%. Larger firms are more likely to have their
main bank relationship with a private bank (see Table 2 for details).
The differences in mandates or mission statements between private banks on the one
side and cooperative and Sparkassen sector banks on the other, should lead to a lower
survival probability of financially distressed firms that have a relationship with a private
bank. Banks with higher risk levels should have on average a higher probability of firm
distress within their portfolio. In addition, governance can effect competition in loan
markets. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that borrowers have risk-shifting incentives as
the interest burden increases. As documented by Sapienza (2004), protected banks can
pass on their lower refinancing costs to customers and offer lower interest rates for loans.
Firms financed by private banks that have relatively high interest rates should be more
prone to moral hazard and shift to riskier projects. Matthey (2010) argues that private
banks compete with non-private banks in debt repayment rather than simply on interest
streams. Private banks can offer transaction-based lending that rules out renegotiation
in financial distress in order to attract low-risk firms. The liquidation threat needs to be
credible in order to prevent high-risk firms from free riding. Private banks should therefore
be less likely to absorb the exogenous shocks from their clients and clients should have a
higher probability to default.
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2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Description of the Data Set
The core data comes from the MUP, maintained by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW). The MUP is a firm-level dataset based on data collected by Creditre-
form, the largest credit rating agency in Germany. Since 1999, ZEW receives a copy of
Creditreform’s whole firm-level data warehouse twice a year. These data are cleaned and
brought into a panel structure. The MUP covers almost all of the roughly 3.1 million firms
located in Germany. It contains information on the firm’s industry code, location, legal
form, size, owners, and owners’ characteristics. In addition, it provides information on the
creditworthiness, the main bank relationship, and up to five further bank relationships of
each firm.
For data processing reasons, I use only a 10% random sample of the total population of
economically active firms in all sectors except agriculture, the public sector, and holding
companies. The sample contains semiannual observations for the years 2000 to 2005. The
time period has been chosen for the following reasons. First, financial distress is defined as
a negative change in firm’s payment status between two observations. The MUP started
in 1999. The first panel observation is required for identification of financial distress.
Second, in 2005, unlimited state guarantees for Sparkassen sector banks were abolished
and important legislative changes concerning standards for the banks’ decision making
processes in lending became effective.3 Gropp et al. (2010) and Fischer et al. (2011)
show that Sparkassen sector banks increased their risk taking after this removal of state
guarantees. Third, it is necessary to observe financially distressed firms some time after
they became financially distressed in order to determine whether or not they close. In this
analysis, this period is defined to be two years. The restriction of episodes of financial
distress to the period prior to 2005 rules out any effect of the economic crisis which started
in 2008. The sample consists of 3,039,854 firm-year observations based on 319,423 firms.
Each firm in the sample is linked to the ZEW Bank Panel. The Bank Panel covers all
banks active in business lending within the sample period in Germany. It includes bank
characteristics, such as the banking group, bank size, market shares in business lending,
default of portfolio firms, as well as characteristics of the local banking market.
2.4.2 Distress and Market Exit
My interest is in exploring the effects of the main bank’s characteristics and the local
banking market conditions on the survival of financially distressed firms. To examine the
3EU legislation abolished state guarantees for Sparkassen sector banks in 2005. The Basle II accord came
into effect at the end of that period (Bundesamt fu¨r Finanzaufsicht letters 34/2002 (minimum standards
for business credit), 18/2005 (minimum standards for risk management), and European Union guidelines
2006/48 and 2006/49.)
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different hypotheses above, I estimate the following probit regression:
Default|Distress = β0 +β1 × Soft Information
+β2 × Bank Portfolio Default Rate
+β3 ×Multiple Bank Relationships
+β4 × Local Banking Market Competition
+β5 × Controls + ε
(2.1)
A natural choice in survival analysis would be a hazard rate model. Such a model would
require the identification of financial distress and market exit on a daily or at least monthly
basis. However, the interest is not in the estimation of the time elapsed between financial
distress and market exit.
Identification of financial distress I employ trade credit rating information identify-
ing episodes of financial distress. Petersen and Rajan (1994) used the level of trade credit
rating in order to identify financially constrained firms. Since I am interested in events
of financial distress, I deviate from the identification used by Petersen and Rajan (1994).
Two conditions must hold: First, a firm’s credit rating needs to decline from the previous
period. Second, the new credit rating must be poor.
Table 2.3 presents a description of the payment status categories of the MUP. The
payment status of a firm worsens if a firm moves to a category with a higher number.
Changes from unknown to known payment status are ignored because it cannot be inferred
whether or not the payment status worsens. There is a sufficiently large number of firms
which recovered. In total, 66,069 cases of payment status decline are identified. A firm is
defined as becoming financially distressed if it moves to category 4 (poor), 5 (bad), or 6
(junk) from any other category. In total, 47,626 episodes of distress are observed.
Table 2.3: Classification of payment status in the MUP
Code Payment Sta-
tus
Description Decline in pay-
ment status
Distress
0 unknown No information provided
1 excellent Cash discount; does not use trade credit
2 sound Within term of payment, makes use of trade credit Yes
3 fair Minor problems; occasionally payments are made later
than term of payment
Yes
4 poor Exceeds the agreed payment term up to 30 days /
payment reminders
Yes Yes
5 bad Exceeds the agreed payment term up to 3 months or
longer / several payment reminders
Yes Yes
6 junk Severe payment problems / Insolvency procedures Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the classification of the firms status of payment by Creditreform. Decline in payment
status is defined as a worsening of payment status code compared to the previous period. Observations with
class 0 in the previous period are neglected. Distress is defined if a decline in payment status end up in code
four to six.
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011
Identification of firm closure The MUP contains two sets of information allowing
the identification of a firm closure. First, information on insolvency procedures, because
insolvency regulation is binding for limited liability firms. The vast majority of insolvent
firms were liquidated. Only in rare cases was insolvency procedure used to restructure the
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firm. Unless the firm was restructured, I consider the date of opening the procedure as
the date of market exit. Second, information on firms which voluntarily closed without
insolvency procedure. During its inquiries, Creditreform collects information on those
market exits including the approximate date of market exit.
Unfortunately, I can not observe whether a bank applies an audit to distinguish be-
tween viable and non-viable firms, or if a renegotiation has taken place. However, I can
distinguish between firms that survive and those that exit the market. From this finding,
I can infer that surviving firms successfully renegotiate debt contracts.
I consider market exit within a two-year period after facing financial distress as being
related to the fact of having been financially distressed. I estimate the probability that
financially distressed firms closed in period t and the following four periods n, where each
period n takes six months.
2.4.3 Main Explanatory Variables
The main explanatory variables are provided in the MUP. The definitions and descriptives
statistics of the main explanatory variables are provided in Table 2.5. The bank type is
assigned according to the bank groups described above. Table 2.4 shows the univariate
results of bank type on a decline in payment status, financial distress and exit rate. Of the
firms which have a private bank as a main bank 2.4% experience an episode of payment
decline and 1.8% an episode of financial distress. Of firms with a Sparkasse or cooperative
bank as their main bank, the shares of payment decline and financial distress are signifi-
cantly lower. The share of financial distressed firms that closed was 61.0% for firms with
a private bank as their main bank relationship. The share of financially distressed firms
that closed was lower for firms with a Sparkasse (56.6%) or cooperative bank (55.6%) as
their main bank relationship.
Table 2.4: Bank type, distress, and market exit
Private Sparkassen Cooperative Total
banks banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decline in payment status Number 18,792 29,396 17,881 66,069
% 2.42 2.17 2.28 2.27
Test private vs. *** ***
Distress Number 13,660 21,392 12,574 47,626
% 1.76 1.58 1.6 1.63
Test private vs. *** ***
Market Exit (if distressed) Number 8,337 12,110 6,994 27,441
% 61.03 56.61 55.62 57.62
Test private vs. *** ***
Note: The rows denoted with “Number” present the count of cases within the sample. The rows denoted with
“%” give the percentage of firms with the particular bank type as main bank relation to which the respective
variable applies. The rows “Test private vs.” present test statistics of mean differences between private banks
and either Sparkassen or cooperative banks. *,**, and *** denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels
of significance.
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, author’s own calculations.
Hypothesis 1 states that there is a negative relation between a firm’s market exit and
its main bank’s ability to process soft information. I test whether β1 > 0 in Equation
4.1. Williamson (1973) argues that size is a proxy for organizational complexity and
that larger organizations are generally more hierarchically structured. Soft information
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describes a banks’ knowledge of the firm or entrepreneur that can not be codified, such as
trustworthiness, and is difficult to diffuse through the bank’s hierarchy. In the empirical
banking literature, bank size is often used as a proxy of a bank’s ability to process soft
information (e.g. Stein, 2002; Berger and Black, 2011). Bank size is usually measured
by the bank’s total assets. In the publicly available data bases for bank balance sheet
information, such as Bankscope, the total assets are missing for a large share of the banks.
This would reduce the sample size significantly. Therefore, I measure “bank size” as the
total labor force of the firms for which the bank serves as the main bank. The Spearman
rank correlation between the total assets reported in Bankscope and bank size provided
in the ZEW Bank panel varies between 0.72 and 0.80 for the years 2000–2005 and are
significant at the one percent level.
The nearly full coverage of the stock of firms by the MUP allows generating information
about the portfolio characteristics of each bank. Related to hypothesis 2, I test for β1 > 0
in Equation 4.1. Bank loan default rate considers the potential losses a bank faced in a
particular year. This measures the share of firms closing in a given year in proportion to
the number of portfolio firms (bank size; both weighted by the number of employees of
their portfolio firms).
Hypothesis 3 asserts that firms with multiple bank relationships are more likely to exit
the market, and I test for β2 > 0 in Equation 4.1. The MUP contains information of a
firm’s main bank and up to five further bank relationships. The median of the variable
Number of Bank Relations is one while the mean is 1.28. These figures are considerably
lower than found by other studies concerning Germany. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) report
a median of five relationships to banks and Ongena and Smith (2001) find that the number
of relationships is eight on average, while the median is five. The reason for this difference
is that average firm size in the data at hand is significantly lower than for the other studies,
while the number of banks is positively correlated with firm size. Firms with multiple bank
relations also have better ratings (10 point mean difference; rating varies between 100 and
600 points). The MUP does not contain information on each bank’s financing share, which
would be useful for controlling for multiple but asymmetric relationships. The effect is
therefore rather underestimated.
The nearly full coverage of the MUP is also used to measure the degree of local market
competition in order to test hypothesis 4, whether β4 > 0 in Equation 4.1. I consider
the local banking market to correspond with the administrative districts (Landkreise and
kreisfreie Sta¨dte). A bank is assigned to a district if at least one of its branches is located
in this district. In the literature on competition in banking markets, variables describing
the market structure are commonly used (Degryse and Ongena, 2008). Bank intensity
is calculated as the ratio of banks active in business lending in a district per capita.
This variable captures the possible alternative bank relationships a firm can have. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of squared market shares in
the main firm–bank relationships in a district. However, bank intensity and the HHI
do not necessarily describe competition. Local market concentration is often negatively
related with market size, and market share could just reflect a bank’s efficiency (Degryse
and Ongena, 2008). Firms’ switching between banks can be considered as an alternative
measure identifying that banks compete against each other and attract new customers. In
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regions with low competition on the banking market firms are locked in a bank relationship
and banks can extract rents. In regions with a high level competition in the banking
market, firms can more easily switch. In such regions, banks can only extract rents to a
lower extent and are less able to invest in specialization (Boot and Thakor, 2000). I use
the ratio of firms that switch their main bank relationship to the total number of firms in
the district. Recall that in the period of interest, a significant number of banks merged.
Bank merger causes a discontinuity in relationships and firms are more likely to switch
their bank relationship (Degryse et al., 2011). In order to rule out such merger effects, I
consider only firms whose house bank was not involved in a merger. On average 0.8% of
all firms in a district change their main bank within a six-month period. The maximum
of bank switches was 7%.
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics – Main explanatory variables of financially distressed firms
Variables Explanation Mean Min Max
Sparkasse 1 if a public bank is the main financ-
ing partner
0.45 0 1
Cooperative Banks 1 if a cooperative bank is the main
financing partner
0.26 0 1
Bank size =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b × Empi 44,836 49 476,952
Bank loan default rate (emp wght) =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b×Empi|firmclosure=1
Banksizeb
2.01 0.01 42.93
local bank competition (intensity) Number of banks active in the firm’s
district per capita
0.01 0.00 0.02
local bank competition (HHI) =
∑District
d=1 (
Firmi,b
Firmi,d
)2b 0.23 0.07 0.63
local bank competition (switch) =
∑District
d=1 Firmi,d|switch main bank=1∑District
d=1
Firmi,d
0.01 0 0.07
No. of Bank relationships Number of bank relationships 1.22 0 6
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables used in the probit
regression of market exit of financially distressed firms. In this table, I use the following indices and
abbreviations: i for firm; b for bank; d for district; Emp for the number of employees.
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, author’s own calculations.
2.4.4 Control Variables
In line with other studies on firm survival, I include several variables grouped as internal or
external factors factors. The definitions and descriptive statistics of the control variables
are provided in the Table 2.11 in the Appendix. 38% of financially distressed firms faced
two or more episodes of financial distress covered by the variable History of Distress.
Almost one-third of all firms are Limited liability companies. Real Estate is an indicator
variable that residential, commercial, or mixed property is owned by either the firm or
the entrepreneurs. This property can either be used as collateral or liquidated in order to
repay debt. For almost one-third of all firms, real estate could be used. Debt collection is
unity if Creditreform was asked to collect debt from the firm in the particular period. The
outcome of debt collection can be further distinguished as still open, repaid completely,
partly, or unpaid.
The vast majority of firms is run by a single person. Only 8% are managed by a
team, while for 17%, no information on management team is available. 10% of all firms
are run by entrepreneurs with a certificate of Master Craftsman and 9% with a university
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degree as their highest educational level.4 The average firm size is 12 employees and the
average firm age is 17 years in the full sample. In contrast, financially distressed firms are
smaller (seven employees) and younger (an average age of 7.4 years). 25% of the sample
firms are younger than eight years but 60% of financially distressed firms are younger
than eight years. The variables change in local number of market exits and East Germany
cover regional differences of business environments. I further control for industry and year
effects.
2.5 Results of the Probit Regression
In this section I present the results of a probit regression of the cross-sectional sample
of financially distressed firms on their market exit. The model is estimated after the
period of financial distress and up to four of the successive periods, in order to take into
account any delay in the borrower’s or lender’s decision making process, as well as any
delay in observing the firm’s market exit. Robust clustered standard errors are used, due
to existence of firms with multiple episodes of financial distress during the sample period.
Table 2.6 presents the marginal effects of the main explanatory variables.5 Columns
(1)–(2) present the base specification, including the bank type; columns (3)–(4) include
further variables for the local banking market competition and multiplicity of bank rela-
tionships, and columns (5)–(6) include the bank size and the bank portfolio default rate.
All specifications include the full set of control variables.
Characteristics of the main bank and local banking market The results of the
main explanatory variables from estimating Equation 4.1 support the hypotheses. I find
that the probability of a financially distressed firm’s exiting the market increases with the
size of its main bank. The marginal effect of bank size is not significant immediately after
the event of a firm’s financial distress, but is positively significant from the third period
on. Larger banks usually are more hierarchically structured and are less able to process
soft information. Bank size and hierarchy influence the guidelines about the handling
of financially distressed firms. For example, it has been specified whether a firm is still
supervised by its account manager or has been passed on to a specialized department.
This finding suggests that larger banks have stricter guidelines. Soft information, such as
trustworthiness, cannot be codified, and only with difficulties is it passed on to the new
account manager. The new department is less likely to process soft information, but more
likely to liquidate such a firm.
The findings for the Bank portfolio default rate support hypothesis 2. An increasing
loan default rate in business lending has a negative effect on subsequent market exit. The
effect on market exit remains stable over all estimated periods. This supports the findings
on the perverse incentives of troubled banks to minimize additional losses on the balance
sheet by Peek and Rosengren (2005).
The results also support hypothesis 3 and suggest that financially distressed firms
4A master certificate represents a higher degree of business qualification awarded either by the chamber
of industry and commerce or the chamber of crafts.
5Table 2.13 in the Appendix provides regression results of the full list of variables.
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Table 2.6: Main results – Market exit given financial distress (marginal effects after probit)
Base Loan Default Full
Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit
in t+1 in t+4 in t+1 in t+4 in t+1 in t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sparkasse 0.029* 0.008 0.028 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cooperative Bank 0.002 -0.018 -0.002 0.013
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Bank size (ln) -0.002 0.016**
(0.01) (0.01)
Bank portfolio default rate -0.012** -0.016*** -0.013** -0.013**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Local bank market 5.972*** 3.661** 5.706*** 3.705** 5.741*** 3.476**
competition (switch) (1.44) (1.47) (1.58) (1.62) (1.58) (1.62)
No. of bank relationships 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.045***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: This table presents the marginal effects of selected variables after probit regression of financially
distressed firms. Marginal effects are presented for the period directly (t+1; half year) and 4 periods
(t+4; 2 years) after the episode of financial distress. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**,
and *** denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels of significance.
Source: MUP (ZEW), 2012, author’s own calculations.
located in more competitive local banking markets have a higher probability of market
exit. The economic effect is also large for both events. This finding suggest that banks
within a competitive environment are less able to generate revenues from good customers
to compensate for any potential losses due to distressed firms. Even more importantly, the
bank cannot build on an inter-temporal contract because it faces the threat that distressed
firms’ are more likely to switch once recovered. There might be a potential concern that
switching rate is more a measure of regional economic performance than bank competition.
This would be the case if switching behavior depend on firm risk. Further analyses does
not indicate such a relationship. The rating of firms that will switch within the next two
years is slightly better than those firms that stay with their main bank relationship (4
points mean difference in rating; rating scales varies between 100 and 600 points). The
rating of firms that did switch within the previous two years is lower (25 points mean
difference) than of firms that stayed. Next to the small differences in mean rating one has
to take into account that the average switching rate at the district level is approximately
1%. For robustness checks I included the the change in insolvencies on the state level, as
well as regional GDP growth and the change in the local number of market exits (both on
the district level). Both variables are insignificant and do not have severe effects on local
switching rate.
Similar effects can be found at the firm level. Firms with multiple bank relationships
have a better rating, general. Those firms should be better able to arise financing from
there lenders. However, an increasing number of bank relationships of financially distressed
firms increases the probability of market exit. There are two related explanations. First,
firms with multiple bank relationships can generally switch more easily and the main
bank is less willing to offer an inter-temporal contract. Second, an increasing number
of stakeholder increases the difficulties in coordinating the various bank lenders. This
finding is in line with previous studies on debt renegotiation and restructuring (Franks
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and Sussman, 2005; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008).
The effects of the bank type on the market exit of financially distressed firms is not
robust. There is a positive effect on leaving the market from firms with a main bank
relationship with a Sparkasse in the first period after financial distress. However, this
effect is significant only at the 10 % level and vanishes in later periods. There are no
significant effects of the bank type cooperative bank on market exit.
Results of control variables There are further interesting results about the control
variables. There is a negative effect of real estate, owned by the firm or the entrepreneurs,
on market exit. Firms or entrepreneurs that are able to offer real estate property for
securitization have a lower probability of exiting the market. Firms possessing the legal
form of a limited liability company are more likely to become financially distressed but
also have a higher probability of subsequential market exit. This is in line with Harhoff
et al. (1998), who found that high-risk firms are more likely to choose limited liability as
the legal form.
Creditreform also offers debt collection for trade credit partners. Firms from which
Creditreform was asked to collect debt have a lower probability of market exit. Further
analysis showed that this result is driven by firms that were able to repay the debt com-
pletely or at least in part. Firms for which debt collection is still going on have some
chance of repaying their debt. Those firms still have a lower probability of market exit,
although the economic effect is lower compared to full or part repayment. Only firms for
which Creditreform was unable to collect debt have a higher probability of market exit.
Firm age is found to have a non-linear negative effect on market exit. This finding
is consistent with the literature on firm survival (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). With
increasing firm age, the probability of surviving financial crises increases substantially.
In contrast to other studies (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995), I find a positive effect of
firm size on market exit probability. Only for very large firms do I find the market exit
probability decreasing.
There are two interesting results regarding firm exit in connection with regional aspects.
First, even 10 to 15 years after the reunification, firms located in East Germany are more
likely to exit the market. This reflects still existing regional differences in product and
banking markets in spite of the time passed since German reunification. Second, financially
distressed firms in regions with an increasing rate of market exits have a negative effect
on the probability of firm market exit.
2.6 Heckprob Model on Financial Distress and Market Exit
The results presented above require that a change in payment status is observed. One
could argue that the observation of a change in payment status is related to the main
explanatory variables or to the data generating process. To control for potential biases, I
estimate the probability of a firm’s financial distress in a first step, and its probability of
market exit in a second step. I employ the empirical model of a heckprob that is closely
related to Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) in order to control for a potential error term
correlation of both steps.
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Model identification requires an exclusion restriction, a variable that affects the selec-
tion equation but does not affect the main equation. Those variables should be correlated
with the change in the firm’s mode of payment status or affects the probability that such
an event is observed. However, those variables should not be correlated with a firm’s
subsequent market exit (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
2.6.1 Exclusion Restrictions
I use three variables as exclusion restrictions that cover different aspects of the data gener-
ating process. These variables should affect the likelihood that a decline in payment status
is observed by Creditreform. Once Creditreform has downgraded a firm’s payment status,
the firm is most likely to be under current observation. Therefore, there is neither a reason
to believe that the same variables have an influence on the observation of market exit nor
on the market exit itself. Table 2.7 presents the descriptive statistics and definitions of
the exclusion variables and the main variables for the selection equation.
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics of main explanatory variables – Selection equation
All firms
Variables Explanation Mean Min Max
Exclusion restrictions
Quality Index Index of investigation quality of Creditrefom
branches per period. Index varies between 0 (low-
est quality) and 1 (highest quality). Index reflects
the range of the predicted common factor after fac-
tor analysis of the following five components: 1.
Share of firms with missing date of foundation; 2.
Share of missing date of business registration for
limited liabilities; 3. Missing information on the
number of employees; 4. Share of active firms in-
vestigated; 5. Mean time elapsed between date of
foundation and first observation.
0.51 0 1
Investigation 1 if firm was investigated by Creditreform staff in
the particular period.
0.22 0 1
same Hausbank (Creditreform
and firm)
1 if the firm and local Creditreform branch have
the same main bank relationship; zero otherwise.
0.23 0 1
Banking variables
Sparkasse 1 if a public bank is the main financing partner 0.47 0 1
Cooperative Banks 1 if a cooperative bank is the main financing part-
ner
0.26 0 1
Bank size =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b × Empi 46,327 13.00 476,952
Bank loan default rate (emp
wght)
=
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b×Empi|firmclosure=1
Banksizeb
1.90 0.01 46.15
local bank competition (inten-
sity)
Number of banks active in the firms district per
capita
0.01 0.00 0.04
local bank competition (HHI) =
∑District
d=1 (
Firmi,b
Firmi,d
)2b 0.23 0.07 0.63
local bank competition
(switch)
=
∑District
d=1 Firmi,d|switchmainbank=1∑District
d=1
Firmi,d
0.01 0 0.07
No. of Bank relationships Number of bank relationships 1.21 0 6
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables used in the heckprob regression
model. In this table, I use the following indices and abbreviations: i for firm; b for bank; d for district; Emp for
the number of employees.
Source: MUP (ZEW), 2012, author’s own calculations.
The probability that an episode of financial distress is observed should increase with
the quality of the investigation. I make use of the organizational structure of Creditreform.
Creditreform’s central business activities, subsidiaries, and joint ventures are all legally
united under the Creditreform AG which is owned by a society (Verband der Vereine
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Creditreform e.V.). But firm information is collected by 130 independent, regional, sepa-
rate companies that are members of this society. Even if investigation procedures adhere
to certain standards, the sources and quality may differ between Creditreform branches
(Almus et al., 2000). A branch with relatively “poor quality” is more likely to make an
error of the second type, not observing a deterioration of payment behavior of a financially
distressed firm.
I construct a Creditreform branch quality index. This variable is based on five measures
of different quality aspects, each calculated at the level of the local Creditreform offices
per period. First, the share of firms with missing date of foundation. Second, the share
of firms in the legal form of a limited liabilities missing the date of its first registration.
Third, the share of firms with missing information on the number of employees. Those
three pieces of information can usually be collected at little cost. In addition, firm age and
size are mostly reported as important variables predicting market exit (see for example
studies by Audretsch (1991) and Franks and Sussman (2005)). Fourth, the share of active
firms investigated in the particular period within the branch portfolio. The quality of the
data pool is assumed to increase with the share of up to date firm information. Fifth, the
mean time elapsed between the firm’s foundation and the first observation.6 Branches with
high quality and good business networks are more likely to shorten the time in identifying
new businesses in their region.7
I employ a factor analysis to predict the common factor of the described quality indi-
cators for each period (OECD, 2008). The eigenvalues of the first factor varies between
1.67 and 1.94 and the scoring coefficients have the expected signs. The index is a trans-
formation of the relative distances between the predicted factors and range between 0 and
1. An index value of one indicates the branch with the best quality in a given period.
Creditreform updates firm information either automatically, based on external informa-
tion, such as business register information, or investigation by own staff. It is more likely
that an episode of financial distress is observed if the particular firm was investigated in
this period. The dummy variable Investigation takes on the value one if Creditreform staff
did some investigations concerning the firm in the particular period, and zero otherwise.
In 23% of the firm-period observations, the firm and the local Creditreform branch
have a relationship with the same bank. I do not suppose that the banks violate bank
secrecy. However, Creditreform might use bank references for their own credit assessment.
Local branches could negotiate better terms and conditions for bank references if they
have a relationship with the particular bank themselves. Requesting references in such
cases more often would positively affect the identification of financial distress.
2.6.2 Results of the Heckprob Estimation of Distress and Market Exit
Table 2.8 presents the marginal effects of the exclusion restriction and the main explana-
tory variables of the heckprob model.8 I present three specifications. Columns (1)–(3)
6I use only firms that are observed for the first time with a known date of foundation.
7For confidentiality reasons, I do not report statistics of the individual variables describing Creditreform
branch quality.
8Table 2.13 in the Appendix provides regression results of the full list of variables for firm distress and
table 2.14 for firm exit.
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present the base specification, including banks’ rent seeking potential; columns (4)–(6)
present the bank types; and columns (7)–(9) present the variables concerning bank port-
folio characteristics. All specifications include exclusion restriction and the full set of
control variables. As in the probit regression model, I estimated the market exit after the
period of financial distress and through up to four succeeding periods. Robust clustered
standard errors are used, due to the existence of firms with multiple episodes of financial
distress during the sample period.
A Comparison of Tables 2.6 and 2.8 shows that the results of the main explanatory
variables remain stable after controlling for potential selection bias. The results from the
first step provide some interesting findings on their own. In addition, these lead to a better
understanding and interpretation of the findings on market exit.
Exclusion restrictions I find strong and significant results for the the Creditreform
quality index and investigation. The quality index is found to be both statistically and
economically significant. Creditreform branches with relatively higher quality are more
capable of detecting episodes of firms’ financial distress. A firm that was investigated by
the Creditreform staff in a particular wave has a higher probability that financial distress
is observed than does a firm without such an investigation. The variable that indicates
whether the same bank has a main relationship with the Creditreform branch and with the
firm is significant only in the base specification. The effect vanishes as soon as I control
for the type of the firm’s main bank relationship. The correlation coefficient ρˆ (see Table
2.14 in the Appendix) for the market exit regression is found to be significantly different
from zero at the 1% level. Estimates obtained from a normal probit model are likely to
be inefficient.
Heckprob–Main explanatory variables The effects of Bank Size on market exit
remain stable after controlling for potential selection bias. I find no evidence that firms
with a main relationship to a large bank face a higher probability of financial distress.
The results of the heckprob show a significant and negative effect of Bank Loan Default
rate on market exit, as in the previous probit regression. The results of the first heckprob
step show a significant and positive effect of Bank Loan Default rate on financial distress.
These findings support the interpretation of perverse incentives of troubled banks by Peek
and Rosengren (2005) only in part. Troubled or distressed banks are not willing or able to
absorb the financial shocks of their portfolio firms. Compared to sound banks, relatively
more clients of a troubled banks become financially distressed. A troubled bank then has
incentives to minimize additional defaults in their portfolio.
Local Banking market competition has positive effects on both financial distress and
market exit. The economic effect is also large for both events. Banks in competitive
markets where firms often switch their main bank relationship are less likely to absorb
financial shocks from their clients. In addition, renegotiation is more difficult and the
firms are more likely to exit the market. The reasoning behind this bank behavior is that
in competitive markets, good clients can easily switch. A bank that supports a financially
distressed firm cannot be sure to collect from the future profits of the firms that recover.
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A larger number of bank relationships has a significantly positive correlation with a
higher probability of financial distress. However, this effect is economically irrelevant. The
effect on market exit between the heckprob regression and the probit regression does not
vary significantly.
2.7 Discussion and Further Robustness Checks
In this section I discuss the influences of the type of the bank and the age of the firm on
the presented results.
Discussion of the bank type As discussed in Section 2.3, banks differ in their in-
stitutional background. These differences affect their liquidation policy as well as their
portfolio risk. In the first stage of the heckprob regression I control for several potential
influences. I find that firms with a Sparkasse or cooperative bank as their main bank have
a lower probability of becoming financially distressed. One explanation of this observation
is the Sparkassen and cooperative bank’s mission statement to support distressed but vi-
able firms. Let’s assume that a firm’s chance of receiving a financial shock is uncorrelated
with its main bank type. Non-private banks would be more likely to provide additional
finance for a firm hit by a financial shock. Such a firm would not need to delay payments
and is therefore not observed as financially distressed.
The institutional background of a bank also has a potential influences on its risk taking.
Merton (1977) argues that creditors and deposit holders of protected banks do not have
incentives to relate the level of demanded interest rates to the banks risk level. Banks
that lack such a disciplining market behavior have incentives to increase their portfolio risk
(Flannery, 1998). During the sample period, Sparkassen sector banks were protected by
guarantees provided by the local authorities. Keeley (1990) argues that bank risk-taking
is influenced by its charter value. The charter value (current value and future earnings)
is owner specific. If the bank goes bankrupt or must be sold, owners would not only lose
the current but the future value as well as their political influence on the bank’s business
policy. Due to this threat, protected banks tend to decrease risk taking.
The presented results could be biased by bank type if there are severe differences in the
portfolio risk between bank types. In general, a financially sound firm is more capable of
absorbing financial shock on its own, shifting internal funds. If a bank portfolio consists of
a larger share of sound firms, the probability should be lower that an episode of financial
distress of a portfolio firm is observed. The empirical findings on differences in the portfolio
risk are mixed. (Gropp et al., 2011) find evidence that the charter value effect dominates
the market discipline effect. Fischer et al. (2011) observed that risk taking increased for
Landesbanken after the abolishment of explicit public guarantees. Analysis from the MUP
(Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in the Appendix) show that the credit portfolio of Sparkassen sector
banks and cooperative banks is first and second order stochastic dominant over private
banks’ credit portfolio in terms of risk. Cooperative banks have the highest share of firms
with good risks. But tests on differences between bank types of the cumulative distribution
and kernel density are not significant. In contrast, (Iannotta et al., 2007) found that for
a sample of European banks, public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher
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insolvency procedure risk and Koetter et al. (2007) documented a high share of distress
bank mergers that are related to Sparkassen sector banks and cooperative banks. In the
regressions presented in this paper, I control for differences in portfolio risk structure using
the variable Loan default rate.
Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that relationship oriented banks invest in specialization.
The added value from specialization is that these banks make more efficient liquidations
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Furthermore, I am interested in whether surviving
firms from relationship oriented banks recover better from financial distress than do those
from transaction oriented banks. Therefore, I employ a test of differences in performance
measured by sales. I use a difference in difference approach. First, I calculate the difference
of sales between distressed but surviving firms with a private versus a non-private bank
for the baseline (immediately after an episode of financial distress) and a follow-up period.
Second, I calculate the difference between the baseline and follow-up period. For the
baseline period, I use sales observations of the first and second year after financial distress.
The follow-up period consists of the sales figures from between four to seven years after
the financial distress. I employ a difference in difference approach controlling for firm age,
industry, and years of the sales figures after financial distress. Sales figures are updated
infrequently in the MUP, resulting in a significant reduction in the number of observations.
Table 2.9: Performance of surviving firms after financial distress by bank type
Outcome Base line (1st and 2nd year after distress) Follow-up (4th-7th year after distress) DIFF-In-DIFF
Variable Public and Private Banks Diff Public and Private Banks Diff
and Coop. Banks (1)-(2) Coop. Banks (4)-(5) (3)-(6)
Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All available observations (No. of obs. 18,198)
Sales† 468.676 1933.68 1465.004 459.491 1220.543 761.051 -703.952
Std. Error 233.494 300.463 269.813 473.815 499.777 215.094 344.212
t 2.01 473.55 5.43 468.66 1923.09 1461.73 -2.05
P>t 0.045 0 0.000*** 0.332 0.015 0.000*** 0.041**
Single observation for follow-up period (No. of obs. 12,734)
Sales† 463.427 1940.956 1477.529 514.404 1107.27 592.867 -884.662
Std. Error 268.03 345.529 313.568 278.932 377.777 351.112 469.497
t 1.73 467.7 4.71 463.61 1989.59 1475.01 -1.88
P>t 0.084 0 0.000*** 0.065 0.003 0.091* 0.060*
Only firms with both, baseline and follow-up observations (No. of obs. 8,200)
Sales† 776.452 1903.492 1127.039 827.487 1555.703 728.216 -398.823
Std. Error 184.28 242.642 219.247 182.485 237.66 210.746 303.208
t 4.21 781.1 5.14 776.73 1952.85 1125.15 -1.32
P>t 0 0 0.000*** 0 0 0.001*** 0.188
Note: This table presents results of the difference in difference estimation of changes in sales of survived firms after
an episode of financial distress. Differences in Differences were estimated controlling for firm age, industry and
number of years after financial distress. Level of significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
† Sales in kEUR
Source: MUP (ZEW), 2012, author’s own calculations.
In Table 2.9 I present three difference in difference estimations. The upper panel
presents the results, pooling all available observations. It shows that the mean of sales for
non-private banks is in general lower than that of private banks. This is in line with the
previous results, that private banks tend to server larger clients. It also shows that firms
with private banks performed poorly compared to those with a Sparkasse or cooperative
bank as their main bank. The mean sales of firms with a Sparkasse or cooperative bank
reduced by 2% while for firms with private banks, it reduced by 37%. The results hold if
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I shrink the observations to the maximum distance in years between the financial distress
and reported the sales figures. I further limit the panel to firms for which sales figures
are observed in both the baseline and the follow-up period. Creditreform updates sales
figures for the larger firms more frequently. Smaller firms are more likely to have a main
relationship with a non-private bank. The reported mean of sales increases, while figures
for private banks are mainly unaffected. As in the middle panel, mean sales increase for
firms with non-private banks (+ 6.6%) and decrease for firms with private banks (- 18.3%).
The reported Diff-in-Diff is not significant.
Discussion of local banking market competition As discussed in the data section,
there is a broad literature on bank competition, applying various kind of measures. As a
robustness check, I use three different specifications of the local banking market compe-
tition. The Table 2.16 in the Appendix shows the regression results using the HHI, the
bank intensity, and the ratio of main bank switches as a proxy for local banking market
competition. Hypothesis 4 stated that firms have a higher probability of financial distress
when there is higher competition in the local banking market. To support the hypothesis
one should find a negative sign on the HHI, a positive on bank intensity and on switching
rate. For the HHI and bank intensity I find the reverse. These variables are also not
significant as to the probability of the market exit of a distressed firm. However, these
variables might be related to market structure and yet not reflect a bank’s rent-seeking
potential.
Discussion of firm age, main bank switching, and legal form The findings of
other firm survival studies suggest that young firms have a high probability of exiting the
market (Headd, 2000; Bates, 2005). For German firms, Egeln et al. (2010) found a peak
of market exit rate at the age of three to four years. As a robustness check, I re-estimated
the model when excluding young firms up to the age of seven years. The results on the
effects of the remaining sample of mature firms are presented in the Table 2.15 in the
Appendix. The results remain overall stable. Compared to the full model, I no longer
find a positive effect of bank size on market exit. In addition, the effect of competition in
the local banking market vanishes for mature firms in the regression up to two years after
financial distress.
Because the MUP started as a panel in 1999 the duration of firm-main bank rela-
tionships are unknown. Instead, a recent switch of the firm-main bank relationship is
observed. Firms that will switch their main bank relationship within the next tow years
have a slightly better rating than firms that will stay, whereupon the rating of recently
switched firms is poorer (see Section 2.5). Recently switched firms might have a less strong
relationship and are therefore more likely becoming financially distressed. An indicator
variable identifying firms that switched within the previous two years is insignificant and
main results remain stable. In a further specification, I excluded switching firms and again
the main results remain stable.
The available data as well as the corresponding empirical model have some limitations
that need to be considered for the interpretation of the results. The coefficients of Business
Register are found to be positive and highly significant in all periods and marginal its
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effects are considerable high. These findings are consistent with those presented by Harhoff
et al. (1998). However, as time goes by after an episode of financial distress, this effect
decreases, indicating that it takes longer to observe the voluntary market exit of firms not
publicly registered. Therefore, a sample selection problem might still exist.
Insolvency procedures are to be made public by the courts and information is incor-
porated in the Creditreform data base in a timely manner. But there is no centralized,
publicly available body of information on voluntary market exits, and identification is
based on Creditreform’s investigation efforts. Therefore, insolvency procedures could be
over-represented compared to voluntary market exits. An appropriate assumption would
be that firms which were not investigated or whose information was not updated for a
long time have closed. However, this would not solve the problem. Accordingly, the ob-
servations of deteriorating mode of payment are rare for these firms. Only limited liability
firms need to file insolvency procedures. In the regressions, the firm’s legal form controls
for the type of market exit.
In addition to firms exiting the market after financial distress, the panel also contains
observations on firms that fail without a deteriorating mode of payment. Three cases
can be considered. First, the deteriorating state is simply not observed. The selection
equation incorporated in the model should mitigate this possible selection bias. Second, a
firm’s status already refers to the worst case. For this reason, further deterioration is not
possible. The third case is related to the institutions of German bankruptcy legislation for
indebted firms. Those firms need to file for bankruptcy, while bankruptcy is for balance
sheet rather than for solvency reasons. Logically, a deteriorating status of the mode of
payment is not observed.
2.8 Conclusion
Banks can “lean against the wind” and keep financing troubled but viable firms. But
banks are not alike in their lending strategy, organizational structure, or rent seeking
potential, all of which are relevant to their ability to do so. I analyze the effects of bank
governance, bank size, loan default rate, a firm’s having multiple bank relations, and the
local banking market competition on a firm’s probability of becoming financially distressed
and subsequently exiting the market. I use a large sample of firms active in Germany in
the period 2000–2005.
The main findings are that larger banks are less able to process soft information once
firms are in financial distress. Those firms show a higher probability of leaving the market.
A firm’s probability of becoming financially distressed is higher if its main bank has a high
loan default rate. But those banks try to reduce additional losses on their balance sheet
and firms have a lower probability of exiting the market. Banks are less likely to act as
a relationship lender if they are active in a local banking market with a high degree of
competition.
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2.9 Appendix
Figure 2.1: Kerneldensity of bank type’s credit risk (2005)
Note: Credit rating score 1 indicates low and 6 high risk. Calculation is based on the number of firms financed by each bank type
where a credit risk score was assigned by Creditreform in August 2005.
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, Author’s own calculation.
Figure 2.2: Risk portfolio related by bank type (2005) – Cumulative distribution
Note: Credit rating score 1 indicates low and 6 high risk. Calculation is based on the number of firms financed by each bank type
where a credit risk score was assigned by Creditreform in August 2005.
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, Author’s own calculation.
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Table 2.10: Description of bank types within the German banking market
Bank type Bank or Banking Group Description
Private Banks Large banks: Deutsche Bank
AG, Commerzbank AG, Dres-
dner Bank AG1, HypoVereins-
bank2, Postbank3
Publicly listed companies.
other commercial and real es-
tate banks, branches of foreign
banks
In general, legal form of limited liabil-
ity; some are publicly listed companies;
including branches of foreign banks.
Public banks Sparkasse Owned by area municipalities.
Landesbanken4 Clearing houses for Sparkassen; Banks
are jointly owned by Sparkassen and
the La¨nder.
Cooperative banks Cooperative banks Owned by members of the cooperative
society.
Central bank for cooperative
banks5
Clearing houses for cooperative banks.
Banks jointly owned by cooperative
banks.
excluded public banks Deutsche Bundesbank Central bank.
Development / special purposes
banks6
Public development banks are govern-
mentally owned and operate either on
La¨nder or federal level.
1 Dresdner Bank AG merged with Commerzbank AG in 2008.
2 HypoVereinsbank merged with UniCredit in 2005.
3 Deutsche Postbank AG merged with Deutsche Bank AG in the period 2008-2010.
4 Following institutions are classified as Landesbanken: HSH Nordbank (before 2003: Hamburgische Lan-
debank, Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein), Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, in 2008), Landesbank
Rheinland-Pfalz Girozentrale (LRP; merged with LBBW in 2008), Landesbank Saar (SaarLB; since2002
(NORD/LB), Bremer Landesbank, Landesbank Berlin (LBB), Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB),
Landesbank Hessen-Thu¨ringen Girozentrale (Helaba), Landeskreditkasse Kassel, Landesbank Sachsen
(merged with mainly owned by BayernLB), Landesbank Baden-Wrttemberg / Baden-Wrttembergische
Bank (LBBW), Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB), Deutsche Kreditbank, DekaBank, Deutsche Wertpa-
pier Service Bank AG, NLB FinanzIT, LBS.
5 Following institutions are classified as central banks for cooperative banks: DZ Bank AG, WGZ Bank
AG(Westdeutsche Genossenschaftliche Zentralbank), Deutsche Apotheker und A¨rztebank eG.
6 Following institutions are classified as public development banks: Landestreuhandbank Rheinland-
Pfalz, LfA Fo¨rderbank Bayern, L-Bank, Investitionsbank Berlin, Investitionsbank des Landes Branden-
burg, Bremer Aufbau-Bank GmbH, Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt, LTH-Bank fu¨r Infrastruktur,
Investitionsbank Hessen, Landesfo¨derinstitut Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen-Bank (N-Bank),
Investitions- und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz (ISB) GmbH, Sa¨chsische Aufbaubank, Investitionsbank
Sachsen-Anhalt, Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein, Thu¨ringer Aufbaubank, Kreditanstalt fr Wiederauf-
bau (KfW), Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA, merged with KfW in 2003).
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Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics of control variables
All firms Firms in financial distress
Variables Explanation Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
History of Distress Number of previous episodes of distress 0.03 0.19 0 4 0.38 0.63 0 4
Limited liability 1 if the company has the legal form of a
limited liability (GmbH, GmbH & Co.
KG) or stock company (AG, SE).
0.29 0.45 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1
Real Estate 1 if either residential, industrial or
mixed property is owned
0.31 0.46 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1
Debt Collection
(all)
1 if CREDITREFORM is commis-
sioned to collect debt from the partic-
ular firm
0.08 0.28 0 1 0.54 0.50 0 1
Debt collection
open
1 if debt collection is not yet finished 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
Debt collection
paid
1 if debitor completely payed back the
debt CREDITREFORM was asked to
collect.
0.02 0.13 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1
Debt collection
partly paid
1 if debitor payed back a part of the
debt CREDITREFORM was asked to
collect.
0.00 0.06 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1
Debt collection un-
paid
1 if the debtor was unable to pay back
the debt CREDITREFORM was asked
to collect.
0.01 0.11 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1
Management Team Number of entrepreneurs or Number of
management board members.
0.08 0.28 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1
Management Team
M
1 if the number of entrepreneurs or
number of management board mem-
bers is unknown.
0.17 0.37 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Master Craftsman 1 if the highest educational degree of
all the members of the management
team is a master certificate received
from the chamber of industries and
commerce or the chamber of crafts.
0.10 0.30 0 1 0.08 0.28 0 1
Academic 1 if the highest educational degree
within the management team is a
University degree (either a German
diploma, degree of doctor, or profes-
sorship).
0.09 0.28 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Firm size Number of employees 11.64 284.09 1 50,000 7.39 59.49 1 9,249
Firm age Firm age in years 16.90 34.06 0 1004 13.05 29.12 0 995
Firm age cat. 1 1 if firm age is between 0 an 2 years 0.05 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1
Firm age cat. 2 1 if firm age is between 3 and 7 years 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1
Firm age cat. 3 1 if firm age is between 8 and 12 years 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Firm age cat. 4 1 if firm age is between 13 and 19 years 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1
Firm age cat. 5 1 if firm age is between 20 and 49 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1
Firm age cat. 6 1 if firm age is 50 years or older 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.01 0.12 0 1
Firm age unkown 1 if date of foundation is unknown 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.08 0 1
change in market
exit
Percentage change in the number of
market exits on the district level.
1.10 0.52 0.12 12.19 1.10 0.51 0.12 12.19
East Germany 1 if firm is located in East Germany 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.29 0.46 0 1
Cutting edge tech-
nology
1 if Cutting Edge Technology 0.01 0.07 0 1 0.00 0.06 0 1
High technology 1 if High Technology 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1
Low-tech manufac-
turing
1 if Manufacturing 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
High-tech services 1 if Technology-intensive Services 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
Knowledge inten-
sive services
1 if Consultancy 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Corporate oriented
services
1 if Industry/corporate-related Ser-
vices
0.04 0.20 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
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Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics of control variables
All firms Firms in financial distress
Variables Explanation Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Consumer oriented
services
1 if Consumer Services 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.21 0.40 0 1
Energy and Mining 1 if Energy and Mining 0.00 0.05 0 1 0.00 0.03 0 1
Construction 1 if Construction 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
Trade 1 if Trade 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
Transportation 1 if Transportation and postal services 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Financial services 1 if Financial services 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.03 0.16 0 1
Industry unknown 1 if Industry code unknown 0.01 0.07 0 1 0.00 0.06 0 1
Year 2000 1 if year is 2000 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Year 2001 1 if year is 2001 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.14 0.34 0 1
Year 2002 1 if year is 2002 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.17 0.39 0 1
Year 2003 1 if year is 2003 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1
Year 2004 1 if year is 2004 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1
Year 2005 1 if year is 2005 0.16 0.40 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
No. of observation 2,477,819 45,256
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the probit and heckprob regression.
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, author’s own calculations.
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Table 2.12: Results of probit regression – Marginal effects
(full set of variables)
Base Loan Default Full
Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit
in t+1 in t+4 in t+1 in t+4 in t+1 in t+4
Sparkasse 0.029* 0.008 0.028 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cooperative Bank 0.002 -0.018 -0.002 0.013
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Bank size (ln) -0.002 0.016**
(0.01) (0.01)
Bank portfolio default rate -0.012** -0.016*** -0.013** -0.013**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Local bank market 5.972*** 3.661** 5.706*** 3.705** 5.741*** 3.476**
competition (switch) (1.44) (1.47) (1.58) (1.62) (1.58) (1.62)
No of bank relations 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.045***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Real estate -0.158*** -0.139*** -0.162*** -0.150*** -0.162*** -0.146***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Management team 0.029 -0.052 0.017 -0.059 0.017 -0.059
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Management team MV 0.053** 0.0 0.041* -0.009 0.042* -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Master Craftsman -0.048** -0.087*** -0.053** -0.086*** -0.053** -0.086***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
University degree -0.028 -0.037 -0.021 -0.034 -0.021 -0.034
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Limited liability 0.476*** 0.532*** 0.471*** 0.515*** 0.471*** 0.515***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Debt collection -0.220*** -0.122*** -0.239*** -0.132*** -0.239*** -0.132***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
History of MoP decline -0.023** 0.009 -0.025** 0.006 -0.025** 0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firms size (emp, ln) 0.01 0.073*** 0.016 0.075*** 0.016 0.076***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm size2 0.064*** 0.041*** 0.061*** 0.040*** 0.061*** 0.040***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm size3 -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm age 3 - 7 -0.029 -0.082*** -0.024 -0.077*** -0.023 -0.077***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm age 8 - 12 -0.098*** -0.227*** -0.075*** -0.213*** -0.075*** -0.214***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm age 13 - 19 -0.145*** -0.292*** -0.120*** -0.278*** -0.120*** -0.279***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm age 20 - 49 -0.154*** -0.330*** -0.138*** -0.324*** -0.137*** -0.326***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm age > 49 -0.105** -0.308*** -0.108** -0.311*** -0.107** -0.312***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Firm age unknown -0.064 0.018 -0.013 0.06 -0.012 0.057
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
∆ local market exits -0.016 -0.014 -0.022* -0.027** -0.022* -0.027**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
East Germany 0.127*** 0.118*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 0.143*** 0.131***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cutting edge technology 0.105 -0.168 0.082 -0.193* 0.082 -0.192*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
High technology -0.062 -0.094 -0.104 -0.141* -0.104 -0.142*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Low-tech manufacturing -0.061** -0.054* -0.071*** -0.055* -0.071*** -0.054*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High-tech services 0.007 -0.037 0.004 -0.043 0.004 -0.043
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Knowledge intensive services -0.082** -0.078** -0.084** -0.085** -0.084** -0.088**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Corporate oriented services -0.025 -0.003 -0.031 0.0 -0.031 -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Consumer oriented services -0.016 -0.019 -0.036* -0.039** -0.036* -0.040**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Construction -0.070*** -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.051** -0.064*** -0.051**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transportation and 0.025 0.057** 0.022 0.049* 0.022 0.048*
postal services (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Financial services -0.110*** -0.086** -0.155*** -0.112** -0.155*** -0.111**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry missing -0.242*** -0.240*** -0.191* -0.204* -0.190* -0.208*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Year 2000 -0.295*** -0.271*** -0.268*** -0.257*** -0.268*** -0.254***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year 2001 -0.163*** -0.124*** -0.154*** -0.117*** -0.154*** -0.115***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
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Table 2.12: Results of probit regression–Marginal effects (full
set of variables)
Base Loan Default Full
Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit
in t+1 in t+4 in t+1 in t+4 in t+1 in t+4
Year 2003 0.021 0.016 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year 2004 0.024 0.019 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year 2005 0.098*** 0.073*** 0.095*** 0.063*** 0.096*** 0.057***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant -0.245*** 0.190*** -0.258*** 0.235*** -0.232*** 0.062
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 54283 54283 45256 45256 45256 45256
LR Chi2 3343 3010 2934 2596 2934 2599
log likelihood -34896.52 -34946.6 -29102.49 -28961.09 -29102.4 -28957.38
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, author’s own calculations.
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Table 2.13: Estimation results Heckprob – Financial distress
(full sample)
Model: Basis Bank type Bank characteristics
Statistics: Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Dependent variable: Financial Dis-
tress
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quality Index 0.073*** 0.003*** 0.073*** 0.003*** 0.071*** 0.003***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Investigation 0.252*** 0.010*** 0.238*** 0.009*** 0.244*** 0.009***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Same Hausbank (Creditreform and
firm)
0.015*** 0.001*** 0.006 0 0.005 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Sparkasse -0.027*** -0.001*** -0.035*** -0.001***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Cooperative Bank -0.059*** -0.002*** -0.070*** -0.003***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Bank size (ln) -0.001 0
(0.00) (0.00)
Bank Loan Loss Provision (emp
wght)
0.013*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00)
Local bank competition (switch) 4.237*** 0.162*** 4.540*** 0.175*** 4.581*** 0.177***
(0.44) (0.02) (0.49) (0.02) (0.49) (0.02)
No of bank relations 0.021*** 0.001*** 0.012*** 0.000*** 0.012*** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firms size (emp, ln) -0.024*** -0.001*** -0.038*** -0.001*** -0.036*** -0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm age -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm age unknown -0.199*** -0.008*** -0.203*** -0.008*** -0.201*** -0.008***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Limited liability 0.019*** 0.001*** 0.028*** 0.001*** 0.028*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Int: Sparkasse x firm size 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.00) (0.00)
Int: cooperative bank x firm size 0.032*** 0.030***
(0.00) (0.01)
Int: Sparkasse x Investigation 0.017 0.018
(0.01) (0.01)
Int: Cooperative bank x Investiga-
tion
0.004 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01)
Debt collection 1.150*** 0.044*** 1.176*** 0.045*** 1.174*** 0.045***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
East Germany 0.081*** 0.003*** 0.075*** 0.003*** 0.069*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Delta local market exits 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cutting edge technology -0.079*** -0.003*** -0.076** -0.003** -0.072** -0.003**
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
High technology -0.034* -0.001* -0.022 -0.001 -0.022 -0.001
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Low-tech manufacturing 0.019** 0.001** 0.028*** 0.001*** 0.029*** 0.001***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
High-tech services -0.017* -0.001* -0.01 0 -0.013 -0.001
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Knowledge intensive services -0.001 0 -0.002 0 -0.003 0
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Corporate oriented services 0.063*** 0.002*** 0.063*** 0.002*** 0.064*** 0.002***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Consumer oriented services 0.059*** 0.002*** 0.063*** 0.002*** 0.064*** 0.002***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Construction 0.103*** 0.004*** 0.103*** 0.004*** 0.103*** 0.004***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Transportation and postal services 0.110*** 0.004*** 0.111*** 0.004*** 0.111*** 0.004***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Financial services 0.040*** 0.002*** 0.036*** 0.001*** 0.036*** 0.001***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Industry unkown -0.263*** -0.010*** -0.235*** -0.009*** -0.236*** -0.009***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Year 2000 -0.008 0 0.009 0 0.01 0
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Year 2001 -0.030*** -0.001*** -0.026*** -0.001*** -0.023*** -0.001***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Year 2003 -0.005 0 -0.007 0 -0.007 0
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Year 2004 -0.025*** -0.001*** -0.026*** -0.001*** -0.031*** -0.001***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Year 2005 -0.103*** -0.004*** -0.107*** -0.004*** -0.113*** -0.004***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
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Table 2.13: Estimation results Heckprob–Financial distress
(full sample)
Model: Basis Bank type Bank characteristics
Statistics: Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Dependent variable: Financial Dis-
tress
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -2.495*** -2.461*** -2.468***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Observations 3,040,000 2,540,000 2,477,819
LR Chi2 85,143 74,899 73,384
log likelihood -231,000 -195,000 -190,000
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, author’s own calculations.
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Table 2.14: Estimation results after Heckprob - Market exit
(given distressed; full sample)
Model: Basis Bank type Bank characteristics
Period after episode of distress: t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4
Dependent variable: Market Exit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sparkasse 0.030* 0.005 0.028 0.025
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cooperative Bank 0.003 -0.019 -0.001 0.022
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Bank size (ln) -0.002 0.013**
(0.01) (0.01)
Bank Loan Loss Provision (emp wght) -0.014***
(0.01)
Local bank competition (switch) 5.646*** 3.218** 5.661*** 3.136* 5.711*** 3.340**
(1.48) (1.49) (1.61) (1.63) (1.61) (1.65)
No of bank relations 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.039***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Real estate -0.143*** -0.123*** -0.147*** -0.133*** -0.147*** -0.132***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Management team 0.054* -0.034 0.049 -0.038 0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Management team unknown 0.062*** 0.007 0.051** -0.002 0.051** -0.005
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Master Craftsman -0.027 -0.067*** -0.026 -0.063** -0.026 -0.066**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
University degree -0.013 -0.024 -0.006 -0.023 -0.005 -0.022
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Limited liability 0.432*** 0.498*** 0.430*** 0.482*** 0.430*** 0.482***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Debt Collection open -0.366*** -0.251*** -0.365*** -0.236*** -0.362*** -0.234***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Debt Collection fully paid -0.935*** -0.726*** -0.948*** -0.719*** -0.945*** -0.717***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Debt Collection partly paid -0.484*** -0.375*** -0.497*** -0.374*** -0.494*** -0.369***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Debt Collection not paid 0.234*** 0.211*** 0.268*** 0.254*** 0.271*** 0.255***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
History of MoP decline -0.043*** -0.002 -0.048*** -0.008 -0.048*** -0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firms size (emp, ln) 0.019 0.089*** 0.025 0.091*** 0.026 0.091***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm size2 0.059*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.035** 0.057*** 0.034**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Firm size3 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm age 3 - 7 -0.001 -0.060*** 0.007 -0.053** 0.006 -0.056**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm age 8 - 12 -0.056*** -0.195*** -0.03 -0.179*** -0.031 -0.181***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Firm age 13 - 19 -0.095*** -0.252*** -0.065** -0.236*** -0.066** -0.237***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm age 20 - 49 -0.094*** -0.282*** -0.069** -0.270*** -0.072** -0.278***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm age > 49 -0.038 -0.244*** -0.043 -0.254*** -0.049 -0.252***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm age unknown -0.078 0.004 -0.024 0.051 -0.018 0.048
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
delta local market exits -0.011 -0.01 -0.014 -0.021* -0.013 -0.022*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
East Germany 0.103*** 0.092*** 0.117*** 0.102*** 0.118*** 0.107***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cutting edge technology 0.158 -0.13 0.143 -0.15 0.143 -0.153
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
High technology -0.053 -0.081 -0.104 -0.124* -0.104 -0.133*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Low-tech manufacturing -0.060** -0.052* -0.072*** -0.057* -0.071*** -0.052*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High-tech services 0.002 -0.043 -0.003 -0.045 -0.006 -0.051
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Knowledge intensive services -0.084** -0.081** -0.091** -0.097** -0.091** -0.090**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Corporate oriented services -0.036 -0.017 -0.04 -0.008 -0.039 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Consumer oriented services -0.025 -0.03 -0.042** -0.047** -0.041** -0.049**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Construction -0.085*** -0.074*** -0.083*** -0.068*** -0.083*** -0.066***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transportation and postal services 0.008 0.037 0.009 0.034 0.009 0.031
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Financial services -0.122*** -0.099*** -0.170*** -0.124*** -0.172*** -0.131***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
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Table 2.14: Estimation results after Heckprob – Market exit
(given distressed; full sample)
Model: Basis Bank type Bank characteristics
Period after episode of distress: t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4
Dependent variable: Market Exit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry missing -0.219*** -0.209*** -0.163 -0.16 -0.163 -0.182
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Year 2000 -0.314*** -0.280*** -0.288*** -0.266*** -0.287*** -0.269***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Year 2001 -0.163*** -0.121*** -0.149*** -0.108*** -0.150*** -0.114***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year 2002 0.032* 0.023 0.025 0.012 0.026 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year 2003 0.047** 0.037** 0.032 0.024 0.031 0.029
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year 2004 0.133*** 0.101*** 0.128*** 0.083*** 0.128*** 0.087***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.068 0.565*** -0.041 0.513*** -0.035 0.389**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
ρ Constant -0.128** -0.151*** -0.104* -0.127** -0.101 -0.124**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 3,040,000 3,040,000 2,540,000 2,540,000 2,540,000 2,480,000
LR Chi2 5,435 4,756 4,904 4,214 4,885 4,139
log likelihood -265,000 -265,000 -223,000 -223,000 -222,000 -219,000
Source: MUP (ZEW) 2011, author’s own calculations.
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Table 2.16: Regression results – Local banking market competition
Specification: HHI - Banking Market Bank Intensity Switch Main Bank
Distress Exit t+4 Distress Exit t+4 Distress Exit t+4
Quality Index 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.071***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investigation 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.244***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
same Hausbank 0.002 0.003 0.005
(Creditreform branch (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
and firm) 0 0 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sparkasse -0.039*** 0.023 -0.036*** 0.024 -0.035*** 0.025
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
-0.002*** 0.007 -0.001*** 0.007 -0.001*** 0.008
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Cooperative Bank -0.072*** 0.021 -0.073*** 0.019 -0.070*** 0.022
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
-0.003*** 0.005 -0.003*** 0.004 -0.003*** 0.005
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank size (ln) 0 0.014** -0.003 0.01 -0.001 0.013**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0 0.005** 0 0.004 0 0.005**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bank Loan Default Rate 0.013*** -0.014*** 0.013*** -0.015*** 0.013*** -0.014***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0.001*** -0.005*** 0.000*** -0.005*** 0.001*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
local bank competition 0.065*** 0.013 -3.492*** -5.03 4.581*** 3.340**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.95) (3.14) (0.49) (1.65)
0.002*** 0.007 -0.135*** -2.002 0.177*** 1.420**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (3.14) (0.02) (0.60)
No of bank relations 0.017*** 0.042*** 0.017*** 0.042*** 0.012*** 0.039***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0.001*** 0.016*** 0.001*** 0 0.000*** 0.015***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.016*** (0.00) (0.00)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.449*** 0.410** -2.393*** 0.480*** -2.468*** 0.389**
(0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.18)
athrho
Constant -0.126** -0.126** -0.124**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 2,480,000 2,480,000 2,480,000 2,480,000 2,480,000 2,480,000
LR Chi2 73,315 4,134 73,298 4,137 73,384 4,139
log likelihood -191,000 -219,000 -191,000 -219,000 -190,000 -219,000
Note: Coefficients and related standard errors are presented in the first and second row of each variable.
Marginal effects and related standard errors in third and fourth row. *,**, and *** denote significance
level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels of significance.
Source: MUP (ZEW), 2012, author’s own calculations.
Chapter 3
An Information Economics
Perspective on Main Bank
Relationships and Firm R&D
3.1 Introduction
Investments in R&D are crucial for firm success. They allow firms to produce unique
knowledge as the basis for distinctive products and efficient processes. Firms can increase
their competitiveness by investing in R&D and innovative firms face lower default proba-
bilities. Securing adequate funding for strategic investments in R&D is therefore directly
linked to firm performance. But there are shortcomings in capital markets providing funds
for R&D investments. These are typically explained by the nature of R&D projects, which
suffer both from information imperfections and asymmetries (for a comprehensive review
see Hall (2005)). Information imperfections stem from inherent uncertainties about the
technological and commercial viability of novel products for which no ex-ante probabilities
of success exist (Amit et al., 1990). Information asymmetries arise from the fact that firms
possess knowledge of the value of their R&D projects, which is superior to that of external
investors (Ahuja et al., 2008). These investors, therefore, bear the extra risk of hidden
information and hidden actions.
For the vast majority of firms, banks are the cornerstone for external financing. But
in theoretical or empirical models explaining financing of private R&D, banks are nearly
completely absent. It is assumed that banks suffer equally from information uncertain-
ties and asymmetries in the evaluation of R&D projects. Bank finance is seen to be
ill-equipped to provide necessary funding. The literature therefore considers available
funds for R&D investments as largely restricted to internal cash flows or venture capital
investments, whereupon venture capital investments are scarce. For Germany, the fourth
largest economy in the world with a population of roughly 3 million firms, Bureau van
Dijks ZEPHYER database records only 250 venture capital investments per year during
the last decade.
Banks’ role in financing R&D might be underestimated in the literature. We argue
that a firms main bank relationship can make a difference for its R&D investment and that
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some banks may be better equipped to support innovative firms than others. We address
this issue and develop a theoretical model of bank financing for firm R&D investment,
which rests on identifying heterogeneity among banks. Our approach challenges core
assumptions of existing literature, which treats banks as homogeneous in their inability
to obtain R&D related information of their clients and make adequate risk evaluations.
The identification of these heterogeneities among banks makes the bank choice a strategic
variable for managers.
We adopt a novel perspective based on information economics theory by challenging
the dominant assumption that all banks are equally subject to suffering from informa-
tion asymmetries in financing private R&D projects. We acknowledge that banks cannot
produce the relevant information on technological innovation themselves. However, banks
are uniquely positioned to aggregate the outcomes of the information production of other
firms in the industry in the client portfolio, i.e. information externalities (Stiglitz, 2002)
originating from heterogeneous client portfolios of different banks exist. We contrast this
perspective by relying on portfolio theory, which posits the opposite relationship: Cor-
related risks in specialized bank portfolios should make R&D investment in client firms
less likely (Markowitz, 1991). Within this framework we incorporate findings from bank-
ing and finance literature which has a renewed interest in examining firm innovation and
growth (e.g. Herrera and Minetti (2007); Benfratello et al. (2008)).
We test our theoretical framework empirically for more than 5,000 high-tech firm ob-
servations on R&D investments in Germany between 2002 and 2007. Unique access to the
database of Germanys leading credit rating agency on the population of German firms and
their main bank relationship allows us to construct novel variables on the overall portfolio
of each of the firms main bank. We have the rare opportunity to link this information
to firm characteristics, R&D investment, patent statistics and venture capital investments
based on a direct, non-heuristic link. In terms of industry, firm and variable coverage, the
data set is, to the best of our knowledge, unique in its breadth and representativeness.
The empirical results corroborate our theoretical model. Firm R&D investment is
higher if its main bank is either highly diversified or very active in its particular industry.
The information externality effect is restricted to knowledge intensive sectors in which
major uncertainties about commercial application exist. On the one hand we find that firm
investments increases with their main bank’s industry market share. Banks that serve a
large share of the firm’s industry are more experienced and capable of evaluating innovative
firms. On the other hand, banks need to diversify. Firm R&D investment decreases with
an increase in the industry share within the bank’s client portfolio. A concern might be
that a firm selected its main bank relationship with respect to planed R&D investments.
We control for this by adopting an IV regression approach instrumenting main bank switch
using different variables describing the local banking market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, we
outline our theoretical framework culminating in the derivation of hypotheses. In the
subsequent section we present our empirical study including data, variables and method-
ologies. We present the results of these analyses followed by derived conclusions in the
last two sections.
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3.2 Conceptional Framework
We choose information economics theory as our main theoretical building block (Stiglitz,
2002; Ahuja et al., 2008). We combine research from finance literature on bank lending
decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 2001) with the literature on knowledge production through
R&D.
A firms R&D investment decisions can be described as a function of the characteristics
of its industry, its existing knowledge, and the available funds. This study will focus on
available funds, while industry characteristics and knowledge are largely treated as control
variables. We conceptualize a firms available funds as a general liquidity pool from which
a firm can draw financial resources for its R&D investment. We explicitly acknowledge
that R&D investment competes with other firm functions (e.g. marketing) for these funds.
The pool of available funds determines the cost of capital for a company. Firms will invest
in projects (R&D or other) only if the expected returns exceed the cost of capital based on
a net present value rational. The pool of funds has three primary components: Internal
cash flows, equity finance, and bank loans.
Most firms rely on internal cash flows for their R&D projects (Kim et al., 1998). When
it comes to external financing of innovations, venture capital financing has received a lot
of attention in the literature (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004;
Levitas and McFadyen, 2009). It is generally acknowledged that access to venture capital
is constrained for the majority of firms because of limited availability and the highly
selective nature of venture capital investors who target a small number of investments
with the potential for high returns (Eckhardt et al., 2006). Banks, however, as the primary
provider of external financing for the vast majority of firms, appear ill-equipped to finance
R&D investments (Bozkaya and De La Potterie, 2008).
Assuming a perfect market for capital, financing R&D investments should not be
different from any other investment decision and firms should opt for all projects with
a positive net present value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, the assumption
does not hold because of the nature of R&D (for recent reviews, see Hall (2005) and
Hall (2009)). The outcomes of R&D are generally uncertain. This uncertainty has two
primary dimensions (Amit et al., 1990). First, there is a substantial degree of technological
uncertainty about the success of an R&D project. Materials and procedures are almost by
definition new and largely untested. Probability distributions for the success of an R&D
project are difficult or even impossible to predict at the early stages (Hall, 2005). R&D
investments provide very little collateral. Half of all R&D expenditures finance wages for
skilled scientists and engineers (Hall, 2005). Investments in physical research assets and
laboratories are often highly specific to a firm or even a project making it difficult to re-
deploy, sell or use for others (Vincente-Lorente, 2001). Secondly, there is a large degree of
uncertainty about whether the firm will be economically successful with its technologically
new products and processes. A significant proportion of product innovations end up as
economic failures because they do not meet customer needs or because competitors are
quick in their imitation or substitution activities, which erodes margins from the pioneering
advantage (Dos Santos and Peffers, 1995; Gourville, 2006).
Even so, research shows that these underlying uncertainties are not equally exogenous
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to managers and external capital providers. Endogenous uncertainty can be overcome by
firm activities over time while exogenous uncertainties exist independently of any firm
actions (Folta and O’Brien, 2004; Cuypers and Martin, 2010). Firms perform R&D to
resolve endogenous uncertainties through experimentation, testing and simulation. In
that sense, R&D is a sequential process in which firms uncover information and reduce
endogenous uncertainty at each stage of the process (Cuervo-Cazurra and Annique, 2010).
There is a long time span between the start of an R&D project and the appearance of
revenues from it, i.e. when the uncertainty is ultimately resolved and success or failure is
apparent to actors outside of the firm. Empirical estimates predict this time duration to
be between four and five years albeit with significant differences across industry (Pakes
and Schankerman, 1984). Hence, firms have significant time advantages in discovering
potentials or failures within R&D projects over external partners, from whom the same
uncertainties remain exogenous. This gives rise to an information asymmetry that insiders
can exploit (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Ahuja et al., 2008).
Banks are even more disadvantaged in this situation than equity investors because
banks have limited opportunities for directing/monitoring the use of their funds and they
do not benefit from any resulting profits beyond the contractually fixed interest rate (Hen-
nart, 1994). Moreover, in their lending decisions, all banks are equally subject to legal
and regulatory constraints imposed by their institutional environment (e.g. Bank for In-
ternational Settlement, 2005).
Financing R&D investments is therefore characterized by a combination of information
that is either unavailable (exogenous uncertainty) or asymmetrically distributed between
the firm and its external capital providers (endogenous uncertainty). Appropriate risk
premiums for individual borrowers cannot be assessed (Stiglitz, 2002) and firms find them-
selves credit-constrained because banks will only set high, average risk premiums (Aghion
et al., 2012). As a result, the pool of funds available for R&D investment in a firm is
deprived of bank financing.
An emerging stream of literature from finance and strategic management is beginning
to emphasize heterogeneities among banks. The literature on banks and innovation financ-
ing is still scarce. Positive relations have been found for the development of the regional
banking system (Benfratello et al., 2008) and relationship length (Herrera and Minetti,
2007). Negative relationships stem from government ownership of banks (Sapienza, 2004;
Haselmann et al., 2009).
3.3 Hypotheses
All of the theory presented so far rests on the important assumption that all banks draw
from identical pools of information and should therefore suffer from identical degrees of in-
formation deficits. We question this assumption and argue that information is distributed
asymmetrically between banks, too. We concede that the specific uncertainties related to
R&D investments of a particular firm are equally exogenous to all banks. However, infor-
mation - on technological feasibility as well as market success - is produced by other firms
in the same industry. At least parts of the uncertainties are therefore endogenous to these
firms. We argue that banks are heterogeneous in their ability to access this information
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based on information externalities from the composition of their existing client portfolio.
What is more, we will set out the opportunities for the focal firm i to signal the value of
its R&D activities and influence the availability of bank financing.
Banks differ in their level of engagement with client firms. Boot and Thakor (2000)
present a dichotomy of bank lending with varying levels in between. Transaction lending
is closely related to brokerage activities where it is sufficient for the bank to lend based
on a standardized transaction. Relationship lending, though, requires borrower-specific
information for activities such as screening and monitoring (for a review see (Boot, 2000)).
The relation specificity can provide banks with access to private data about the financed
firm which can lead to a quasi monopolistic banking position and superior benefits from
future business with the particular client (Boot et al., 2000). We will focus on a specific
relationship, i.e. a firms main bank, defined as the bank that a firm considers its primary
source for all banking services. Within all relationship lending, main banks are uniquely
positioned for acquisition of information about their client firms (Herrera and Minetti,
2007).
We construct a simple theoretical model to investigate the effect of the client portfolio
of a firms main bank on the firms R&D investment which can be easily extended. We
assume two identical firms, is and js. Both operate in industry s. Bank A is the main
bank of firm is, bank B is the main bank of firm js. Banks A and B are identical, except
for their client portfolio. Each bank has only two firms in its portfolio. Bank As portfolio
consists of firm is and identical firm ks which operates in the same industry; for short
PA(js, ks). It is further assumed that industry s consists only of three firms is, js and ks.
Bank Bs portfolio encompasses firm js and identical firm lt from a different industry t; in
short PB(js, lt). We will develop a purely comparative argument for the R&D investments
of firms is and js. We make the following assumptions: All firms have equal propensities
to invest in R&D. The underlying uncertainties and adverse selection problems for the
particular R&D investments are identical for bank A and B. They are fully exogenous to
each bank. However, the portfolio composition can provide bank A with an information
advantage over bank B. Firms can overcome endogenous uncertainties through various
forms of R&D, market research, prototyping, simulations, etc. Hence, there is a pool of
relevant information produced by firms in the industry. All firms reveal information to
their main banks through their transactions and loan applications. Substantial parts of
this information can be expected to be private and not available to the general public.
This information may include competitive interactions, future product and market plans
as well as revenue streams (Boot and Thakor, 2000). It is important to note that the
private information is produced by the individual firm and only aggregated by its main
bank which is uniquely positioned to do so. The bank does not necessarily learn in the
narrow sense of exploring causal relationships but benefits from information externalities
based on its client portfolio (Stiglitz, 2002). It is an externality because the bank does not
directly and economically reimburse its other clients for the provision of this particular
information. Hence, bank A and bank B draw from different pools of information in
their lending decisions. The bank with the more relevant information can be expected
to be in a position to assess risk premiums for individual firms more accurately than the
general, high-risk premium. As a result, more funds will be available to its clients and, all
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other things being equal, the firm doing business with this bank should be able to make a
comparatively greater investment in R&D.
The relevance of the information externality of the main bank for firms is and js is
greatest if the information stems from a similar technological and market context, i.e.
from competitors in the same industry (Dussauge et al., 2000). Hence, PA(is, ks) can be
expected to deliver more relevant information externalities than PB(js, lt) because bank A
can obtain information from firm ks which operates in the same industry as is. Given that
the pool of relevant information is finite, i.e. from all firms in a given sector, a bank that
has a greater number of such firms as its clients is more likely to benefit from information
externalities. Hence, information asymmetries between bank A and bank B emerge from
their market share with firms in sector s.
In a typical loan application process a bank will benchmark the information of a
prospective borrower against key figures from its other clients in the same sector. This
comparison is often times based on information stemming from other lending contracts
which is not publicly available. The quality of such benchmarks is expected to be higher
for banks that draw from a larger pool of industry information than banks with a com-
paratively narrower pool. In theory, firms could be expected to avoid certain banks in
the first place because of the danger of unintentional knowledge spillovers to competitors.
However, in reality strong safeguards are in place to prevent banks from revealing informa-
tion about one client to another client. The penalties would be high both in terms of legal
liability and a lose of reputation (e.g. (Degryse and Ongena, 2001)). In sum, all firms in
an industry produce a pool of information with the potential to reduce R&D uncertainties
but some banks have access to a larger share of this information than others. We propose:
Hypothesis 1 R&D investment of a firm increases with the degree of market share of its
main bank in its industry.
However, the degree of composition of its client portfolio is not an isolated information
provision tool for the bank. A high degree of specialization in one industry would also
imply that the risks involved from the technology or market side are highly correlated.
This follows the basic rationale that banks manage the risks originating from their clients
for the portfolio as a whole rather than individually (Markowitz, 1991). Banks can reduce
the systemic risk of the overall portfolio by combining uncorrelated risks (Markowitz,
1952). Following this portfolio theory logic, PA(is, ks) contains more risk than PB(js, lt)
because the risks originating from firms js and lt can be expected to be less correlated since
they operate in different sectors, i.e. market and technology environments, respectively.
Bank A can be expected to demand a higher risk premium from its client is than does
bank B from js based solely on the risk exposure of its portfolio. As a result, available
funds for is should be comparatively lower, resulting in less R&D investment. We suggest:
Hypothesis 2 R&D investment of a firm decreases with the degree of specialization of its
main banks corporate client portfolio in its industry.
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3.4 Description of the Data Set
We construct a unique panel data set for testing the theoretical predictions. Data re-
quirements are extensive because comprehensive information is required for banks and
their client portfolio across multiple industries. What is more, the bank information needs
to be linked to firm R&D investment. We achieve this by linking multiple databases in
Germany.
The crucial starting point is the MUP. This is a firm-level database collected by
Creditreform, the leading credit rating agency in Germany. The Creditreform data cover
nearly the entire population of 3 million German firms. The Creditreform data are also
the German input for the widely used AMADEUS database. Creditreform provides credit
information and insurance services based on its data. Hence, the Creditreform data covers
information that allows an assessment of a firm’s credit worthiness. Most importantly for
our study, it contains firms bank relationships, including the bank that firms’ consider as
their main bank. Data quality can be considered to be high since keeping information on
financial solvency and relationships up to date is a core part of Creditreforms business
model and firms are not overly concerned about revealing their bank relationships (similar
information could be found on a typical invoice).
Given the population character of the database, we can calculate the industry compo-
sition of each banks client portfolio. The bank information is very precise based on the
German eight-digit bank code, which allows a precise identification of the banks location
and type (e.g. private bank vs. Sparkasse). Based on this information, we can track 2,432
banks. The banking code is mandatory for banks in Germany for obtaining a banking
license. Coverage is therefore not limited. It should be acknowledged that the database
does not contain information on the extent of each banks lending engagement with in-
dividual firms. To the best of our knowledge, no such database is publicly available or
accessible.
We link this data set to the MIP which provides information on firm R&D investment;
the dependent variable of our analyses. The data set is drawn as a representative, stratified
random sample based on the German MUP firm population. In contrast to other studies
analyzing bank-based financing for innovation we can therefore form perfect matches be-
tween the two databases, i.e. we do not have to rely on regional banking indicators (e.g.
Benfratello et al. (2008)) or heuristic matching. The MIP survey is conducted annually
by the ZEW on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
The MIP survey targets R&D decision makers. These can be heads of R&D depart-
ments, innovation managers or CEOs which is most likely the case in smaller firms where
no elaborate functional structures exist. Several mechanisms are in place to secure the
quality of the survey and its results. All core constructs in the survey follow the OECDs
Oslo Manual on measuring innovation inputs, outputs and processes (OECD, 2005). Fur-
thermore, the MIP is the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS)
of the European Union. CIS methodology and questionnaires have been refined over the
years in international application. They are subject to extensive pre-testing and piloting
in various countries, industries and firms with regard to interpretability, reliability and
validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This multinational application of CIS guarantees
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quality management and assurance.
The merged dataset contains precise identifiers for the European Patent Office statistics
as well as the Bureau van Dijk ZEPHYR since it is also the basis for the AMADEUS
database. The former linkage allows us to obtain the number of patents granted to each
firm, the second one tracks venture capital investments.
The degree of uncertainty (both exogenous and endogenous) is not equally distributed
across all industries. Some industries follow at least partially predictable technological tra-
jectories while others experience discontinuous and hence uncertain changes (Dosi, 1982).
The latter follow innovation patterns which are closer to scientific discovery. Knowledge
is a crucial input for firms in these high-tech sectors and the underlying uncertainties in
its production are therefore especially pronounced. They require a research stage within
firm R&D, which is not yet directed at a particular product. Technological and market
potentials are highly uncertain at this stage compared to the development stage in which
potential revenue streams are beginning to emerge (for a recent review see Czarnitzki
et al. (2011). We argue that the distance to application increases the uncertainty of the
innovation activities in an industry. This, in turn, increases the potentials for benefitting
from information asymmetries because the final resolution of fundamental uncertainties
through observable market success is further removed in the future. At the same time,
the risk of financing R&D increases if potential revenue streams are further delayed in the
future (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). In this analysis we restrict our sample to firms in medium-
tech manufacturing, high-tech manufacturing, or knowledge intensive service industries.
An industry is defined as either low-, medium-, or high-tech based on the average R&D
intensity of firms in the respective General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities
in the European Communities (NACE) three digit class. The final data set contains 5,134
observations from 3,166 firms between 2002 and 2007 encompassing firm, innovation and
R&D characteristics, bank information, patent activity and venture capital investments.
3.5 Empirical Model
A logical inference from our theoretical reasoning is that some firms may not be able
to invest in R&D at all, i.e. their R&D investment equals zero. Hence, a technique is
required that takes into account that the dependent variable is censored at zero. We
estimate censored panel regression models. In particular we estimate random effects Tobit
models. Fixed effects Tobit models are only beginning to emerge and existing approaches
have been criticized for delivering inconsistent estimates as well as being overly demanding
on assumed data and variation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010).
The inconsistency stems primarily from the finite nature of empirical samples. Non-linear,
fixed-effects models suffer especially from inconsistency issues because estimates are more
likely to be influenced by incidental parameters (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Heckman, 1987).
Inconsistencies can be assumed to be reduced if the sample encompasses more than eight
time periods and random effects estimators are more commonly applied (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). Given our data availabilities we opt for a random effects model. We run
several model specifications and include the independent variables of interest stepwise.
As discussed above our interest is whether and how firm R&D investment is influenced
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by its main bank relationship, and in particular by the main banks’ portfolio characteris-
tics. We estimate the following equation:
R&D activity/intensity = β0 Constant (3.1)
+ β1 Bank industry spec.
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+ β2 Bank industry share
+ β3 Bank size
+ β4 Bank spatial spec.
+ β5 Bank type
+ β6 Firm controls
+ β7 Industry controls
+ β8 Year controls
In Table 3.1, we provide descriptive statistics for the sample as well as a comprehensive
overview of variable observation, definitions, and scales. As the dependent variables we
use R&D activities and R&D intensity. R&D activities is an indicator variable equals
one for firms with R&D expenditures. Within the panel nearly half of the firms invested
in R&D. This high figure reflects the restriction on industries with above average R&D
expenditures. On average R&D expenditures to sales were 4%. Restricting to R&D active
firms R&D expenditures to sales was nearly 8%.
Firm-bank relationship information is observed in the MUP. The majority of firms have
a main relationship with a private bank. Sparkassen serve as main-bank relationship for
30% of all sample firms, Landesbanken for 4% and cooperative banks for 17%. Compared
to the underlying population (the MUP) private banks show larger market shares for the
sample at hand. This can be explained by two factors: First, on average, sample firms are
larger. Second, we focus on high-tech industries only. Analyses based on the MUP reveal
that large, private banks have higher market shares in in both groups.
Bank portfolio information is provided by the ZEW Banking Panel and with respect
to the firms’ main bank relationship as observed in the MUP. Bank size (β3) is often used
as a proxy for organizational hierarchic structure and measured by total assets (Berger
and Black, 2011). In public available bank balance sheet data sets, such as Bankscope,
total assets is missing for many especial small banks. We therefore measure Bank size
as the number of people employed by firms’ the bank serves as main-bank. In the main
regression we divide the four large banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank,
and HypoVereinsbank) into regional subdivision based on the 2 digit German banking
code. As robustness we will present also regressions with the total size. The spearman
rank correlation between total assets provided by Bankscope and bank size used in the
paper varies between 0.7163 and 0.7358 in the years 2002-2006.
Our two main identifying variables are Bank industry specialization (β1) and Bank
industry share (β2). Bank industry specialization is the share of a firm’s industry within
the banks’ portfolio. On average, the share of a firms’ industry in the bank portfolio is
7%. We expect the coefficient of the variable Bank industry specialization being negative
(see Hypothesis 1). Bank industry share instead, is the share of firms in the industry
(on NACE 2 digit) served by this particular bank. On average the banks’ market share
in the industry within Germany is 4. We expect the coefficient of the variable Bank
industry share being positive (see Hypothesis 2). We consider that both variables are
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not correlated. Consider a niche industry as an example. A bank could serve the whole
industry (Bank industry share equals one) but because this industry is small the industry
would make only a small fraction within the bank’s portfolio.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Description
R&D activity 0.498 0.500 0 1 1 if for firms with R&D expenditures
R&D intensity 0.039 0.106 0 1 = R&D expenditures
Sales
Bank size 65, 586 86, 751 98 547, 715 =
∑
Firmsi,b × Employeesi,b
Bank industry specialization 6.691 8.192 0.008 85.049 =
∑
Firmsi,b,NACE2dig×Employeesi,b,NACE2dig
Bank sizeb
×
100
Bank industry share 0.365 0.573 <0.001 4.301 =
∑
Firmsi,b,NACE2dig×Employeesi,b,NACE2dig∑
Firmsi,NACE2dig×Employeesi,NACE2dig
×
100
Bank spatial specialization 0.650 0.348 0 0.998 =
∑
Firmsi,b,d×Employeesi,b,d∑
Firmsd×Employeesi,d
Non-private banks 0.459 0.498 0 1 1 if main bank relationship with a
Sparkasse, Landesbank, or Cooperative
bank
No. of bank relations 2.071 1.183 1 6 Number of bank relationships
Switch of bank relation 0.148 0.356 0 1 Switch of main bank relationship within
the last three years
Return on sales previous year 0.030 1.003 -1.416 2.064
Return class./.Avg. of Return class
S.D. of return class
No. of employees 146.257 339.605 1 4, 329 =
∑
Employeesi
Patentstock per empl. prev.
Year
0.002 0.008 0.000 0.071
∑
Patenti∑
Employeesi
Firm age 15.793 12.855 1 98 Company age since foundation in years
Gov. R&D subsidy 0.202 0.402 0 1 1 if firm received public R&D subsidies
in the year of observation
Credit rating −0.001 0.823 -3.055 5.113 Rating./.Avg. of rating
S.D. of rating
Public stock company 0.041 0.198 0 1 1 if firm has a legal form of a stock com-
pany (“Aktiengesellschaft”)
Private Equity 0.005 0.070 0 1 1 if firm received Private Equity since
foundation
Part of company group 0.389 0.488 0 1 1 if firm is part of group company
Location east Germany 0.383 0.486 0 1 1 if firm is located in eastern Germany
Medium-tech-manuf.† 0.418 0.493 0 1 1 if firm is a medium-tech manufacture
High-tech manuf. 0.121 0.326 0 1 1 if firm is a high-tech manufacture
Knowledge-intens. services 0.461 0.498 0 1 1 if firm provides knowledge intensive
services
Year 2003† 0.209 0.406 0 1 1 if your of observation is 2003
Year 2004 0.083 0.276 0 1 1 if your of observation is 2004
Year 2005 0.253 0.435 0 1 1 if your of observation is 2005
Year 2006 0.172 0.377 0 1 1 if your of observation is 2006
Year 2007 0.284 0.451 0 1 1 if your of observation is 2007
No. of banks in district 38.300 28.948 9 139 Number of banks operating at least one
branch in firm’s district
No. of firms in district 13, 023 20, 521 726 90, 833 Number of firms located in the district
Bank intensity (district) 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.017 =
∑
Banksd∑
Firmsd
Local banking market competi-
tion
0.008 0.003 0.001 0.049 =
∑
Firmsd|main bank switch∑
Firmsd
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables used. In this table, I use the following indices and
abbreviations: i for firm; b for bank; d for district; NACE2dig for the 2 digital code of the NACE industry classification.
† Serve as base category in regressions.
Source: MIP and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Next to main bank relationships, the MUP contains up to five additional bank relation-
ships per firm. The average number of bank relationships within the sample is two. The
Panel structure of the MUP allow to observe a switch of the firm-main bank relationship.
Nearly 15% of sample firms switched their main bank relationship within the previous 3
years.
The following variables are used as firm control variables. Average firm size of panel
firms is 146 employees. The largest sample firm has 4,329 employees. We further control
for the fact that the firm is part of a larger company group. Return on sales is provided
in classes. In order to employ a single variable we generated a standardised index. On
average firms hold two Patents per 1,000 employees. Both variables, return on sales and
patent stock per employees, are with respect to previous year. 20% of the sample firms
received governmental R&D subsidies while 5used private equity. Most sample firms
are incorporated as limited company. 4% of sample firms have the legal form of a stock
company. We further control for industries and year of observation. We present industry
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definitions in table 3.7.
For the instrumental variable approach we use further variables describing the local
banking market. We consider a bank to be active in the firms’ district if the bank operates
at least a single bank in that district. On average there are 38 banks active per district.
We count the number of firms that are located in a district. On average 13,000 firms are
located in a district. The largest district in terms of number of firms is Berlin (90,000
firms). With approximately 3.4 million inhabitants Berlin is by far the largest district
with a large industry share of trade, retailers and services. On average, there are 5 banks
active in a district per 1,000 firms. We measure local banking market competition as the
share of firms in a given district that recently switched their main-bank relationship. The
mean district switching rate is 8. The district with the highest switching rate, that is
considered as the one with the most competitive banking market, has a switching rate of
5%. We further use the concentration of the local banking market measured as the sum
of squared market shares in main-bank relationships in a district.
We inspect the data set for multicollinearity based on correlations and variance infla-
tion factors and find no evidence by any conventionally applied standard (e.g. Chatterjee
and Hadi (2006). The mean variance inflation factor equals 1.63 with the highest individ-
ual variance inflation factor equaling 3.94.
3.5.1 Results
Main Results - Main bank industry specialization and market share Table 3.2
presents the estimation results of the logit and tobit models testing hypotheses 1 and 2.
Specification (1)-(3) presents the results for the logit model. Specification (1) contains only
control variables and can serve as a benchmark for all other models. Significant effects
remain stable across models and the quality of model fit increases (log likelihood and Chi
squared test). Specification (2) further includes banking related variables. Specification (3)
includes the main effects of bank specialization and industry market share. Specification
(4)-(6) presents the results for the Tobit model. In Specification (4) and (5) we either use
bank industry specialization or bank industry share. In specification (6), we present the
full set of variables.
The effect of bank specialization is negative and highly significant, supporting hy-
pothesis 2. A banks market share in the focal firms industry has a positive and highly
significant effect on R&D investment. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported, too. We calculate
effect sizes based on a one standard deviation difference from the average in main bank
industry specialization and market share. In Table 3.3, we present the marginal effect of
R&D activity (Specification (1) and (2)) and R&D intensity (Specification (3)). Bank in-
dustry specialization reduces firm R&D activity as well as intensity. Bank industry share
increases both. Hence, the effects are not just significantly different from zero but also have
a sizeable impact on firm R&D. This result reinforces the theoretical logic that both port-
folio and information externality theory can inform predictions of firm R&D investment
through the main banks client portfolio. A firms main bank with a larger market share in
the industry allows more firm R&D spending while the increasing industry specialization
within a banks portfolio allows less.
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Table 3.2: Main results (coefficients) – Main-bank characteristics and firm’s R&D activity
Model Logit Tobit
Dependent Variable R&D activity R&D intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank industry −0.026∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
specialization (0.006) (0.000) (0.001)
Bank industry share 0.264∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.006) (0.006)
Bank size (ln) −0.045 −0.121∗∗ −0.001 −0.002 −0.006∗
(0.039) (0.045) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank spatial 0.013 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000
specialization (0.153) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sparkassen and −0.383∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
cooperative banks (0.117) (0.119) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
No of bank relations 0.057 0.062 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.041) (0.041) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Switch of bank relation 0.137 0.122 0.013 0.013 0.012
(0.106) (0.106) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Return on sales 0.048 0.053 0.054 −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗
(t-1, stand. index) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Patent stock 48.879∗∗∗ 47.979∗∗∗ 47.237∗∗∗ 2.105∗∗∗ 2.172∗∗∗ 2.119∗∗∗
per employees (t-1) (12.573) (12.488) (12.405) (0.382) (0.393) (0.376)
No of employees (logs) 0.218∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.004 −0.002
(0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm age (years, ln) −0.169∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.059) (0.059) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gov. R&D subsidy 3.457∗∗∗ 3.451∗∗∗ 3.441∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Credit rating −0.069 −0.057 −0.053 0.001 0.001 0.001
(stand. index) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Public stock company 0.998∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.243) (0.240) (0.237) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Private Equity 1.819∗∗ 1.777∗∗ 1.644∗ 0.118∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.119∗
(0.630) (0.649) (0.646) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062)
Part of company group 0.361∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.009
(0.089) (0.091) (0.091) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
East Germany −0.477∗∗∗ −0.555∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.017∗∗
(0.096) (0.100) (0.101) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.791∗∗∗ −0.061 0.684 −0.017 −0.015 0.029
(0.202) (0.492) (0.530) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
sigma
Constant 0.145∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 5314 5314 5314 5314 5314 5314
LR Chi2 -2615.89 -2601.9 -2584.56
log likelihood 73.68 52.24 83.39
Note: Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance level
on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: MIP and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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Control variables All models contain an identical set of control variables. Their influ-
ence on firm R&D intensity is consistent across all models with regard to significance levels
and directions. We have not developed theoretical predictions for any control variables but
significant effects should be discussed briefly. First, it is noteworthy that out of all control
variables at the bank level bank size and the type of bank have a significant influence on
firm R&D investment. An average firm working with a Sparkasse or cooperative main
bank invests significantly less in R&D. This result supports other studies (Haselmann
et al., 2009) which emphasize the inefficiencies in bank decision making induced by politi-
cal influence through government ownership (Porta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004). Further
more, large banks, especially the large private banks, are more likely to have sufficient
cases in a certain industry to build an in-house competence center. This might not be
reflected in the variables industry specialization or share. The large private banks also
do not have a mandate to serve for any firm but can strategically invest in competence
of specific industries or technological fields. Large private banks also have more direct
international connections that might be beneficial for exporting firms with high R&D in-
vestments. In order to rule out potential endogeneity problem due to high correlation
between R&D investment and exporting we did not incorporate export information in the
regressions.
Table 3.3: Main results (marginal effects) – Main-bank characteristics and firm’s R&D
activity
Model Logit Tobit
Dependent Variable R&D activity R&D intensity
(dydx) Pr > 0 E(R&DSales | > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Bank size (ln) −0.019∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.002∗
(0.045) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank industry specialization −0.004∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank industry share 0.042∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.006) (0.006)
Bank spatial specialization 0.006 0.028 0.003
(0.154) (0.010) (0.010)
Sparkassen and cooperative banks −0.067∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.008) (0.008)
No of bank relations 0.01 −0.002 0.000
(0.041) (0.002) (0.002)
Switch of bank relation 0.02 0.032 0.004
(0.106) (0.008) (0.008)
Note: Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote
significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: MIP and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
R&D intensity increases with firm size but decreases with firm age. Similarly, incorpo-
rated firms having access to the stock market invest more in R&D. This provides evidence
for the close relationship between overall resource availability for R&D investments (Ahuja
et al., 2008) as well as R&D as part of a growth strategy for young firms (King et al.,
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1993). Similarly, the negative relationship between return on sales and R&D investment
can be interpreted as an investment in generating the potential for future revenue streams
in which the positive performance effects of current R&D are on average, four to five years
removed (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984). The significant industry dummies (medium
tech manufacturing is the reference group) indicate that the R&D investment is a direct
reflection of technological opportunities and competitive pressures. R&D investment in-
creases with the knowledge intensity of the industry in both manufacturing and services.
Low knowledge-intensive service sectors such as transportation are the exception reflecting
fewer technological opportunities (e.g. Lyons et al. (2007)).
3.5.2 Consistency and Robustness Checks
We estimate several additional empirical specifications to demonstrate the robustness of
our findings. In Table 3.4, we present different variations of our main model. In specifi-
cation (1) we control for firm and in specification (2) for bank fixed effects. We find, that
the effects of our main explanatory variable remain stable. Above, we discussed potential
differences of the effect on firm R&D investment between bank types. In specification (3)
and (4) we split the sample between private and non-private (Sparkassen, Landesbanken,
and cooperative banks) in order to check whether firm R&D investment is driven by the
type of its main-bank. The core findings on the effects of main bank market share and sec-
tor specialization remain intact for both sub-samples. We further follow up on the results
of the control variables regarding significant differences for Sparkassen and cooperative
banks. We have dedicated controls for bank size and geographic scope in every model.
However, banks may also differ in their structure. Especially large private banks with a
national branch system can benefit from accessing the knowledge pool/risk diversification
of the group as a whole. We recalculate all portfolio variables at the group level and
present the results in specification (5). Our core findings remain stable indicating that
the effects are not dependent on assumptions about the aggregation level of the banks or
limited to certain bank types.
Finally, our theoretical argument is strictly comparative in nature and combinations of
firms and their main bank are assumed as given. This is largely in line with our descriptive
statistics indicating that 85% of the firms in our sample did not switch their main bank
during the three year observation period. Nevertheless, firms and banks have made choices
about this relationship at a certain point in time but this selection is unobservable to us. In
order to test, whether the bank choice is correlated with the error term and may therefore
bias the results, we estimate an additional instrument variable tobit model. The only
bank choice variable available to us is whether the firm has changed its main-bank in the
preceding three years. We use this variable as the dependent variable in the first stage
equation of the instrument variable estimation (Table 3.5).
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks – Model variation
Fixed Effects Bank type Bank Unit
Firm Bank Private Non-Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank industry −0.001∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
specialization (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bank industry share 0.020∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.001)
Bank size (ln) −0.008∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.008∗ −0.007∗ −0.005∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Bank spatial 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
specialization (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sparkassen and 0.011 −0.141∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
cooperative banks (0.016) (0.062) (0.018)
No. of bank relations 0.005 0.000 −0.004 0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Switch of bank relation −0.007 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008)
Return on sales −0.003 −0.008∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.004 −0.007∗∗
(stand. index, t-1) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Patent stock −0.527 2.006∗∗∗ 2.237∗∗∗ 1.815∗∗∗ 2.071∗∗∗
per employee (t-1) (0.400) (0.442) (0.592) (0.361) (0.370)
No. of employees (ln) 0.01 −0.003 0.002 −0.006 −0.002
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Company age 0.023∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(years, ln) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Gov. R&D subsidy 0.020∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010)
Credit rating 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002
(stand. index) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Public stock company 0.155∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.04 0.032∗∗
(0.079) (0.014) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014)
Private Equity 0.071∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.135∗ 0.045 0.116∗
(0.033) (0.066) (0.076) (0.031) (0.063)
Part of company group −0.017∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.005 0.026∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Location east Germany −0.006 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.017 −0.017∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.155∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.033 0.039 0.039
(0.083) (0.049) (0.056) (0.043) (0.037)
Sigma constant 0.050∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 5314 5314 2875 2439 5314
log likelihood 3967.86 529.13 140.19 −39.52 99.03
Note: Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote
significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: MIP and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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We rely on four regional variables (district level) as instruments: the number of bank
operating a branch within a district (ln), bank intensity (number of banks related to
number of firms in the district), the share of firms switched their main-bank relationship
in the previous year, and the concentration of the regional banking market. In table
3.5 we present six specifications. Columns with even numbers show coefficients on the
instrumental variable bank switch. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) show that each single
variable is statistically significant at least on the 10% level. Firms in regions with more
active banks have a higher probability switching the main bank (column(4)). Once the
firm population is taken into account the effect turns negative (column (2)). Firms are
less likely to switch in concentrated banking markets (column (8)) and more likely in
markets with high competition (column(6)). In column (10) we jointly use bank intensity
and competition and in column (12) competition and concentration. The instruments are
jointly significant at the 98% significance level. We conduct an additional Sargan test on
potential overidentification which is rejected. Columns with uneven numbers contains the
coefficients of the Tobit estimation results related to the dependent variable R&D intensity
with the bank change being instrumented. Estimation results on our main hypothesis tests
remain stable. In sum, we are confident that our empirical analyses provide reliable tests
of our theoretical framework.
3.5.3 Signaling
So far, we have considered mechanisms only on the bank side and their ability to overcome
information asymmetries through externalities. However, firms have additional opportu-
nities to overcome the information asymmetries by signaling the value of their R&D activ-
ities. We follow Ndofor and Levitas (2004) and define a signal as “conduct and observable
attributes that alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market
about unobservable attributes and intentions.” This is a deviation from the theory out-
lined in the previous section as firms is and js in the model are no longer considered to be
identical. They differentiate themselves through firm-specific signaling. A credible signal
will allow a bank to provide a more accurate risk assessment on a firms R&D investment,
resulting in more available funds and subsequently increased R&D investment. We will
explore signals based on firm’s past actions (patenting) as well as legitimacy that can be
transferred from ties to established actors and institutions (government R&D subsidies
and venture capital investors).
The value of signaling through past actions is rooted in theory of firm reputation
(Rindova et al., 2005). Levitas and McFadyen (2009) investigates the value of patents as
signals for attracting venture capital investors and corroborates it for a sample of firms
from the pharmaceutical industry. Patents are a tangible representation of a successful
innovation. Moreover, the patent office requires a certain degree of novelty in order to grant
a patent (Encaoua et al., 2006). The existence of a patent therefore also allows inferences to
be drawn about the quality of the underlying R&D. Patents can be interpreted as signals
of future revenue streams. These may come from possessing a temporary advantage on
the product market or through generating license fees (Levitas and McFadyen, 2009).
Hence, a main banks risk concerns based on correlated risks in its client portfolio should
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be reduced.
Other potential signals are not rooted in a firms past actions but in being associated
with authoritative actors (Rindova et al., 2005). This perspective is rooted in institutional
theory. Organizations can gain legitimacy and hence access to resources through external
validation in establishing institutional linkages with established institutions or succeeding
in contests (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Rao, 1994). We focus predominantly on a firms abil-
ity to attract external funds for R&D or, more precisely, government R&D subsidies and
venture capital investment. Venture capital investors are known to be highly selective in
their investment decisions (Eckhardt et al., 2006). They monitor firms intensely, conclude
growth/performance-oriented contracts, facilitate crucial personnel decisions and provide
additional services (e.g. access to strategic alliances (Gompers and Lerner, 2001)). As
a result, the chances that the firm will be successful in the future and generate positive
returns should increase. On the basis of this signal, banks should therefore be able to pro-
vide additional funds for the firm and its R&D investment. Similarly, many governments
provide R&D grants for firms to stimulate R&D investment. Information requirements
in applications are extensive and competition for grants is intense (Czarnitzki and Toole,
2007). Successful grant awards are highly selective and can signal the exceptional value
of an R&D project (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Kleer, 2010). Banks may therefore rely on
this external assessment for overcoming information asymmetries.
Our main results in Table 3.2 show that the main effects of all of these factors are
positive and significant. This is fully in line with existing research emphasizing comple-
mentarity effects of R&D with existing knowledge stocks embodied in patents (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989), as well as additional effects from government R&D subsidies (Aerts and
Schmidt, 2008), and growth-oriented venture capital investments (Levitas and McFadyen,
2009). However, the signaling effect that these factors may have on a firms main bank
is novel. We add separate multiplicative interaction effects with each factor and bank
industry specialization and market share. We use separate models for each interaction to
avoid potential issues arising from multicollinearity. In table 3.6 we present the results of
the specification including interaction terms. Column (1) include interaction terms with
firm’s patent stock, column(2) with Venture Capital investment, and column (3) with
governmental R&D subsidies.
All main effects remain stable. For the patent stock, only the interaction effect with
the main banks degree of portfolio specialization is positive and significant (column (1)).
The findings suggest that firm’s capable to signal their R&D quality by their patent stock
relax the main bank’s need of diversification. A bank might consider that those firms
are less affected by industry shocks. Firms received venture capital and simultaneously
have a relationship with a bank that has a high market share in the firm’s industry show
significantly higher R&D investments in addition to both base effects. Input-oriented
signals originating from successfully attracting government R&D subsidies (column (3))
fail to alter the risk assessments or information position of banks. We suspect that this
is due to the fact that they are general in nature and can be interpreted positively even
without in-depth industry experience of a bank.
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Table 3.6: Robustness check – Signaling: Patent, VC, public R&D grant
Patent stock Venture Capital Public R&D
(1) (2) (3)
Bank industry −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
specialization (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank industry share 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Patentstock per empl. 1.730∗∗∗ 1.915∗∗∗ 1.934∗∗∗
prev. year (ratio) (0.336) (0.313) (0.315)
Int: Patents * 0.003∗∗
bank industry spec. (0.001)
Int: Patents * −0.008
bank industry share (0.011)
Private Equity 0.131∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Int: Venture Capital * 0.051
bank industry spec. (0.028)
Int: Venture Capital * 0.145∗∗∗
bank industry share (0.037)
Gov. R&D subsidy 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Int: Gov. R&D subsidy * 0.001
bank industry spec. (0.001)
Int: Gov. R&D subsidy * 0.007
bank industry share (0.008)
Sparkassen and −0.035∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
cooperative banks (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bank size (ln) −0.005 −0.005 −0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank spatial specialization 0 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of bank relations −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Switch of bank relation 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Further firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.033 0.034 0.039
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant σ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant  0.085∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 5, 314 5, 314 5, 314
LR Chi2 756 791 752
log likelihood 513.83 525.75 511.63
Note: Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote
significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: MIP and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this study we question the general assumption that all banks suffer to the same de-
gree from information deficits or asymmetries when providing funds for R&D intensive
clients. We concede that banks cannot produce the necessary technological information
themselves. They are, however, uniquely positioned to benefit from the information pro-
duction of the firms in their client portfolio. Hence, they can benefit from an information
externality which becomes important if the information is relevant to the technological
and market environment of its clients, i.e. the bank has a large market share in the clients
industry. We compare and contrast this effect with portfolio considerations and predict a
negative relationship between a firms R&D investment and the industry specialization of
its main bank. These theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical test for Ger-
many based on a dataset that is, to our knowledge, unique in terms of variable coverage,
representativeness, and comprehensiveness. With regard to the signaling that the firm can
provide itself about the quality of its R&D, we find that only patents and venture capital
provide valuable signals to banks, and not government R&D subsidies. These findings
have major implications for academic research as well as for practical management and
policy development.
Our core contribution to strategic management theory is to bring a differentiated
perspective on the role of banks into the discussion of financing firm R&D. This factor
has been absent within a theory stream that has acknowledged the shortage of funding
for R&D (Cuervo-Cazurra and Annique, 2010) as well as its root causes of information
being either not available or asymmetrically distributed (Vincente-Lorente, 2001). Ex-ante
strategic management literature has emphasized attracting highly selective equity investors
as the primary source of external funds for R&D (Chaddad and Reuer, 2009; Levitas and
McFadyen, 2009). Our findings show that bank financing is a neglected variable in firms
R&D decisions and that heterogeneity can be identified among banks based on information
externality and portfolio theory. The findings show also that opportunities for signaling
to banks are limited to reputation effects from past patent activity and venture capital
investment.
These theoretical contributions have direct implications for management practice as
banks are the primary provider of external financing for the vast majority of firms (Phelps
and Tilman, 2010). Our theoretical and empirical findings are strictly comparative in
nature and interpretations on opportunities of active search and selection (either through
banks or firms) have to be made carefully. We find clear evidence that a firms main bank
makes a significant difference in the availability of funds for R&D investment. Hence,
it follows only logically that firms should be better off working with highly diversified
banks. The positive effects of working with leading banks in a firms industry are limited
to knowledge-intensive sectors. Interestingly, risk considerations stemming from special-
ization in a banks industry portfolio are a less pressing issue for firms with opportunities
to signal the value of their R&D activities through patents. Venture Capital investments
are recognized by bank’s with high industry market shares but do not affect their need
for diversification. Governmental R&D subsidies are, in themselves, valuable for firms but
provide no further signaling effect to a firms main bank.
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On the policy making side, we show that heterogeneities among banks have substantial
implications for their client’s R&D investment. This is of high relevance as many govern-
ments aim at strengthening private R&D investment as a tool for generating economic
growth, employment and competitiveness. The European Unions Europe 20-20 Strategy
provides a fitting example by targeting R&D investment of 3% of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) in its member states as a core objective. At the same time, bank regulation
reform is a major topic in many countries following the recent, worldwide financial crisis.
Our results provide a nuanced answer on the banks that can provide funding for firms
and their R&D investment. We cast doubts on a general call for banks specializing in
financing innovation. Banks with a broad industry portfolio are equally valuable because
they can manage risks through diversification, especially for firms operating in more stable
technological environments.
In sum, our research provides a novel perspective on the relationship between banks,
their information availabilities and the R&D investment of their firms. This provides fruit-
ful avenues for future research. First, we develop and test strictly comparative arguments.
This is partly due to the fact that the vast majority of the firms in our sample (85%) never
changes its main bank. However, more detailed insights into how firms and banks select
these relationships would be an important addition to our current model both theoretically
and empirically. Secondly, we are able to investigate our research question empirically for
a large economy with a well-established, diverse financial system. However, European
economies have been described as being especially reliant on bank financing. Comparative
studies in Anglo-American settings could provide valuable insights into the international
generalizability of our findings. Thirdly, we have focused on the firms R&D input side
of the firm. Banks may influence not just overall R&D investment but also the nature
of firm R&D as well as the outcomes. We suspect that this particular research question
lends itself more to qualitative research but we are confident that our comprehensive,
quantitative analyses provides a reliable basis for it.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.7: Industry classification
Industry NACE Code Industry Group
Mining and quarrying 10-14 Low-tech manufacturing
Food and tobacco 15-16 Low-tech manufacturing
Textiles and leather 17-19 Low-tech manufacturing
Wood / paper / publishing 20-22 Low-tech manufacturing
Chemicals / petroleum 23-24 Medium high-tech manufacturing
Plastic / rubber 25 Low-tech manufacturing
Glass / ceramics 26 Low-tech manufacturing
Metal 27-28 Low-tech manufacturing
Manufacture of machinery and
equipment
29 Medium tech manufacturing
Manufacture of electrical ma-
chinery
30-32 High-tech manufacturing
Medical, precision and optical
instruments
33 High-tech manufacturing
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34-35 Medium tech manufacturing
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery,
sports equipment and toys
36-37 Low-tech manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41 Low-tech manufacturing
Construction 45 Low-tech manufacturing
Retail and motor trade 50, 52 Low knowledge-intensive services
Wholesale trade 51 Low knowledge-intensive services
Transportation and communication 60-63, 64.1 Low knowledge-intensive services
Financial intermediation 65-67 Knowledge-intensive services
Real estate activities and renting 70-71 Distributive services
ICT services 72, 64.3 Knowledge-intensive services
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3 Knowledge-intensive services
Consulting 74.1, 74.4 Knowledge-intensive services
Low-tech business-oriented services 74.5-74.8, 90 Low knowledge-intensive services
Chapter 4
Corporate Main Bank Decision
4.1 Introduction
Building up close main-bank relationships can be beneficial to small and medium sized
firms for several reasons. For mature firms, relationship lending eases access to bank
finance (Berger and Black, 2011; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994;
Cole, 1998) and positively affects firm innovation activity (Herrera and Minetti, 2007).
As a further advantage, a relationship bank is able to “lean against the wind” if a firm
is in financial distress (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Based on the information gathered
by multiple interactions, a relationship bank is better informed and therefore capable of
evaluating a firm’s going concern value. Such a bank makes more efficient liquidations
keeping financing distressed but viable firms (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Relation-
ship banking therefore provides an insurance for liquidity and is especially attractive for
high risk firms. But firms face transaction costs in providing information. Furthermore,
banks have an informational monopoly and bind firms to this relationship, which allows
inter-temporal cost sharing and bank rent seeking. Therefore, cost sensitive firms with
low risk might ask for more transaction oriented banking.
A bank’s ability to offer relationship banking depends on its portfolio characteristics,
investment in specialization, and strategy. Berger and Black (2011) argue that hierarchal
banks are less capable of processing soft-information, such as an entrepreneur’s trust-
worthiness. They show empirically that larger banks are less capable of passing along
soft-information within the hierarchy and are therefore less involved in relationship lend-
ing. Brown et al. (2012) show that larger banks react more strongly to hard-facts, such
as credit ratings, than do small banks. There is a further literature shows that the char-
acteristics of the bank portfolio affect a firm’s probability of experiencing distress and
subsequent market exit (Peek and Rosengren (2005), Fukuda et al. (2009), and Ho¨wer
(2009)) or innovation activity (Ho¨wer et al., 2011). Furthermore, banks need to invest in
specialization in order to offer relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 2000). For banks
that have higher refinancing costs than others, it is hard to invest in specialization to offer
the advantages of relationship banking and simultaneously offer competitive interest rates.
Matthey (2010) argues that such banks have incentives to compete in debt repayments.
In other words, those banks offer cheap loans and services to cost sensitive firms with low
default risk and which do not demand liquidity insurance.
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Do firms select the main bank relationship according to their risk or preferences for
being helped in difficult times? I empirically test this for newly established German firms.
High market shares of Sparkassen and cooperative banks make the German banking system
particularly interesting with regard to this question. Both Sparkassen and cooperative
banks have a mission statement and implicit or explicit guarantees, reducing refinancing
costs. But private banks are not restricted to a certain lending or liquidation policy
and have incentives to offer transaction oriented banking, thus attracting low risk firms.
I analyse a firm’s main bank choice related to its demand for liquidity insurance, its
sensitivity to costs, and its ex ante default risk. For my analyses, I identify the main bank
initially chosen, as well as banks that were also available to the firm. The set of alternatives
varies over firms, depending on the local banking market. I focus on newly established
firms since there is no previous financial track record or entrepreneurial experience in that
particular business and the bank choice is not influenced by the decision or timing of
switching the main bank.
The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, a representative sample of young firms in Germany,
paints a rich picture of firm and entrepreneurial characteristics. It includes detailed in-
formation on firms’ criteria for choosing a main bank relationship, the selected bank, and
previous private relationships with that bank. I use nearly 1,900 observations on firms es-
tablished between 2009 to 2011. Alternative banks and their characteristics are identified
using the ZEW Bank Panel. I test for risk considerations in a firm’s initial main bank
choice in two steps. In the first step, I employ a logit model to estimate the probability
of choosing a certain bank type. In the second step, I employ a nested logit model to
estimate the probability of choosing a bank out of a set of alternative banks.
The empirical analysis suggests that the firm chooses a bank and not the reverse.
Only 13% of all firms were restricted in their choice in terms of a bank’s refusal to offer
an account or grant a loan. I find that firms for which “expected bank support in financial
distress” is of the utmost importance choose a relationship oriented bank. Entrepreneurs
who consider their personal bank relationship to be valuable to their firm are also more
likely choose a relationship oriented bank. However, I do not find that firms select their
main bank according to ex ante risk measured by predicted default probability. Cost
sensitive firms are more likely to choose a private bank. Furthermore, I find that a bank’s
local competence is an important selection factor. Banks with a high regional market share
and those that are regionally concentrated are more likely to be chosen. The distance
between firm location and bank branch is not economically significant.
The present paper is structured as follows. In the following section, I review the
literature on relationship banking and describe the institutional background of the German
banking system. In Section 4.3, I describe the data set used. In Section 4.4, I present
the logit model for firm decisions as to the type of main bank. In Section 4.5, I present
a nested logit model. In this model, a firm chooses a particular bank out of a set of
alternatives. In Section 4.6, I discuss the results and provide further robustness checks.
Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 Relationship vs. Transaction Oriented Banking
The choice of a bank is related to transaction costs and to the bank services offered. But
firms may also take into account that their main financing partners can influence their
decisions, and are able to liquidate the firm. In the first part of this section, I review the
literature on relationship banking. I elaborate characteristics that describe whether a firm
is more likely to demand relationship oriented banking or transaction oriented banking.
In the second part of this section, I describe the German banking system. Institutional
differences within the banking sector help to discriminate between banks that are more
likely to offering relationship oriented banking than to offer transaction oriented banking.
4.2.1 Firm Characteristics and the Demand for Relationship Banking
The literature on firm financing and financial intermediation stresses that the probability
a firm is being liquidated depends on the source of its financing, and that a firm selects its
financing sources according to the firm’s default risk or the risk preferences of its owners.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that bank loans are more expensive than publicly
traded debt. They show that firms with a higher liquidation risk select bank loans over
publicly traded debt, because renegotiation is easier with a single or a few banks than
with anonymous debt holders. Wilner (2000) argues that trade credit partners have a
stake in the firm and are less likely to liquidate a firm in financial distress than are banks.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Huyghebaert et al. (2007) find empirical evidence that
credit constrained firms are more likely to use the more expensive trade credit instead of
bank financing. But differences exist even within banking, and there is usually a distinction
made between relationship and transaction oriented banking.
Ongena and Smith (1998) define relationship banking as “the connection between a
bank and a costumer that goes beyond the execution of simple, anonymous, financial
transactions”. It is characterized by “close monitoring, renegotiability, and implicit long-
term contractual agreements” (Berlin and Mester, 1998). A bank gains an informational
advantage over its competitors by privately observing the client’s payment behavior. Banks
further reduce the information asymmetries between themselves and the firm and gain
inside information by observing a firm’s financial and entrepreneurial decisions (Fama,
1985; James, 1987).
A close bank–firm relationship can be beneficial for the firm for several reasons. First,
asymmetric information in credit markets can lead to credit constraints (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Gathering information over time can therefore improve the firm’s access to finance.
Harhoff and Koerting (1998) as well as Angelini et al. (1998) show that the probability
that a firm gets a credit is positively related to the length of the firm–bank relationship.
I therefore expect that firms seeking bank finance choose a relationship orientated bank.
Second, relationship banking offers greater flexibility when renegotiation is needed
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Discretion in the decision to liquidation is vital for the
bank as well as for the firm. Banks’ investing in screening and monitoring are better in
evaluating distressed projects. Such a bank makes more efficient liquidation decisions,
than a bank that follows a strict liquidation rule (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).
From the firm’s perspective, the attempt on the part of a relationship oriented bank
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for efficient liquidation can be seen as implicit liquidity insurance. In the case of a liquidity
shock, such a bank puts more effort into the evaluation of a firm’s solvency. That bank will
continue financing if the firm is considered to be solvent and the costs can be recouped by
future transactions. Relationship lending can be seen as a commitment to continue doing
business together through financially tough times (Ongena and Smith, 1998), and such
banks “would lean against the wind” (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Elsas and Krahnen
(1998) find that main banks in Germany with strong firm relationships do so, and do
continue to lend to customers after a worsening of the client’s credit rating. Also Ho¨wer
(2009) find that financially distressed firms that have close bank relationships have a lower
market exit probability. Especially firms with high default risk have incentives to choose
a financing partner offering such an implicit liquidity insurance.
Relationship banking is related with higher pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. Boot
and Thakor (2000) argue that banks need to invest in relationship banking. The screening
and monitoring costs need to be reimbursed by the bank’s clients. In relationship banking,
both the costumer and the bank are willing to make temporary sacrifices in order to obtain
future benefits (Ongena and Smith, 1998).9 Thus, clients are willing to accept higher up-
front interest payments if the relationship promises liquidity insurance or lower repayments
in the future. Non-pecuniary costs arise through interactions between the entrepreneur
and the bank, such as the provision of confidential information and transaction costs for
meetings.
Based on the above literature review regarding relationship banking of mature firms,
I expect the following behavior of newly established firms. Firms with comparably high
default risks or managed by entrepreneurs asking for liquidity insurance are more likely
to select a relationship oriented bank. In contrast, cost-sensitive firms and those with low
default risk are more likely to select a transaction oriented bank.
4.2.2 The German Banking System and Identification of Relationship
Oriented Banks
In the literature, relationship banking is identified by either using firm–bank relationships
or bank characteristics. Identification based on the characteristics of the firm–bank rela-
tionship use its duration (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998) or its scope (i.e., financing volume
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005)). This however is not useful in the context of this study.
My interest is in testing whether newly established firms with certain characteristics are
more likely to choose a transaction or a relationship oriented bank. Similar to Elyasiani
and Goldberg (2004), I use bank characteristics to distinguish between transaction and
relationship oriented banks.
In this study, I use the differences in ownership and governance within the German
banking system to distinguish between relationship and transaction oriented banks. The
German banking system can be characterised as a “Three Pillar System,” referring to pub-
9Studies concerning the effect of relationship banking on interest rates analyze the intertemporal behav-
ior and find mixed results. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict decreasing interest rates and collateral
requirements while the relationship matures (see also Santikian (2011)). In contrast, Greenbaum et al.
(1989); Rajan (1992) predict increasing interest rates since lenders recoup the initially subsidized interest
rates. I am not aware of studies analyzing the differences in interest rates and fees between relationship
oriented and transaction oriented banks for equally risky firms.
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lic, cooperative, and private banks, all active as universal banks (Engerer and Schrooten,
2004). Sparkassen have a “public mandate” to foster regional development and support
firms as long as is economically reasonable. In Germany, this objective is codified in the
laws governing Sparkassen. Sparkassen are owned by the district or municipality. Local
politicians are represented in the board of supervisors to ensure that the bank fulfils its
mandate. Landesbanken are the central banks of the Sparkassen, but also have their own
business clients. These banks are jointly owned by the regional Sparkassen association
and the federal states. Until 2005, the owners of Sparkassen and Landesbanken provided
an unlimited cover in case of the bank’s financial distress (so-called Gewa¨hrtra¨gerhaftung
and Anstaltslast). This regulation was removed for competitive reasons. However, the
Sparkassen banking sector still provides implicit guarantees by either direct bail–out or
mergers within the sector, and a bank’s risk from former financial contracts are covered
until 2015.10
Most cooperative banks are organized locally, whereas some cooperative banks are
active nationwide but specialize in certain industries (e.g. the Deutsche Apotheker und
A¨rztebank specialized for pharmacies and medical practitioners). Cooperative banks are
owned by members which can be private persons or firms. A cooperative bank’s aim is
“to promote the acquisition and the business of members” (Engerer, 2006). Hakenes and
Schnabel (2011) show that cooperative banks perform the same functions as Sparkassen.
Members face an additional payment liability in case of bank insolvency, which lowers
the costs of refinancing. They are represented in the board of supervisors to ensure the
fulfilment of the bank’s mission. Sparkassen and especially cooperative banks have a close
branch network. This makes them more capable of collecting soft information than are
private banks.
Private banks have no mission statement similar to those Sparkassen and cooperative
banks, but are shareholder value oriented. It is argued that private banks face higher
refinancing costs, because these are neither protected by (explicit or implicit) guarantees
nor by the owners’ additional liability. As Matthey (2010) point out, “to what extent
the true objective functions differ is subject to debate. But public banks usually have the
mandate to support the economy, which they cannot publicly breach. Accordingly, most
borrowers assume that if they take out a loan from the public bank their firm will not get
liquidated at the first sign of financial difficulties. Independently of the public bank’s true
objective function this perception may suffice to allow private banks to enter the market,
separate the borrower pool, and obtain profits in equilibrium”. In the theoretical model of
Matthey (2010), private banks have incentives for offering more attractive loans to safe
firms by a lending policy that includes the liquidation of any distressed borrower. The
expected returns of safe firms are higher than those of risky firms, and private banks can
offer lower interest rates that overcome their cost disadvantage. Even explicit guaran-
tees of Sparkassen to phase out the mandate do not. Sparkassen and cooperative banks
still describe their business model as being oriented “towards common welfare, based on
economic performance” (DSGV, 2008). A Private bank’s liquidation policy needs to be
credible. This does not rule out intensive firm–bank relationships where private banks
10The bail–out of Landesbanken by Sparkassen associations and states in the aftermath of the financial
crisis serves as anecdotic evidence.
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collect confidential information by multiple interactions with the firm. But entrepreneurs
need to believe that renegotiation is much harder with private than with non-private
banks, and self select accordingly.
Table 4.1: Bank business area and market share by bank type (2009)
Bank type Statistic Bank business area
regional super-regional national Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public banks # banks 395 41 3 439
market share 0.42 0.06 0.01 0.49
Cooperative banks # banks 904 233 17 1,154
market share 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.28
Private banks # banks 114 62 32 208
market share < 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.23
Total # banks 1,413 336 52 1,801
market share 0.62 0.13 0.24 1.00
Note: This table presents the number of banks according to their bank type and scope of business area, as well
as the share of German banks that have a main bank relation with a particular bank. Information on the number
of banks active in banking with businesses is provided in the ZEW Banking Panel. Information on firm shares is
estimated based on the Mannheim Enterprise Panel. Banks are classified as follows: portfolio firms spread over
up to ten districts as regional, between eleven to 40 districts as supra-regional, and more than 40 districts as
national.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Another aspect of the German banking system is that some banks have restricted
spatial business areas. The so–called “regional principle” should ensure that Sparkassen
and most cooperative banks have a natural interest in their region’s performance. This
restriction influences the pool of alternative banks from which a firm can choose. I classify
a bank in terms of its spatial business area as being either regionally, supra-regionally, or
nationally active. The scope of action of a bank is determined on the basis of the spatial
distribution of its clients. For each bank, I count the number of districts in which its
clients are located. In some cases, banks have only a single client in a district. To avoid
inflating the figures with such cases, I only consider firm–bank relationships if the following
criteria hold: First, at least three clients are located in a given district. Second, the share of
observed firm–bank relationships of a given district to all firm–bank relationships observed
is larger than 0.24%. This criterion is equivalent to a bank with clients equally distributed
among the 412 German districts. Banks with clients in up to ten districts are defined to
be regionally active banks, between eleven and 40 districts, super-regionally active, and
above 40 districts, nationally active.
In Table 4.1, I present the number of active banks in 2009 according to their ownership
type and the scope of their spatial business area. The table shows that 395 Sparkassen
sector banks were regionally active. These banks served as the main bank for 42% of
all firms active in Germany. Nearly two out of five cooperative banks are active on the
regional level only, serving as the main bank relationship for 20% of all customers.
4.3 Description of the Data Set
My analysis is based on the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. This panel is a representative sam-
ple of newly established firms in Germany. The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is a stratified
random sample, drawn from the MUP that has a nearly full coverage of the economically
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active firms located in Germany. Firm level data of the MUP is collected by Creditreform,
which is the largest credit rating agency in Germany. The stratification criteria are the
year of establishment, the firm’s industry coding, and KfW support.11 Firms in high-tech
industries and with KfW support are oversampled in order to ensure having sufficiently
many observations to evaluate either group. The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is a yearly
survey and started in 2008. The survey is conducted using computer assisted telephone
interviews. The sample screening ensures that only independent businesses, i.e., businesses
that do not belong to a group of companies, are interviewed (see Fryges et al., 2010, for
a more detailed description of the data set).
The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel contains information on the funding, economic activity
and the managers of newly established firms. The fifth wave of the KfW/ZEW Start-up
Panel, which was conducted in 2012, contains information regarding the firm’s main bank
decision. In addition to the ordinary questionnaire, firms founded in the years 2009 to 2011
were asked the questions presented in Figure 4.1. In the interviews, 3075 firms classified
their main bank as either Sparkasse, cooperative, private, or non-existent (question (1) of
Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Bank choice related part of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel questionnaire
1. To which banking group does your Hausbank belong to? Yes
(a) Sparkassen (INT: also Landesbanken) 
(b) Cooperative banks (INT: Sparda-Bank, PSD-Banken) 
(c) Large or private banks (INT: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, former
Dresdner Bank, Postbank, HypoVereinsbank, other regional banks, di-
rect banks, affiliates of international banks)

INT: Please do not read aloud the following options:
(d) No house bank/main bank 
(e) Do not know / Refuses to answer 
2. Did you or another member of the management
team participate in a private or business relationship
with your Hausbank before it became the official
Hausbank of your firm?
Yes No
 
3. Which criteria were important to you while
searching for an adequate Hausbank? Please rank the
following criteria on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being of utmost
importance and 5 being of no importance.
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Prog: Rotate answers 1 2 3 4 5
(a) Specialized industry expertise of the bank     
(b) Expected support in case of a critical business development     
(c) Supply of specialized financial services, i.e. international trade     
(d) Geographical proximity to the bank     
(e) Favorable market conditions     
4. With which other banks did you have conversations about
house bank relationships? With (other) . . .
Yes No
INT: In case of several members of the board of management, one mem-
ber conversing with the bank will suffice.
(a) Sparkassen  
(b) cooperative banks  
(c) large or private banks  
5. Did one of the banks with which you had these talks
reject running a debit account, a loan or other
business relationships?
Yes No Do not know /
Refuses to answer
  
Note: These questions were part in the fifth wave of the KfW/ZEW start-up Panel conducted as a computer
assisted telephone interview (CATI) in 2012. The query was limited to firms up to the age of three.
11Certain industries are excluded, such as agriculture. KfW is a promotional bank at the federal level
in Germany. KfW provides support not only by promotional loans but also by other subsidies, such as
financial funds for entrepreneurial coaching. A firm is stratified as KfW supported if it received any kind
of support from the KfW.
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In addition to the survey data, the MUP contains, for most of the firms, information
on the bank’s name, local branch, and type of the bank that serves as the firm’s main
bank relationship, as well as for up to five further bank relationships. In Table 4.2, I show
that for 1862 cases, or 52%, the main bank information provided in the MUP is consistent
with the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel (Column (1)). Column (2) shows that in 10% of the
cases, the bank type information is inconsistent. The bank information in the MUP is
missing for 1330 firms (37%).
The data set is complemented by the ZEW Bank Panel. This panel contains infor-
mation about the characteristics of each bank’s portfolio, regarding business clients. The
characteristics are calculated based on the firm–main bank relationships observed in the
MUP. There are two advantages in using the ZEW Bank Panel, compared to the publicly
available data, such as the bank balance sheet data from Bankscope provided by Bureau
van Dijk, which is often used in empirical studies. First, especially for small banks, bal-
ance sheet data is often not available. See, however from Table 4.1, that regionally active,
typically small, banks have a large market share in terms of main bank relationships.
The ZEW Bank Panel covers any bank having relationships with German firms. Second,
the ZEW Bank Panel allows a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of the banks’
portfolio, such as industry concentration or market shares in local banking markets, than
does the balance sheet data.
Table 4.2: Sample structure and identification of main-bank relationsships
Year of Statistics KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel bank information is ... Total
foundation consistent with MUP inconsistent with MUP unknown in MUP
(1) (2) (3)
2009 obs. 644 139 312 1,095
% 0.59 0.13 0.28 1.00
2010 obs. 648 106 432 1,186
% 0.55 0.09 0.36 1.00
2011 obs. 570 119 586 1,275
% 0.45 0.09 0.46 1.00
Total obs. 1,862 364 1,330 3,556
% 0.52 0.10 0.37 1.00
Note: This table presents the sample structure and the identification of a firm’s main bank relation. The
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel provides information on the type of the firm’s main bank relation. The Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (MUP) provides information a firm’s main bank and bank type. The table presents the number
of observations and share of firms for which information from both data sets regarding firms’ main bank type is
either consistent, inconsistent, or missing in the MUP.
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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4.4 Logit Model Approach
To examine firms’ criteria and characteristics for choosing a main bank relationship I
employ a logit regression model. The model employed has the following specification:
ln[ p(Non-Private Banki=1)1−p(Non-Private Banki=1) ] = α0 +α1 × ex ante risk
+α2 × Criteria
+α3 × Previous personal relation
+α4 × Seeking external finance
+α5 × Signal: No gov. support
+α6 × Export / Born global
+ε
(4.1)
4.4.1 Variable Description
Dependent Variable In this model, “Non-private banki” is an indicator of the bank
type that serves as the main bank relationship for firmi. As a result of the discussion
in Section 4.2.2 regarding the German banking system, one can infer that private banks
are more transaction oriented whereas non-private banks are more relationship oriented.
The dummy variable is unity if the selected bank is either a Sparkasse, a Landesbank, or
a cooperative bank. In Table 4.3, I present the distribution of the main bank relation-
ship by bank type within the sample. Sparkassen have the highest share of main bank
relationships, serving 49% of all newly established firms. Landesbanken only serve a small
fraction, 2%. Nearly one–third of newly established firms have their main relationship
with a cooperative bank, whereas these banks have the closest branch network (44% of
all observed branches are from cooperative banks). The variable “Non-private bank” is
zero for the following banks: Deutsche Bank (6% market share in main bank relationships
with newly established firms), Commerzbank (7%), Postbank (3%), and HypoVereinsbank
(Member of UniCredit ; 2%), as well as other private banks (2%).12 The distribution of
banking groups for start-up firms within the sample is representative for Germany and is
similar to those of established small and medium sized firms.
Independent Variables—Ideal data set and proxies used I present the descriptive
statistics of the main explanatory variables in Table 4.4. The table shows the mean values
within the sample, as well as the mean conditional on the type of the main bank chosen.
In addition, the table shows the expected sign for the logit regression with private banks
as base category.
My main interest is in the role of firm risk in the entrepreneur’s initial main bank
choice. In an ideal setting, I would be able to distinguish between a bank’s supply of
a liquidity insurance and a firm’s demand for such. The firm demand for an insurance
depends on the firm risk and the entrepreneur’s belief that the insurance is valid. Previous
research has shown that firm risk need not correlate with the entrepreneur’s confidence
or risk assessment. A confident entrepreneur might see a low probability of becoming
12During the years of observation, Postbank was taken over by Deutsche Bank. Postbank is left as an
option since it still operates under the brand “Postbank.”
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Table 4.3: Main-bank relationships of newly established firms
Public banks Cooperative banks Private banks
firm obs 946 559 357
share 51% 30% 19%
Sparkasse Landesbank Cooperative Large banks other
banks pr. banks
firm obs 906 40 559 326 31
share 49% 2% 30% 18% 2%
No. of active banks 429 10 1,154 4 205
No. of bank branches 1,946 71 2,516 890 286
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics on the main bank choice as a decision tree. Figures for firm
observation and firm shares are taken from the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel for consistent observation with the
MUP. Figures for Number of active banks and bank branches are from the ZEW Banking Panel and restricted
to main business bank relations observed by Creditreform.
† Figures presented for the year 2010; ‡ No. of bank branches reflect the count of branches that are identified
by Creditreform and must not reflect branch network definition of a particular bank.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
financially distressed, and hence not ask for liquidity insurance no matter the true risk.
Therefore, an ideal set of variables would contain a measure of ex ante default risk and of
the entrepreneur’s subjective risk assessment.
A firm’s credit rating, generally available in the MUP as provided by Creditreform,
would perform as an adequate proxy of firm ex ante risk. However, the Creditreform
rating information is not available for the firm’s initial year (see Brown et al. (2012)).
Therefore, I use a prediction of firm market exit probability as a proxy for ex ante risk.
The KfW/ZEW start-up panel contains a core set of variables for each firm related to its
initial year. The information on market exit is either provided by the survey or by the
MUP. I use a 90 % random subsample of the firms founded in 2005 to 2007, estimating
a probit regression model for firm market exit within three years after its establishment,
on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics. In Table 4.10 in the Appendix, I present
the definitions, the descriptive statistics, and the estimated coefficients of the variables
employed. The variable “market exit probability” is an out-of-sample prediction for the
sample firms founded in 2009 to 2011.
In order to test the goodness-of-fit, I use the remaining 10% subsample of firms founded
in 2005 to 2007 with known market exit for an out-of-sample prediction. In Figure 4.3
in the Appendix, I plot the Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve. This curve
draws the probability of detecting a true state (sensitivity) against the probability de-
tecting a false state (1 – specificity). The area under the curve provides a measure of
the discrimination. The diagonal line (Area under ROC curve = 0.5) suggests no dis-
crimination whereas 1 would be perfect discrimination. The estimated area under ROC
curve coefficient of 0.73 is considered an acceptable level of discrimination (Hosmer and
Lemeshow, 2000). For a self selection strategy adopted by private banks to be successful,
ex ante high risk firms would need to choose a non-private bank. I therefore expect a
positive sign for ex ante risk and non-private banks.
A sound measure for entrepreneurial confidence and subjective risk assessment is miss-
ing in the data. However, in the interview, entrepreneurs were asked to rank the impor-
tance of the following criteria for selecting their initial main bank, on a five point Likert
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scale: “Expected support in case of a critical business development” (Question 3 (b) of
Table 4.1). This measures the entrepreneur’s demand for liquidity insurance in difficult
times. It might not be directly related with the entrepreneur’s subjective probability of
becoming financially distressed. Even if an entrepreneur would consider this as an extreme
event, it is severe for firm survival. No matter the reason, firms with a demand for liquidity
insurance should be more likely to choose a relationship oriented bank. I therefore expect
a positive sign in the logit regression. The measure is noisy for at least two reasons. First,
the entrepreneur must be willing to give the bank a stake in the firm. Otherwise the bank
will have no interest in supporting the firm. Second, the entrepreneur needs to expect that
at least some banks would support the firm. The latter reason is not a problem for identi-
fication because if an entrepreneur did not expect support from a single bank, this criteria
would be of no importance for that entrepreneur. For the interpretation of this variable,
one has to keep in mind that during the telephone interview, entrepreneurs respond to
the question up to three years after the initial bank was selected. Therefore, it cannot
ruled out that the entrepreneurs’ answers were biased by either business developments or
by experience with the bank selected.
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.4 reveal that bank support is a very important
criterion for over one–third of all firms. It further provides univariate evidence that firms
that expect bank support in difficult times are more likely to choose a non-private bank.
The share of firms for which this criterion is of utmost importance is 39% for Sparkassen
and 38% for cooperative banks, compared to 24% for private banks.
Table 4.4: Firm characteristics and selected bank type
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Mean Mean Exp. Sign
conditional on chosen main bank type: Base:
Public Cooperative Private Full Sample Private Bank
1. No. of observations (869) (508) (323) (1,700)
2. Previous bank relation 69% 62% 54% 64% +
3.(a) Criteria: Industry
competence†
9% 11% 9% 10% +/-
3.(b) Criteria: Support in crisis† 39% 38% 24% 36% +
3.(c) Criteria: Specialized fin.
services†
6% 5% 9% 6% -
3.(d) Criteria: Favorable market
conditions†
27% 31% 34% 29% -
3.(e) Criteria: Closeness to bank† 48% 48% 24% 43% +
4. Talks with multiple banks 51% 58% 59% 54% +
5. Bank loan/service denied 13% 14% 12% 13% +/-
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 16% 16% 17% 16% +
Demand for bank finance 57% 61% 32% 53% +
Signal: No Governmental sup-
port
33% 31% 55% 37% -
Demand for equity finance 4% 5% 8% 5% -
Export 11% 11% 14% 12% -
Note: † Criterion was of utmost importance (5 scale likert).
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Based on the discussion of relationship banking, I employ two further variables, pre-
vious personal bank relationship and seeking bank financing. First, I use the indicator
variable “previous personal bank relations” (Question 2 of Figure 4.1). Personal relation-
ships are valuable if the firm seeks a close bank relationship and the managers consider the
bank as capable of processing personal information. Previous private bank relationships
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cannot reduce information asymmetry between the firm and bank about the new project,
but banks can use the information about the managers personal trustworthiness and li-
ability. This can become especially important if firms are in financially difficult times.
The identification of this variable is the reverse. Given that personal information is of
less value for private banks, such entrepreneurs would need to build a new relationship
anyway. Since relationship-oriented firms are more capable to process this type of infor-
mation, those might be better able to bind those clients. Therefore, I expect a positive
sign of “previous personal bank relation”. Table 4.4 shows that nearly two third of all
firms use a bank that served as personal main bank relationship of the entrepreneur. 66%
of firms that choice a non-private bank already had previous personal relationships. This
share is smaller within the group choosing a private bank (55%).
Second, I consider firms seeking bank finance in the initial year. With increasing
debt the financiers’ influence increases. The financiers can decide to liquidate the firm
if necessary. Further, relationship banking might increase access to finance. Following
Brown et al. (2012), I define firms with demand for external finance if the firm reported
difficulties and/or used external finance. Demand for bank finance includes the use of
long-term, short-term debt, and promotional loans, as well as reported difficulties seeking
bank finance.13 I expect the coefficient to be positive for non-private banks. Descriptive
statistics already indicate such a relationship. The share of firms seeking bank finance
is higher for firms that choose a Sparkasse (56%) and cooperative (59%) compared to a
private bank (32%).
I use two variables to identify firms seeking transaction-oriented banks. First, firms
stating “favorable market conditions” as a very important criterion selecting a bank (Ques-
tion 3 (b) of Figure 4.1) may not be willing to accept higher costs from relationship-oriented
banks. The share of firms for which favorable market conditions are of utmost importance
is higher for private banks (36%) compared to Sparkassen (28%) or cooperative banks
(31%).
Second, firms can signal their low risk status to transaction-oriented banks by for-
going public support. Such is offered by the German federal and state governments to
newly established firms. On their web page the German federal ministry of economics
and technology lists 193 different public programs available for newly established firms.
The executing institutions also provide assistance applying for subsidies to keep firms’
adminstration costs at a low, affordable level. The chance to receive funding is relatively
high. Based on figures of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel only 8% of firms seeking public
funding were denied. Not demanding public support then can serve as a signal for low
risk. I expect the sign to be negative. Demand for governmental support is defined as the
use and/or stated difficulties attracting either promotional loans, state guarantees, start-
up grants from the federal employment agency, or other forms of subsidies. The share of
firms not demanding public support is higher for private main banks (55%) compared to
Sparkassen or cooperative banks (36% and 32%).
As further criteria, I control for banks’ “industry competence” and “specialized financial
products”. An entrepreneur might consider that banks with high competence or experi-
13Loans from the KfW (on the federal level) and other state promotional banks are mostly granted by
a firms’ main bank, while the promotional bank covers up to 80% of the main bank’s loan default risk.
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ence in the firms business is better able to assess the firms business model. Ho¨wer et al.
(2011) show that firms with relationship to a bank experienced in the firms industry invest
more in R&D. Large, private banks might find it easier organising competence centers for
special fields due to the number of customers. However, especially in the cooperative
banking sector industry specialized banks exist. For this reason there is no expectation
regarding the coefficient’s sign. Depending on their business models firms might also de-
mand specialized financial services, e.g. export financing. Large, private banks are directly
connected internationally. Those banks can offer specialized financial products in-house.
Smaller Sparkassen and cooperative banks instead need to cooperate with their central
institutes. Entrepreneurs might consider that Sparkassen and cooperative banks are less
competent in that field and expect higher (transaction) costs. Descriptive statistics reveal
that the share of firms for which specialized financial services was of utmost importance
is higher for private (9%) compared to cooperative banks (5%) or Sparkassen (6%). I
therefore expect the coefficient to be negative.
Further, I employ a set of control variables that have a potential influence on main
bank choice. A full list of variable definition and descriptive statistics is provided in Table
4.11 in the Appendix. Next to loans, banks offer a variety of financial services. The share
of firms for which specialized financial products was a very important criterion, as well
as for exporting firms, is higher for private banks. Export is an indicator variable that
takes on the value of one if the firm was able to sell products on international markets. I
also control for firm size at start-up, entrepreneurs’ education, industry experience, and
demand for external equity (e.g. Venture Capital, Business Angels, mezzanine capital).
Firm size is measured as the number of employees at start-up, with an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm was founded by a team. I account for entrepreneurs with a
university degree and those that hold a master craftsman’s diploma. For entrepreneurial
experience, I distinguish between successful entrepreneurs that sold a previous business
or run multiple businesses from unsuccessful ones (restarter). I control for ten industries,
including four high-tech (see Table 4.15 in the Appendix for industry classification).
The variables “bank intensity”, “local banking market competition” and regional classi-
fication control for regional aspects the where firm is located. “Bank intensity” is measured
as the number of banks active in the firm’s district divided by the number of active firms
in that district. I measure “local banking market competition” as the number of firms
that switched their main bank relationship within the firm’s district in proportion to the
number of active firms. Further, districts are classified based on the population density
as either metropolises, major cities, hinterland, urban areas, or rural areas, defined by the
federal office for building and regional planing.
4.4.2 Results of the Logit Model
In Table 4.5 I present the results of the logit model of the firm’s main bank selection. As
dependent variable I use non-private banks (Sparkassen, Landesbanken, and cooperative
banks) with private banks as the base category. From the discussion on bank types above,
non-private banks are supposed to be more relationship-oriented than private banks. A
positive coefficient therefore suggests that respective firms are more likely to choose a
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relationship-oriented bank. Next to the coefficient I present the marginal effects (dydx).
All three specifications presented are based on the sample of consistent bank information
(see Table 4.2 column (1)).
The first specification is used as the base model. It includes variables on entrepreneurial,
firm, and regional characteristics. In the second specification, I introduce choice criteria.
The third specification additionally covers variables regarding firms’ demand for external
finance. The number of observations drops by a quarter because firms entering the panel
a year after start-up are asked regarding demand for external finance only. The main
explanatory variable coefficients remain stable in all specifications and also for other spec-
ifications were I additionally use observations with missing bank information in the MUP
(see Table 4.2 column (3)).
Variables indicating relationship orientation I first consider the variables indicat-
ing relationship oriented firms. As discussed above, private banks do not have a mission
statement or mandate and entrepreneurs might anticipate renegotiations in episodes of
distress to be much tougher with private compared to non-private banks. Consistent with
expectations, I find that entrepreneurs for whom “expected support in case of a critical
business development” was of utmost important criteria while searching the main bank
relationship are more likely to choose a non-private bank. Those entrepreneurs have a 8%
higher probability of choosing a Sparkasse or cooperative bank. A successful self selection
strategy, offering low cost transaction oriented banking as discussed by Matthey (2010),
would require attracting low default risk firms. The results of my empirical model do
not confirm such a pattern. The effect of the variable “predicted default probability” of
choosing a non-private bank is not statistically significantly different from zero.
There are at least two explanations for this. First, an entrepreneur’s demand for
liquidity insurance need not depend on an objective risk measure. An entrepreneur might
also want to be insured against an event that is unlikely but existential for the firm. Second,
an entrepreneur’s own beliefs regarding the probability of distress might not correlate
with the predicted market exit probability. As an attempt to control for entrepreneurs’
(over)confidence and expectations, I employed further specifications including indicator
variables “implementing business ideas”, and “expected higher salary” as motives for start-
ups, as well as “expected sales decline”. None of these three variables are significant.
For expected sales decline, this might be the case because entrepreneurs build up their
business in the first years. In the sample, only a small fraction of firms’ expected sales
decline from the initial year to the second. Both motivations might be related to higher
an entrepreneurial confidence higher than for those that start business as a way out of
(expected) unemployment. However, the introduction of these variables do not change the
results for the main explanatory variables.
Although private banks might not attract low risk clients to a larger extent than
non-private banks, a self selection strategy by private banks could still be fruitful. Bank
clients do not necessarily demand bank financing. The average risk in private bank’s
loan portfolio could be lower if only low risk firms demand bank financing or if private
banks employ stricter rules. I find that firms with “demand for bank finance” (used or
reported difficulties with bank finance) have a 10% higher probability choosing a non-
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Table 4.5: Main results – Chosen main-bank type (logit model)
Dependent Variable: Base Choice Criteria Financing sources
Non-private Bank Coef. Margin Coef. Margin Coef. Margin
(Base: Private Bank) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Personal prior relation 0.445** 0.059** 0.601*** 0.078***
(0.139) (0.164)
Talks with multiple Banks -0.297* -0.039* -0.328 -0.042
(0.146) (0.172)
Bank loan/service denied 0.405 0.053 0.122 0.016
(0.216) (0.256)
Market Exit Prob (3 years) -2.041 -0.269 -0.878 -0.113
(1.413) (1.789)
Criteria: Industry competence -0.314 -0.041 -0.342 -0.044
(0.254) (0.309)
Criteria: Support in crises 0.596*** 0.079*** 0.584** 0.075**
(0.164) (0.194)
Criteria: Specialized financial
services
-0.698** -0.092** -0.672* -0.087*
(0.265) (0.330)
Criteria: Favorable market condi-
tions
-0.645*** -0.085*** -0.671*** -0.087***
(0.156) (0.183)
Criteria: Short distance to bank 0.929*** 0.122*** 1.129*** 0.146***
(0.153) (0.181)
No. of bank relations 0.114 0.015 0.062 0.008
(0.197) (0.247)
Demand for bank finance 0.813*** 0.105***
(0.191)
No demand gov support -0.374* -0.048*
(0.178)
Demand for external equity -0.429 -0.055
(0.326)
Export -0.029 -0.004
(0.241)
Sales -0.125 -0.018 -0.111 -0.015 -0.019 -0.003
(0.220) (0.228) (0.293)
Proprietorship -0.449** -0.063** -0.583** -0.077** -0.380 -0.049
(0.148) (0.182) (0.227)
Firm size (employees) 0.114** 0.016** 0.121** 0.016** 0.070 0.009
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
Management team 0.023 0.003 0.013 0.002 0.129 0.017
(0.154) (0.160) (0.185)
Entrepreneurial record -0.418** -0.059** -0.427* -0.056* -0.334 -0.043
(0.159) (0.174) (0.189)
University degree -0.068 -0.010 -0.040 -0.005 -0.080 -0.010
(0.167) (0.173) (0.200)
Master craftsman 0.289 0.041 0.216 0.028 0.193 0.025
(0.200) (0.209) (0.252)
Metropolises -1.190*** -0.168*** -1.021*** -0.134*** -0.746* -0.096*
(0.235) (0.244) (0.298)
Major city -0.410* -0.058* -0.344 -0.045 -0.351 -0.045
(0.175) (0.181) (0.209)
Urban area 0.072 0.010 0.121 0.016 -0.108 -0.014
(0.248) (0.264) (0.302)
Rural area -0.636** -0.090** -0.588** -0.077** -0.603* -0.078*
(0.211) (0.222) (0.267)
Bank intensity (district) 0.225 0.032 0.287 0.038 0.410 0.053
(0.287) (0.300) (0.361)
Banking competition (district) -46.012 -6.494 -38.152 -5.024 -16.159 -2.086
(24.574) (25.403) (30.489)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.646*** 1.370** 0.719
(0.374) (0.524) (0.649)
Observations 1,700 1,700 1,273
LR Chi2 133 233 235
log likelihood -760.18 -710.00 -518.63
Note: In this table I present the results after a logit regression for observations with consistent bank type information in the
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and Mannheim Enterprise Panel. I use “Non-private bank” as the dependent variable in all specifica-
tions. This indicator variable is one if the selected main bank is non-private and zero otherwise. The regressions are based on
three samples: “Base” includes entrepreneurial and regional characteristics. “Criteria” additionally includes variables regarding
selection criteria. Sample sice reduces for “Financing sources” since demand for finance and exports for the initial year is asked if
the firm enters the Panel in its second year only. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance
level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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private bank. This might be the case because firms think that non-private banks are
more likely to grant loans. Other empirical studies have shown that firms seeking bank
finance face more difficulties if their main bank is a private bank (Brown et al., 2012),
as well as having a more relaxed access to bank financing due to relationship banking
(Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). When a firm uses bank financing, the bank’s stake in the firm
increases. I used two interaction terms to control for a joint effect of “demand for bank
finance” and “predicted default probability”, as well as “demand for bank finance” and the
criterion “expected support in case of difficult business development”. Neither of these two
interaction terms is significant (not reported in the table). This could be the case because
the variable “demand for bank finance’ ’ is restricted to the firm’s initial year. Fryges et al.
(2012) show that the fraction of firms using external finance increases with firm age. 70%
of all five year old firms used external financing at least once, with bank finance as the
most important source of external finance. Firms that anticipate future demand for bank
finance might consider support in financial distress as important. This however can hardly
be observed in the initial year.
I find that entrepreneurs who had previous personal or business related relationships
with the firm’s main bank have a nearly 10% higher probability of selecting a non-private
bank. If entrepreneurs consider personal relationships to be meaningless, they would
choose a bank for other reasons and the coefficient would have been insignificant. An en-
trepreneur could also stay with their personal prior bank relationship just for convenience.
This, however, should not be related to bank type, and the coefficient should again be
insignificant. I therefore infer that entrepreneurs’ evaluations of personal relationships and
their being valuable for a firm main bank relationship, differ across bank types. An en-
trepreneur with a previous personal bank relationship to a Sparkasse or cooperative bank
might expect that heir bank is capable of processing personal information also for the new
firm. A Sparkasse or cooperative bank is therefore more capable of binding those customers
that seek to build a close firm–bank relationship. An entrepreneur with a private bank
as their previous personal relationship might consider this personal information as less
valuable for a new firm–bank relationship. Such an entrepreneur would need to build up
a firm–bank relationship without personal information anyway. Compared to Sparkassen
and cooperative banks, private banks are therefore less able to bind such entrepreneurs.
In these considerations, I assume that the choice of a personal main bank relationship was
not influenced by a potential future start-up. I also control for entrepreneurial experience
to rule out the described effect’s not being influenced by previous firm–bank relations.
Variables indicating a transaction orientation The variables indicating transaction
oriented firms also have expected signs. Firms for which “favorable market conditions”
are of utmost importance are more likely to choose a private bank. The coefficient is
statistically significant and the marginal effect suggests that cost sensitive firms are nearly
8% less likely to choose a non-private bank. The results indicate that those entrepreneurs
consider that non-private banks offer services and loans at higher costs, and so choose
a private bank. The distinction between relationship and transaction oriented banks by
their type can serve as an explanation. Relationship-oriented banks need to invest in
specialization (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Entrepreneurs might infer that this investment
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comes with higher costs. For entrepreneurs, comparing costs for bank services can become
very difficult due to cross selling and interest rate differences. Even if cost differences
did not exist, would be sufficient that entrepreneurs expect them to exist. In addition,
entrepreneurs take into consideration the higher transaction costs related to relationship
oriented banks that are due to the higher frequency of meetings and the need to provide in-
formation. Firms that are cost sensitive do not consider relationship lending as important
use a private bank.
I find a weak negative significant effect of firms’ foregoing governmental support on
their choice of a non-private bank. As described in subsection 4.4.1, the cost of applying
for governmental support is affordable and the chances of receiving it are quite high. So
why do firms “leave money on the table” and why are those firms more likely to end up
with a private bank? Public subsidies are intended to improve the situations of high risk
firms. Low risk or good performing firms should not be subsidized. I find that firms that
did not apply for subsidies in their initial year have a nearly 5% lower probability of using
a non-private bank. Firms approaching a private bank could therefore use “not demanding
subsidies” as a signal to indicate their low level of risk.
Results for the control variables Firms seeking specialized financial products, e.g.,
export financing or warranty guarantees, are more likely to choose a private bank. The
majority of firms that choose a private bank have a relationship with one of the large banks.
These banks have better and more direct international connections. In general, Sparkassen
and cooperative banks also offer all types of bank services. However, specialized services
are provided by their central banks. Local Sparkassen and cooperative banks therefore
might be less experienced and the transaction costs might increase, as a further institution
is involved. Private banks instead have in-house competence center for specialized financial
services.
Entrepreneurial and firm characteristics seem not to play a major role in the choice
of the main bank. Larger firms, in terms of the number of employees at the start of
their business, have a higher probability of choosing a non-private bank, whereas firms
in the legal form of a limited liability company are more likely to use a private bank.
Entrepreneurs with previous entrepreneurial experience are also more likely to choose a
private bank. But the findings for these three variables are not robust and vanish as soon
as I introduce variables regarding demand for external finance.
There are two interesting effects regarding regional characteristics. First, firms in
regions classified as metropolitan areas or major cities are less likely to choose a non-
private bank than are firms located in urban areas. Second, and even more interesting,
firms located in rural areas are less likely to choose a non-private bank than are firms in
urban areas. This is surprising, because it is often argued that Sparkassen and cooperative
banks are dominant in rural areas. The descriptive statistics of the distance by bank type
and regional type also reveal that Sparkassen and cooperative banks are located closer to
firms than are private banks. The mean distance of the closest Sparkasse in rural areas is
2.2 km, of cooperative banks 2.3 km, and of private banks 12 km.14 In rural areas, those
14The direct distance presented seems quite close for rural areas. But note that firms are most likely to
choose a location close to any existing infrastructure.
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branches of Sparkassen and cooperative banks are typically small and provide services
for private households. Firms seeking bank financing or with a demand for specialized
services might be asked to approach the bank’s headquarter or a better suited branch.
Even if local branch managers might be in close contact with these units and are asked
about the entrepreneur’s reliability, the entrepreneur would have to face travel costs. Due
to these transaction costs, entrepreneurs in rural areas might be more likely to choose a
private bank than are entrepreneurs in urban areas.
4.5 Nested Logit Model Approach
The empirical model presented above is imprecise in that a firm chooses a bank and not
just a bank type. Now I use a model that allows each firm to choose a main bank from
a set of alternative banks. This version of a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978) is well
suited to deal reasonably flexible with the size of firm observations, bank alternatives, and
a large set of observed variables describing firms’ choice. Each firm i chooses a bank k out
of a set of alternatives from which to choose. The individuals are firms established in the
year of observation. The alternatives from which to choose are the universal banks active
in business financing. Each bank belongs to a single banking group j (either non–private
or private).
The firm’s utility obtained from choosing a bank k out of a banking group j can be
expressed as
Ujk = Vjk + εjk (4.2)
with k = 1, 2, ...,Kj , j = 1, 2, ..., J .
The nested logit model arises when the error terms εjk have the generalized extreme
value distribution with joint cumulative distribution
G(Y ) =
J∑
j=1
(
Kj∑
k=1
Y
1/ρj
jk )
ρj (4.3)
where the scale or dissimilarity parameter ρj is inversely related to the correlation between
εjk and εjl. The parameter ρj can be interpreted as the degree of independence of the error
terms among alternatives within a nest. The larger the ρ, the greater the independence
and the less the correlation between the error terms. The outcome variable Yjk either
takes the value unity if the bank alternative is chosen as the main bank relationship, or
zero otherwise. The parameter Vjk from Equation 4.2 can be evaluated as
Vjk = z
′
jα+ x
′
jkβj (4.4)
where zj is a vector of variables varying over firms (individual-specific) and xjk is a vector
of variables varying over banks or both firms and banks (individual-alternative specific).
The probability of the nested logit model with generalized extreme value distribution can
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Figure 4.2: Decision tree — Main bank choice
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be expressed as
pjk =
exp(zjα+ ρjIj)∑J
m=1 exp(z
′
mα+ ρmIm)
×
exp(
x′jkβj
ρj
)∑Kj
l=1 exp(
x′jlβj
ρj
)
(4.5)
where
Ij = ln(
Kj∑
l=1
exp(
x′jlβj
ρj
)) (4.6)
is the inclusive value. The nested logit model can be decomposed into two logits (pjk =
pj×pk|j). That is the probability that firm i chooses the banking group j (the first part of
Equation 4.5, that is similar to the logit model presented above) times the probability that
the firm chooses bank k conditional on choosing bank group j (second part of equation 4.5).
The inclusive value Ij serves as a convenient statistical test of whether the two decisions
should be nested. If the coefficient of the inclusive value is zero, there is no nesting of the
decisions and Equation 4.5 reduces to the unconditional probability of choosing bank k
times the probability of choosing the banking group.
4.5.1 Sampling the Set of Alternatives
The definition of the decision tree and the set of alternatives is crucial for this kind of anal-
ysis. First, I test for the optimal number of nests. As mentioned in Section 4.2.2 universal
banks active in business finance are organized in three banking groups, but Sparkassen
and cooperative banks have similar business concepts (Engerer, 2006; Hakenes and Schn-
abel, 2011). I employ a Hausman test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives after
a conditional logit model for the choice of bank type, with alternative varying variables.
The test results suggest pooling Sparkassen, Landesbanken, and cooperative banks in a
single nest.
In Figure 4.2, I present the tree structure used. In the first layer, the firm chooses
one of the nests, either non-private (Sparkassen, Landesbanken, and cooperative banks) or
private banks. In the second layer, the firm selects a bank from among the alternatives in
the chosen nest.
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For technical and practical reasons, I need to reduce the set of alternatives from which
each firm can choose. The likelihood function requires that there is an observation for
each firm and alternative. Technically, the number of parameters getting estimated for
each variable added is multiplied by the number of alternatives. Practically, firms are not
able to choose any bank active in Germany because some have constrained geographical
business areas. In general, those banks are allowed to serve clients within their business
area only. This policy is not that strict in practice and one observes relationships with
firms especially in neighboring regions. However, it is unlikely that a Sparkasse in southern
Germany would actively attracts firms in northern Germany. Because there are no clearly
defined local banking markets in Germany, I use three strategies to sample banks into a
set of alternatives from which a particular firm can choose.
Sampling based on bank branch network In the first sampling strategy, I assign
banks to a firm’s choice set if the bank operates a branch close to the firm’s location.
Each set of alternatives consists of eleven banks. It contains the branch with the closest
distance of a Landesbank and each large bank (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Postbank,
and UniCredit). The firm can further choose from among two Sparkassen, two cooperative
banks, and two private banks, that have the branches closest to the firm’s location. If the
chosen main bank relationship does not belong to the sampled set, a randomly selected
bank of the same type gets replaced.
Sampling based on 25 a km radius Within the sample, the 90th percentile firm has
its main relationship with a bank branch located 25 kilometers away from the firm. In
the second sampling strategy, I therefore assign a bank to a firm’s choice set if the bank
operates a branch within 25 kilometers of the location of the firm. If a bank operates
several branches within that distance, I use the information of the closest branch. A
sampled bank branch gets replaced if the chosen bank branch is from the same bank. The
selected main bank is added if it does not operate a branch within the 25 km radius. The
number of alternatives varies over firms according to local bank intensity.
Sampling based on bank client structure Both of these sampling strategies are
based on bank branch networks. Although most firms choose a bank from among those
with a branch close to the firm, this does not fully reflect the firm’s options. Banks that
are active nationwide but operate only a few branches are less likely to be sampled into
a firm’s set of alternatives. Those banks might be specialized in the firm’s industry and
therefore be potentially attractive as a financing partner.
The third strategy is therefore based on the bank’s client structure. Basically, a bank
is sampled if it has clients in the firm’s region. There is a trade-off between false sampling
and not sampling. False sampling might accrue, because a bank’s client moved to another
region but kept its relationship. But, a nationwide bank might not be sampled because it
is small and does not yet have sufficient number of customers in the region yet. For sam-
pling, I use the classification of nationally, supra-regionally, and regionally active banks,
introduced in Section 4.2.2 (see also Table 4.1). First, the firm can choose any bank that
is nationally active. Second, a firm can choose a supra-regionally active bank if that bank
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serves clients in the firm’s regional planning area. Third, a firm can choose a regionally
active bank if that bank serves clients in the firm’s district.
The number of alternatives varies, over firms, from 57 to 195, according to local bank
intensity. The number of alternatives and parameters is still high. McFadden (1973)
shows that using a random subsample of alternatives one can obtain efficient and consistent
estimates of multinomial logit models with alternative varying variables. In the regression,
I use a random sample of one–third of the bank alternatives per firm. The number of
alternatives per firm varies between 19 and 65. Again, if the chosen main bank relationship
does not belong to the sampled set, a randomly selected bank of the same type gets
replaced.
4.5.2 Empirical Equation and Data Used
Since bank level information is required, I use the sample of observations with consistent
bank type information in both the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and the MUP (column (1)
in Table 4.2). In order to test for the hypothesis by taking alternative banks into account,
I estimate the following specification of a nested logit model:
Main Bank (0;1) = ρ Dissimilarity parameter (4.7)
+ α1 ex ante risk
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+ β3 Bank industry and spatial concentration
+ β4 Distance (firm - bank branch)
Dependent Variable The indicator variable “main bank” serves as the dependent vari-
able. The variable is unity if the bank is selected as the main bank relationship and zero
otherwise. Explanatory variables are grouped into either firm specific variables α or alter-
native varying variables β.
Data for the bank type nest (α) I use the variable “non-private bank” for identifica-
tion of the first layer. This indicator variable is unity for non-private banks and zero for
private banks. The vector of variables zj to estimate α consists of the same set of indi-
vidual specific variables used in the logit regression model above. In addition, I estimate
ρ as the dissimilarity parameter that indicates the correlation of errors within the nest.
Data for individual banks (βj) The vector x
′
jk includes a set of variables varying over
firms and alternatives. As alternative variables I employ bank portfolio characteristics
using the ZEW Bank-Panel calculated based on firm–bank relationships observed in the
MUP. Since loan volume is missing from the MUP, all characteristics are based on firm–
main bank relationships of nearly all firms in Germany. Weighting by the firm’s labor
force reflects the fact that, in general, larger firms demand higher loan volumes and more
intensive financial services. I excluded observations of large firms with more than 50,000
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employees for the calculation of this measure. Even after the data cleaning process, e.g.,
controlling for sales figures in the employment data field or double counting, there are
potential errors. The effect of this error on bank characteristics increases with the number
of employees. I tested 10,000 and 40,000 employees as alternative thresholds, without
severe effects on the results.
The descriptive statistics on these variables are shown in Table 4.6. Note that these
statistics are for banks that serve as the main bank relationships of the observed firms.
The interpretation of the table is as follows. Consider the figures regarding the bank mar-
ket share in the firm’s district for non-private banks in the first row of Table 4.6. The
mean market share in the firm’s district is 27% for Sparkassen, 7% for cooperative, and
13% for private banks. The market share of banks serving as a main bank relationship in
the full sample is 18%. The values of the bank portfolio characteristics are asymmetrically
distributed among the three banking groups (see Table 4.12 in the Appendix).
Table 4.6: Characteristics of chosen main banks
Mean Mean Definition Exp.
given chosen main bank is: Full Sign
Public Coop. Private Sample
No of observations (869) (508) (323) (1,700)
Bank size (division) 60 16 101 55 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b×Empi
1,000
Bank size (total) 60 16 3,014 608 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b×Empi
1,000
Bank market share in dis-
trict
0.27 0.07 0.13 0.18 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,d,b×Empi∑District
d=1
Firmi,d×Empi
+
Bank regional concentra-
tion
0.63 0.57 0.03 0.50 =
∑Bank
b=1 (
Firmi,d,b×Empi
Banksizeb
)2 +
Bank industry specializa-
tion
0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,ind,b×Empi
Banksizeb
+
Distance to bank branch 11 17 45 19 Direct distance between firm loca-
tion and bank branch location in
km.
-
Distance to Bank head-
quarter
16 24 257 64 Direct distance between firm loca-
tion and bank headquarter loca-
tion in km.
-
Definition of indicators: i = firm; b = bank; d = district; ind = industry
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
In the empirical banking literature, bank size is often used as a proxy for a bank’s
ability to process soft information (e.g. Stein, 2002; Berger and Black, 2011). Bank size is
usually measured by the bank’s total assets. In the publicly available data bases for bank
balance sheet information, such as Bankscope, the total assets are missing for a large share
of the banks. This would reduce the sample size significantly. Therefore, I measure “bank
size” as the total labor force of the firms for which the bank serves as the main bank.
The Spearman rank correlation between the total assets reported in bank scope and bank
size provided in the ZEW Bank panel for the year 2009 is 0.80, and significant at the one
percent level. I incorporate a squared term that controls for a potential non-linear effect
of bank size on the firm’s main bank choice. Large banks are mostly organized in regional
divisions. I calculated the bank size of large banks according to their regional reporting
required by German banking supervisory authorities. These regions correspond in general
to the states (Bundesla¨nder). Cooperative banks are the smallest banks, followed by
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Sparkassen and Landesbanken. Although large banks are split regionally, those are much
bigger than the banks from the other groups.
I use the variable “bank market share in district” to control for a bank’s engagement
in the firm’s region. I measure bank market share as the total labor force of the firms
for which the bank serves as the main bank and that are located in the entrepreneur’s
district in proportion to the total number of labor employed in the entrepreneur’s district.
I expect a positive correlation of bank market share and firm’s main bank choice.
The variable “banking market concentration” provide information about the regional
concentration within a bank’s portfolio. It is measured in the same way as the Herfindahl
Index: taking the sum of squared district shares within the bank portfolio. District shares
are calculated as the total labor force of the firms located in a particular district for which
the bank serves as a main bank, divided by the “bank size”. The variable “bank industry
expertise” is related to the industry of each firm. I calculate this variable as the total
labor force of the firms with the same industry code as the observed firm for which the
bank serves as a main bank, divided by “bank size”.
Since entrepreneurs also might consider traveling costs when choosing a main bank
relationship, I incorporate the variable “distance to branch/headquarter”. I expect a neg-
ative sign for distance. I use the STATA program “geodist” to calculate the distance as a
direct line between the firm and the bank branch/headquarter. The geocodes are imported
from google maps and based on the postal codes and city for the bank branches and the
exact addresses for the firms and bank headquarters.
4.5.3 Results of the Nested Logit Model
In Table 4.7, I present the main results of the nested logit model. For comparison, I
show the three sampling strategies: (1) closest distance to bank branch; (2) banks with
branches within 25 km of the firm’s location; and (3) client structure – banks active in the
firm’s district. For each sampling strategy, I present a base specification with the bank’s
market share and regional concentration, a specification with the bank size and industry
specialization, as well as a specification that further includes the distance between the
firm and the bank branch. Table 4.14 in the Appendix presents results with the full set
of variables.
I calculate the average marginal effects after the nested logit using the method pre-
sented in Cameron and Trivedi (2009). I increase the value of an observed alternative
varying variable for non-private banks by one standard deviation. Presented marginal
effects correspond to the mean of the difference in predicted probabilities before and after
the amendment. I present the marginal effects of the alternative varying variables for all
three specifications in Table 4.8.
I first consider the estimated dissimilarity parameter, which indicates to what extent
the error terms within a nest are correlated. A dissimilarity parameter of unity would
indicate that there is no such correlation, and the nest might be inappropriate. The test
of dissimilarity rejects the hypothesis that the dissimilarity parameter equals unity for
all specifications. The value of the estimated coefficient ρ differs over specifications. In
specifications based on the branch network (1) and (2), ρˆ is smaller for private than for
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Table 4.7: Main results (coefficients) – Chosen main-bank relationship (nested logit model)
Sampling Strategy: Closest Branch Branches within 25 km Client Structure
Base Size Distance Base Size Distance Base Size Distance
Dependent Variable:
Main bank (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Alternative varying (β)
Bank market share in district 1.743∗∗ 2.242∗∗∗ 3.573∗∗∗ 2.548∗∗∗ 3.138∗∗∗ 3.184∗∗∗ 5.312∗∗∗ 6.301∗∗∗ 6.483∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.62) (0.63) (0.80) (0.75) (0.76) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71)
Bank regional concentration 0.383∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.01 0.198∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.23) (0.24) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13)
Bank size (ln) 0.367∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Bank size (ln, sq) −0.018∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank industry specialization 4.030∗∗∗ 4.835∗∗∗ 3.915∗∗∗ 4.061∗∗∗ 2.370∗∗∗ 3.940∗∗∗
(1.26) (1.26) (1.07) (1.11) (0.48) (0.71)
Distance to bank branch in km 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Individual specific (α)
Criteria:
Industry competence −0.288 −0.27 −0.23 −0.114 −0.087 −0.077 −0.233 −0.176 −0.123
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34)
Support in crises 0.574∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗ 0.539∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Specialized fin services −0.702∗∗ −0.718∗∗ −0.727∗∗ −0.773∗∗ −0.756∗∗ −0.760∗∗ −0.743∗∗ −0.805∗∗ −0.797∗∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Favorable market conditions −0.674∗∗∗ −0.693∗∗∗ −0.629∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗ −0.665∗∗∗ −0.665∗∗∗ −0.648∗∗∗ −0.695∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Short distance to bank 1.121∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Firm Characteristics:
Personal prior relation 0.630∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Talks with multiple Banks −0.313∗ −0.311∗ −0.319∗ −0.327∗ −0.328∗ −0.323∗ −0.289 −0.284 −0.264
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Bank loan/service denied 0.121 0.129 0.106 0.17 0.188 0.192 0.181 0.21 0.206
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27)
No. of bank relations 0.084 0.004 −0.063 0.099 0.036 0.038 0.116 −0.004 0.043
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Demand for bank finance 0.822∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
No demand gov support −0.366∗∗ −0.375∗∗ −0.399∗∗ −0.456∗∗ −0.471∗∗ −0.477∗∗ −0.379∗∗ −0.382∗∗ −0.375∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ Non-private banks 0.350∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
ρ Private banks 0.250∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
LR Chi2 316 296 286 320 303 297 298 278 257
Observations 13,992 13,992 13,992 39,720 39,720 39,451 38,998 38,998 38,998
Cases 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,182 1,182 1,176 1,273 1,273 1,273
Alternatives per cases:
Minimum 11 11 11 4 4 4 19 19 19
Average 11 11 11 33.6 33.6 33.5 30.6 30.6 30.6
Maximum 11 11 11 136 136 136 65 65 65
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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non-private banks, but for client structure (3), the reverse. The value of the estimated
coefficient ρ increases once I introduce the variable distance to branch in km for the
specifications “closest branch” and “client structure.” This might be driven by the fact
that far away alternatives have a stronger effect. For the specification “closest branch,”
this is the case because a chosen main bank relationship that is far away enters the set of
alternatives. In the specification “client structure,” nationwide banks with few branches
enter the choice set, affecting the mean distance.
Table 4.8: Main results (marginal effects) – Chosen main-bank relationship (nested logit
model)
Sampling Strategy Closest Branch Branch within 25km Client Structure
Bank size public 0.018263 0.006797 0.009460
private −0.015219 −0.015867 −0.010071
Bank market share public 0.081273 0.015848 0.044148
private −0.067727 −0.036997 −0.046999
Bank regional public 0.026846 0.000195 0.000295
concentration private −0.000687 −0.000456 −0.000314
Bank industry share public 0.018263 0.006797 0.009460
private −0.015219 −0.015867 −0.010071
Distance to bank public 0.000203 −0.000002 −0.000044
private −0.000169 0.000006 0.000047
Note: This table presents the results of the marginal effect of bank individual specific variables after the Nested Logit model.
Marginal effects are estimated as the mean of the difference in predicted probability after an increase of each variable for private
banks by one standard deviation.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
All the results of the main explanatory variables presented for the logit model above
remain stable in the nested logit. For the control variables, I find that firm size in terms
of the number of employees is positive and significant. This finding suggests that larger
firms are more likely to choose a non-private bank. The finding on firm size of the logit
version was similar but not robust.
I now consider the alternative varying variables. I find an inverse U–shaped relationship
of bank size with a firm’s main bank choice, with a positive effect on bank size and a
negative effect on the squared term of bank size. The results on bank size suggest that
firms choose a bank of a sufficiently large size whereas the bank should not be too large.
On the one hand, larger banks are more hierarchically structured (Berger and Black,
2011). In more hierarchic institutions it becomes harder to pass soft information up the
hierarchy. On the other hand, banks that are too small might have difficulties in building
the competence required by entrepreneurs. Growth oriented entrepreneurs might also
take into consideration that a small bank’s lending policy will be limited by bank capital
requirements.
The bank’s market share in the firm’s district has a positive effect on the entrepreneur’s
main bank choice. For the client structure specification, a marginal increase of market
share for non-private banks increases the probability that a bank of this type is chosen by
4.4 percentage points, whereas it decreases the probability that a private bank is chosen
by 4.7 percentage points. Banks with a high market share in the firms region have detailed
local knowledge. Those banks are more capable of assessing a firm’s riskiness and market
chances, especially for firms with a local market orientation. Those banks can also use
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their local knowledge to assess the entrepreneur’s trustworthiness.
The probability of being chosen for a main bank relationship increases with the bank’s
regional concentration. Regional concentration can also be interpreted as a measure of
a bank’s hierarchic structure, similar to bank size. The more regionally concentrated is
the bank, the shorter is the distance between the branch and the headquarters. The bank
staff might thus be more closely related, and find it easier to share information. The
bank’s policy in general might be more regional focused. The marginal effect of bank’s
regional concentration is rather small. In the specification for client structure, a marginal
increase in a non-private bank’s concentration increases the probability that a private bank
is chosen by 0.003 percentage points and decreases the probability that a non-private bank
is chosen by 0.003 percentage points.
Although bank competence in the firm’s industry is not an important criterion when
choosing a banking group, it influences the selection of a particular bank. The results on
alternative specific variables reveal that a bank’s likelihood of being chosen increases with
the share of the firm’s industry within the bank’s portfolio. The results suggest that firms
do not relate industry competence with a banking group. From a firm’s perspective, bank
industry competence could ease the firm’s access to bank finance, since the bank is more
capable of evaluating the firm’s project. The economic effect of an increase of industry
competence for non-private banks on the probability of choosing a private vs. non-private
bank is quite small.
In specifications (3), (6), and (9), I introduced the distance between the firm’s location
and the bank branch as a further control variable. The sign of the estimated coefficient
in the sampling strategy “closest bank branch” is positive. This effect is driven by the
sampling strategy, because banks were replaced if the bank with a higher distance did
not belong to the original set of alternatives. This sampling effect is less severe for the
strategy “branches within 25 km” and non–existent in the strategy “bank client structure.”
In both, the coefficient is negative. As travel costs increase for the entrepreneur and the
banker, who potentially considers on–site visits, the bank is less likely to be chosen. This
is consistent with the finding for the individual specific variables, that closeness to the
bank is an important criterion for choosing a non-private bank. But the effect of actual
distance to the chosen bank is quite small. As the distance of a non-private bank increases
by 1 km, the probability that such a bank is chosen reduces by 0.005 percentage points
for the “client structure” sampling strategy. Given that most chosen banks are within
25 km, distance is not economically relevant. There are two potential explanations for
this. First, Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that distance might become less important
due to improved lending technologies. They state that public information increases also
for small firms and banks need less direct contact. This is not the case for the firms
under observation. Most firms are proprietorship and do not need to publish financial
statements; and their credit ratings are published only as the firms get older. Second, and
more likely, bank intensity is relatively high in Germany. Firms have many alternative
bank branches within a short distance from the firm’s location. Therefore, differences in
transaction costs might not be severe.
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4.6 Discussion
In this section I discuss further aspects that might a influence firm’s selection of a main
bank. The chosen nested logit model specification should closely reflect the entrepreneur’s
decision making process. In the following, I discuss alternative decision trees. In Table
4.9 I present a subsample analysis for high-tech industries, personal bank relationships
prior to the start of the business, and talks with multiple banks, in general supporting the
decision tree used in the main model presented above. It is often argued that banks are
less capable of evaluating high-tech industries than traditional industries, and therefore
high-tech firms face more difficulties seeking bank finance (Colombo and Grilli (2007);
Brown et al. (2012)). Due to these differences, the importance of the selection criteria
might differ between firms in traditional and in high-tech industries. I split the sample
according to these two industry types and present the coefficients after a logit model in
column (1) for traditional industries and (2) for high-tech industries in Table 4.9. The
results suggests that the criteria are not important for high-tech industries.
An alternative tree structure could be that firms first decide whether to stay with the
bank with which they already have a personal relationship. If not, they might choose
a bank according to the decision tree presented above. The descriptive statistics reveal
that approximately two–thirds of all firms use their personal relationship for their firm
as well. But these groups do not differ with respect to other choice variables, such as a
firm’s seeking bank finance or talking to multiple banks. In columns (3) and (4) of Table
4.9, I present a subsample analysis with respect to prior personal bank relationship. The
results suggest that there are no big differences in the significance and magnitude of the
coefficients.
Firms that use the bank with prior personal relationships might talk with multiple
other banks in order to reduce the financing costs. In a further specification, I find
evidence for such a strategy. I used an interaction term of talks to multiple banks and the
criterion of “favorable market conditions”. In this specification both indicator variables
were insignificant whereas the interaction term becomes significant.
This finding suggests that firms first decide whether they approach a single bank or
talk to multiple banks. Due to the transaction costs for bank talks, one can expect that
firms need specific criteria to be fulfilled in order to choose a main bank relationship.
In columns (5) to (8) of Table 4.9, I present the subsample analysis for the logit and
nested logit model. For firms that talked with only a single bank, the criteria “short
distance,” “favorable market conditions,” and “demand for bank finance” are also signif-
icant. For firms that talked to multiple number of banks, “support in financial distress”
and s“specialized financial services” are significant, in addition. This is in line with the
expectation that those firms that talk to multiple banks are more likely to have certain cri-
teria that need to be fulfilled. The signs of the coefficients are also in line with expectations
regarding relationship/transaction-orientation.
The analysis is based on the assumption that the firm chooses a bank, whereas banks
remain passive. This might not be the case and banks might play a more active role.
Banks can use different marketing and selection strategies to attract new customers. They
might also differ in their screening methods. Next to scoring models, banks could, e.g.,
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Table 4.9: Results of subsample analyses – Chosen main-bank type
Logit Nested Logit
Client Structure
Specification: Hightech Prior relations Bank talk Bank talk
No Yes No Yes Single Multiple Single Multiple
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Main Bank
Bank market share in district 8.225∗∗∗ 6.259∗∗∗
(1.32) (0.94)
Banking market concentra-
tion
0.786∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.19)
Bank size (ln) 0.867∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.30)
Bank size (ln, sq) −0.037∗ −0.042∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Bank industry specialization 3.785∗∗∗ 4.650∗∗∗
(1.03) (1.12)
Distance to bank branch in
km
−0.004∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Non-Private Bank
Personal prior relation 0.743∗∗ 0.393 0.459 0.754∗∗∗ 0.376 0.780∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23)
Demand for bank finance 0.720∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗ 0.636∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.29) (0.31) (0.27) (0.31) (0.26) (0.34) (0.27)
Talks with multiple Banks −0.352 −0.494∗ −0.605∗ −0.272
(0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.23)
Criteria: Industry compe-
tence
−0.361 −0.54 −0.11 −0.821 0.451 −0.703 0.646 −0.35
(0.39) (0.57) (0.46) (0.45) (0.62) (0.38) (0.69) (0.42)
Criteria: Support in crises 0.855∗∗ 0.46 0.739∗ 0.636∗ 0.363 0.683∗∗ 0.313 0.678∗∗
(0.29) (0.28) (0.32) (0.26) (0.32) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27)
Criteria: Specialized fin ser-
vices
−0.499 −1.029 −0.668 −0.747 0.03 −1.055∗∗ −0.759 −1.080∗∗
(0.43) (0.57) (0.52) (0.46) (0.73) (0.41) (0.77) (0.44)
Criteria: Favorable market
conditions
−0.996∗∗∗ −0.415 −0.697∗ −0.804∗∗ −0.748∗ −0.688∗∗ −0.728∗∗ −0.740∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.32) (0.24) (0.34) (0.26)
Criteria: Short distance to
bank
0.979∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗ 1.476∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 1.368∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.33) (0.26)
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 0.063 −2.376 −0.669 −1.082 2.207 −3.682 3.928 −0.585
(2.60) (2.64) (2.76) (2.54) (2.85) (2.49) (2.65) (2.23)
No. of bank relations 0.43 −0.174 0.469 −0.113 −0.113 0.052 −0.608 0.269
(0.36) (0.36) (0.43) (0.32) (0.41) (0.33) (0.46) (0.33)
Bank loan/service denied 0.115 0.29 −0.056 0.779 0.172 0.331
(0.34) (0.41) (0.35) (0.44) (0.27) (0.28)
No demand gov support −0.45 −0.369 −0.682∗ −0.219 −0.477 −0.381 −0.417 −0.403
(0.28) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.27)
Demand for external equity −0.178 −0.665 −1.242∗ −0.044 −0.272 −0.539 0.175 −0.658
(0.54) (0.45) (0.54) (0.47) (0.53) (0.45) (0.58) (0.48)
Export −0.622 0.598 −0.276 0.34 −0.358 0.115 −0.379 0.218
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.42) (0.32) (0.46) (0.34)
Sales −0.076 −0.018 −0.728 0.093 0.512 −0.546 0.281 −0.056
(0.53) (0.37) (0.54) (0.37) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.40)
Proprietorship −0.444 −0.431 0.064 −0.814∗∗ −0.273 −0.515 −0.413 −0.098
(0.34) (0.32) (0.37) (0.31) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.31)
Firm size (employees) 0.083 0.044 0.078 0.037 0.022 0.134∗ 0.035 0.123∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Management team 0.111 0.225 0.135 0.126 0.398 −0.131 0.45 −0.141
(0.28) (0.26) (0.31) (0.25) (0.29) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27)
Entrepreneurial record −0.690∗ 0.035 −0.403 −0.289 −0.334 −0.237 −0.14 −0.215
(0.29) (0.26) (0.32) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.32) (0.28)
University degree −0.013 −0.043 0.115 −0.169 −0.445 0.27 −0.427 0.462
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34) (0.27) (0.31) (0.28) (0.34) (0.29)
Master craftsman 0.172 0.408 −0.263 0.724 0.367 0.22 0.462 0.423
(0.33) (0.41) (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.33) (0.47) (0.34)
Industry and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
public tau
Constant 0.614∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
private tau
Constant 1.066∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.18)
Constant 1.92 0.479 1.095 1.596 −0.272 1.475
(1.02) (0.93) (1.11) (0.82) (1.04) (0.90)
Observations 759 514 450 823 579 694 17,715 21,283
LR Chi2 120 104 116 156 116 152 106 147
log likelihood -250.28 -254.85 -201.02 -290.94 -216.31 -284.86 -940.26 -1,282.49
Note: In this table I present the results of subsample analysis. In column (1) only lowtech and in column (2) only
hightech firms are sampled. In column (3) firms are sampled where entrepreneurs did not have a personal relationship
with the selected bank prior the start of the business and in column (4) if the entrepreneur did have such a relationship.
Firms in columns (5) and (7) are sampled if the firm did not have talks to multiple banks. In columns (6) and (8) only
firms are sampled if the firm talked to multiple banks. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and ***
denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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use behavioral models that use information on entrepreneur’s personal cash management.
The model used by a particular bank is unknown. However, such behavioral models
would require that data from previous personal relationships are available. Throughout
the empirical models, I control for previous personal bank relationships. Another aspect
of a more active role of banks is that banks can deny a relationship. This need not happen
offensively, and a bank could deny single financial services or offer them only at a high
cost. The entrepreneurs were asked whether a bank denied a loan, current account, or
other financial services. I use this information to control for whether a firm’s choice set
was restricted. Only a small fraction of firms were denied by any bank. Only a couple
of firms reported not having a main bank relationship. The results suggest that in most
cases, the main bank relationship is selected by the firm.
During the process of starting a business, banks give advice to entrepreneurs. If the
advice depends on the banking group, it could lead to potential endogeneity difficulties.
I discuss the two variables most prone to endogeneity problems: not demanding gov-
ernmental support, and the firm’s legal form. Banks are involved in many schemes of
public funding in Germany. Private banks (24%) less frequently offer a combination of
own and publicly supported funding by themselves, than do Sparkassen and cooperative
banks (40% and 42%; Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel). However, the endogeneity
problems might not be severe, for two reasons. First, information about public subsidies
is easily accessible on the internet. Second, most entrepreneurs ask chambers of commerce
for general advice before starting a business. Any firm, including a bank, is a mandatory
member of the chamber of commerce. Therefore, chambers of commerce do not have in-
centives to provide different information about governmental subsidies and types of main
bank relationships. Formally, the entrepreneur’s personal financial liability depends on
the firm’s legal form. Banks use different contracts to secure credit provided to the firm
by the entrepreneur’s personal wealth if the firm is a limited liability. The techniques do
not differ between bank types and there is no reason to believe that the advice in favor of
or against a legal form depend on the bank type.
4.7 Conclusion
Financing sources differ in their liquidation policies. The theoretical literature predicts
that firms choose financing sources according their own risk. Sparkassen and cooperative
banks have a mandate or mission statement to support troubled but viable firms. Private
banks have no restrictions on their lending strategy. These banks have incentives to offer
transaction oriented banking and attract low risk firms. Employing a rich data set on newly
established firms, I test whether firms chose their main bank relationship according to their
risk. I find that firms for which bank support in financially difficult times is of utmost
importance are more likely to choose a Sparkasse or cooperative bank. Entrepreneurs who
consider previous personal relationships as important for the firm–bank relationship are
more likely to “stay” with a non-private bank. Firms seeking bank finance in their initial
year are also more likely to choose a non-private bank. Cost sensitive firms, however, are
more likely to choose a private bank. Firms not asking for governmental subsidies might
signal their low risk to private banks. But I did not find significant differences in the
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predicted default probability among bank types.
The findings suggest that private banks might be expected to be tougher in renegoti-
ation. But if a self selection strategy by private banks exist, it might not work out well.
Such a strategy would be successful if private banks attract clients with a low risk of
default. An entrepreneur’s risk assessment might not be correlated with the “objective”
risk. The risk portfolio observed is that of all clients, and need not reflect the average
risk of a banks’ loan portfolio. However, because switching rates are low in general, banks
grant loans mostly within their existing portfolio. The results further indicate that private
banks have less rent seeking potential. Private banks attract cost sensitive clients that are
probably more likely to switch the bank relationship.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.10: Market exit - Descriptive statistics and probit
results
Variable Descriptive Statistics Market Exit
N Mean Min Max SD Coefficient S.E.
Firm size and Team
No. of employees (full time equivalent) 5795 1.27 0.00 282.5 6.139 0.01 (0.01)
No. of team members 5.795 1.41 1 12 0.818 0.00 0.00
Age of oldest team member 5.795 39.60 16 93 9.870 -0.015 (0.03)
Age of oldest team member (sq.) 5.795 1665.65 256 8649 828.716 0.00 (0.00)
Material expenses 5.795 0.63 0.00 1 0.483 0.00 (0.00)
Female Entrepreneur (at least one) 5.795 0.19 0.00 1 0.389 -0.013 (0.11)
Entrepreneur was unemployed prior
foundation
5.795 0.17 0.00 1 0.375 0.00 (0.00)
No. Of team members with en-
trepreneurial experience
5.795 0.20 0.00 3 0.568 0.00 (0.00)
No. of patents granted prior founda-
tion
5.795 0.20 0.00 180 4.175 0.002 (0.01)
craft 5.795 0.27 0.00 1 0.444 -0.298** (0.13)
Limited liability 5.795 0.30 0.00 1 0.459 -0.704*** (0.12)
Motivation
Motivation - Implementation of a busi-
ness idea*
5.795 0.33 0.00 1 0.471 0.114 (0.10)
Motivation - Avoiding a situation of
unemployment*
5.795 0.18 0.00 1 0.383 0.252** (0.12)
Motivation - Others* 5.795 0.03 0.00 1 0.183 0.007 (0.23)
Education and Experience
Industry experience (years) 5.795 13.56 1 54 9.419 0.00 (0.00)
Industry experience (years, sq.) 5.795 272.54 1 2916 340.463 0.00 (0.00)
Qualification in business 5.795 0.26 0.00 1 0.438 0.00 (0.00)
Qualification in business and technol-
ogy
5.795 0.06 0.00 1 0.244 0.00 (0.00)
Qualification in technology 5.795 0.61 0.00 1 0.487 0.00 (0.00)
Portfolio Entrepreneur 5.795 0.05 0.00 1 0.213 0.00 (0.00)
Restarter 5.795 0.04 0.00 1 0.186 0.00 (0.00)
Serial Entrepreneur 5.795 0.02 0.00 1 0.146 0.00 (0.00)
no qualification 5.795 0.03 0.00 1 0.176 0.387 (0.24)
Master Craftsman 5.795 0.26 0.00 1 0.437 0.135 (0.12)
University degree 5.795 0.39 0.00 1 0.488 0.153 (0.11)
Regional and Industry character-
istics
East Germany 5.795 0.18 0.00 1 0.385 0.00 (0.00)
Metropolitan areas and central cities 5.795 0.22 0.00 1 0.414 0.00 (0.00)
Urban areas 5.795 0.44 0.00 1 0.496 -0.008 (0.17)
Urban hinterland 5.795 0.13 0.00 1 0.337 0.082 (0.19)
Rural areas 5.795 0.14 0.00 1 0.343 -0.318 (0.20)
Firm age at panel entry 1 year 5.795 0.39 0.00 1 0.487 -0.341*** (0.10)
Firm age at panel entry 2 years 5.795 0.34 0.00 1 0.474 -1.452*** (0.13)
Cutting edge technology 5.795 0.06 0.00 1 0.243 -0.39 (0.27)
High-technology 5.795 0.04 0.00 1 0.206 0.603*** (0.22)
Software 5.795 0.08 0.00 1 0.273 0.424** (0.17)
Non-tech manufacturing 5.795 0.12 0.00 1 0.328 0.119 (0.17)
Knowledge intensive services 5.795 0.07 0.00 1 0.257 -0.029 (0.19)
Industry related services 5.795 0.05 0.00 1 0.216 0.323 (0.20)
Conusmer related services 5.795 0.12 0.00 1 0.328 0.071 (0.16)
Construction 5.795 0.11 0.00 1 0.317 0.255 (0.18)
Trade 5.795 0.13 0.00 1 0.341 0.226 (0.15)
Constant -0.948 (0.61)
log likelihood -1992.93
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Table 4.10: Market exit - Descriptive statistics and probit
results
Variable Descriptive Statistics Market Exit
N Mean Min Max SD Coefficient S.E.
LR Chi2 301
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Figure 4.3: Receiver Operator Characteristics of predicted market exit probability
Note: Comparison of observed market exit with predicted probability of market exit based on a probit regression of newly
established firms in Germany using the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. Predicted probability that firms established in the years 2005 to
2007 exit the market within 3 years.
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculation.
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Table 4.11: Descriptive statistics for logit model
Variable Mean SD Min Max Definition Source
Prior personal bank relation 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 if at least one team member had private or
business relation with the firms main bank
SuP
Multiple bank talks 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 if firm had multiple bank talks SuP
Bank loan/service denied 0.13 0.34 0 1 1 if a bank denied account keeping, loans,
provision of financial services
SuP
Criteria: Competence 0.10 0.29 0 1 1 if industry competence were considered as
of utmost important for main bank selection
SuP
Criteria: Support in Crisis 0.36 0.48 0 1 1 if banks support in case of firm financial
distress were considered as of utmost impor-
tant for main bank selection.
SuP
Criteria: Specialized finan-
cial services
0.06 0.24 0 1 1 if spezialiszed financial services were con-
sidered as of utmost important for main bank
selection.
SuP
Criteria: Favorable market
conditions
0.29 0.46 0 1 1 if favorable market conditions were consid-
ered as vof utmost important for main bank
selection
SuP
Criteria: Short distance to
bank
0.43 0.50 0 1 1 if closeness to bank were considered as of
utmost important for main bank selection
SuP
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.44 Predicted probability of market exit within
3 years
SuP/MUP
No. of bank relations 1.00 0.36 0 3 No of bank relations MUP
Demand for bank finance 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 if firm either used and/or reported difficul-
ties with bank finance
SuP
No demand for gov support 0.37 0.48 0 1 1 if firm either used and/or reported difficul-
ties with governmental support
SuP
Demand for external equity 0.05 0.23 0 1 1 if firm either used and/or reported difficul-
ties with external equity
SuP
Exporting 0.12 0.32 0 1 1 if firm sold products on foreign markets in
its initial year
SuP
Sales 0.90 0.29 0 1 1 if firm with sales in intial year SuP
Expected sales decline 0.15 0.35 0 1 1 if interview partner expected decline in
sales for the second year
SuP
Proprietorship 0.43 0.50 0 1 1 if firm has a legal form of a limited liability MUP
Firm size (employees) 2.74 6.64 1 242 Number of full-time equivalent employees in-
cluding team members at startup
SuP
Management team 0.32 0.47 0 1 1 if firm was founded by a team. SuP
Entrepreneurial record 0.17 0.38 0 1 1 if entrepreneur was a owner-manager of
firms prior start-up of the observed firm
SuP
University degree 0.42 0.49 0 1 1 if at least one team member holds a uni-
versity degree as highest level of education
SuP
Master craftsman 0.25 0.43 0 1 1 if at least one team member holds a cer-
tificate of master craftsman
SuP
Motivation: business idea 0.35 0.48 0 1 1 if implementation of a business idea was
the main motivation of start-up
SuP
Motivation: higher expected
salary
0.06 0.25 0 1 1 if implementation of a higher salary was
the main motivation of start-up
SuP
Bank intensity (firm) 5.236 1.995 1.706 14.12 No of banks per 1,000 firms active in the dis-
trict
MUP/BP
Bank intensity (employees) 0.52 0.30 0.0 2.0 No. Of banks per 1,000 people employed in
the district
MUP/BP
Local banking market com-
petition (district)
0.01 0.27 0.0 28.6 No of firms switched their main bank rela-
tion in proportion to the number of firms;
per district
MUP/BP
Metropolises 0.08 0.26 0 1 District of cities ≥ 2,500 inhabitants/km MUP/BBR
Major city 0.22 0.41 0 1 District of cities ≥ 100,000 inhabitants MUP/BBR
Hinterland 0.12 0.33 0 1 Districts in urban area with population den-
sity of < 150 inhabitants/km
MUP/BBR
Urban area 0.45 0.50 0 1 Districts in urban area with population den-
sity of ≥ 150 inhabitants/km
MUP/BBR
Rural area 0.14 0.34 0 1 Districts in rural areas MUP/BBR
Year 2009 0.34 0.48 0 1 1 if Year of foundation is 2009 SuP
Year 2010 0.35 0.48 0 1 1 if Year of foundation is 2010 SuP
Year 2011 0.31 0.46 0 1 1 if Year of foundation is 2011 SuP
Cutting edge technology 0.08 0.27 0 1 1 if industry is Cutting edge technology SuP
High-tech manufacturing 0.07 0.26 0 1 1 if industry is High-technology SuP
Software 0.07 0.25 0 1 1 if industry is Software SuP
Technology intensive services 0.21 0.41 0 1 1 if industry is technology intensive services SuP
Low-tech manufacturing 0.11 0.32 0 1 1 if industry is Low-tech manufacturing SuP
Knowledge intensive services 0.05 0.23 0 1 1 if industry is Knowledge intensive services SuP
Business related services 0.06 0.24 0 1 1 if industry is Other business related ser-
vices
SuP
Consumer related services 0.09 0.28 0 1 1 if industry is Consumer orientierted ser-
vices
SuP
Construction 0.11 0.32 0 1 1 if industry is Construction SuP
Trade 0.14 0.35 0 1 1 if industry is Trade SuP
Definition of sources: SuP - KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel; MUP - Mannheim Enterprise Panel; BP - ZEW Bank Panel; BBR -
Federal office for building and regional planing
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Table 4.12: Characteristics of chosen main bank – Sample distribution
Bank type Min P25 P50 P75 P90 Max
Bank size (total)
Public Banks 2 17 36 71 143 601
Cooperative Banks 0 4 8 15 24 160
Private Banks 0 1,439 3,273 4,747 4,957 4,957
Bank market share in district
Public Banks 0.00 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.49 0.71
Cooperative Banks 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.30
Private Banks 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.43
Bank regional concentration
Public Banks 0.10 0.42 0.72 0.83 0.89 0.95
Cooperative Banks 0.01 0.41 0.56 0.78 0.86 0.96
Private Banks 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.41
Bank industry specialization
Public Banks 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.40
Cooperative Banks 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.50
Private Banks 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.28
Distance to bank branch in km
Public Banks 0 1 3 8 18 610
Cooperative Banks 0 1 4 11 23 571
Private Banks 0 2 6 19 150 740
Distance to bank headquarter in km
Public Banks 0 3 9 17 29 553
Cooperative Banks 0 4 10 19 32 574
Private Banks 0 151 243 379 444 757
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own
calculations.
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Table 4.13: Descriptive statistics of the set of alternatives by sampling strategy
Closest Branch Banks within 25 km Client Structure
No. of observations 13,992 39,451 38,998
Min Max Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Bank market share 0.000 0.697 0.069 0.108 0.027 0.072 0.020 0.063
Bank regional concentra-
tion
0.013 1 0.251 0.301 0.450 0.322 0.259 0.293
Bank size 0.000 11.271 7.263 1.731 6.414 1.886 6.403 1.492
Bank industry share 0 1 0.042 0.051 0.041 0.055 0.037 0.056
Distance to bank branch 0 757 16.0 28.3 32.7 73.1 102.2 130.1
Multiple bank talks 0 1 0.545 0.498 0.533 0.499 0.546 0.498
Prior personal bank rela-
tion
0 1 0.647 0.478 0.657 0.475 0.641 0.480
Bank loan/service denied 0 1 0.135 0.342 0.130 0.337 0.139 0.346
Criteria: Competence 0 1 0.091 0.288 0.074 0.262 0.087 0.282
Criteria: Support in Crisis 0 1 0.356 0.479 0.358 0.479 0.348 0.476
Criteria: Specialized finan-
cial services
0 1 0.056 0.230 0.055 0.227 0.057 0.231
Criteria: Favorable market
conditions
0 1 0.291 0.454 0.278 0.448 0.285 0.451
Criteria: Short distance to
bank
0 1 0.439 0.496 0.410 0.492 0.428 0.495
Sales 0 1 0.921 0.269 0.924 0.266 0.922 0.269
Demand for bank finance 0 1 0.527 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.518 0.500
No demand for gov support 0 1 0.355 0.479 0.365 0.481 0.362 0.481
Demand for external eq-
uity
0 1 0.054 0.227 0.059 0.236 0.055 0.227
Exporting 0 1 0.124 0.330 0.125 0.330 0.128 0.335
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 0.048 0.444 0.175 0.065 0.170 0.063 0.175 0.065
No. of bank relations 0 3 1.007 0.351 0.998 0.344 1.004 0.345
Proprietorship 0 1 0.425 0.494 0.444 0.497 0.431 0.495
Firm size (employees) 1 242 2.751 7.462 2.714 6.914 2.663 6.783
Management team 0 1 0.312 0.463 0.328 0.470 0.316 0.465
Entrepreneurial record 0 1 0.219 0.413 0.218 0.413 0.219 0.413
University degree 0 1 0.414 0.493 0.444 0.497 0.430 0.495
Master craftsman 0 1 0.248 0.432 0.244 0.430 0.240 0.427
Year 2009 0 1 0.270 0.444 0.251 0.433 0.263 0.440
Year 2010 0 1 0.333 0.471 0.320 0.466 0.330 0.470
Metropolises 0 1 0.072 0.259 0.053 0.224 0.116 0.321
Major city 0 1 0.211 0.408 0.290 0.454 0.214 0.410
Urban area 0 1 0.126 0.332 0.083 0.276 0.102 0.303
Rural area 0 1 0.131 0.338 0.080 0.272 0.105 0.307
Bank intensity (employees) 0.012 1.977 0.512 0.298 0.477 0.289 0.482 0.299
Local banking market com-
petition (district)
0.002 0.022 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003
Cutting edge technology 0 1 0.059 0.236 0.073 0.260 0.061 0.239
High-tech manufacturing 0 1 0.046 0.209 0.040 0.195 0.044 0.204
Software 0 1 0.079 0.269 0.075 0.264 0.080 0.271
Low-tech manufacturing 0 1 0.110 0.313 0.113 0.317 0.107 0.309
Knowledge intensive ser-
vices
0 1 0.053 0.225 0.063 0.243 0.060 0.238
Business related services 0 1 0.064 0.244 0.060 0.238 0.064 0.244
Consumer related services 0 1 0.090 0.286 0.082 0.275 0.092 0.289
Construction 0 1 0.121 0.326 0.107 0.309 0.116 0.320
Trade 0 1 0.158 0.365 0.146 0.353 0.152 0.359
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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Table 4.14: Results of control variables – chosen main-bank relationship (nested logit
model)
Sampling: Branch network Sampling: Client Structure
Base Bank Char Distance Base Bank Char Distance
risk and risk aversion risk and risk and risk aversion risk and
risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Further control variables
Demand for external equity -0.551** -0.429 -0.513* -0.611** -0.489* -0.592**
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
Competence important 0.065 0.199 0.116 0.04 0.214 0.075
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
Sales 0.229 0.065 0.064 0.293 0.231 0.382*
(0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Proprietorship -0.225 -0.321** -0.374** -0.143 -0.263 -0.11
(0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19)
Firm size (employees) 0.053 0.037 0.048 0.058* 0.044 0.058*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Management team 0.094 0.105 0.081 0.075 0.066 0.067
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Entrepreneurial record -0.195 -0.261 -0.17 -0.183 -0.172 -0.2
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
University degree -0.112 -0.147 -0.104 -0.136 -0.148 -0.121
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Master craftsman 0.208 0.192 0.194 0.187 0.163 0.181
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Local banking competition -10.254 -12.668 -8.072 2.579 4.314 11.648
(24.12) (22.70) (24.66) (24.75) (23.09) (25.35)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
jahr2009 0.109 0.109 0.147 0.128 0.136 0.145
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
jahr2010 0.016 0.016 0.03 0.037 0.038 0.048
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Cutting Edge Technology -0.033 -0.033 -0.047 0.105 0.095 0.154
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
High technology 0.315 0.315 0.362 0.412 0.404 0.444
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Software -0.123 -0.123 -0.112 -0.03 -0.029 0.009
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Manufacturing 0.706** 0.706** 0.705** 0.792** 0.777** 0.786**
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Knowledge intensive services 0.276 0.276 0.27 0.192 0.232 0.303
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Business oriented services 0.376 0.376 0.382 0.367 0.358 0.373
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Consumer oriented services 0.253 0.253 0.275 0.28 0.27 0.327
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Construction 0.119 0.119 0.136 0.405 0.304 0.243
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Trade 0.406* 0.406* 0.409* 0.532** 0.491** 0.528**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
Note: This table presents the results of the Nested Logit model. The upper part presents estimated coefficients of the (bank) alter-
native varying variables. The lower part presents the figures of the individual specific variables that does not vary over alternatives.
Previous estimation results suggested to use two nests: Public/cooperative vs. private banks. Private banks is used as base category
in the lower part. Columns (1)-(3) refer to estimation results based on the sampling strategy “Bank branch structure”. Each firm is
assigned the nearest branch of each of the two nearest Sparkassen, cooperative banks and small private banks, as well as the nearest
branch of the four large banks (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Postbank, and HypoVereinsbank). Bank information is replaced with
respect to bank type if the chosen bank is not initially sampled. Columns (4)-(6) refer to estimation results based on the sampling
strategy “Bank client structure”. A bank is assigned as an alternative of a firm if the bank is regional and active in the firms district,
super-regional and active in the firms regional planing area, or national active. Regional (super-regional) banks are considered to be
active in firms district (regional planing area) if the bank has a significant share of costumers (1 / count of districts (regional planing
area)) in the firms district (regional planing area). Bank information is replaced with respect to bank type if the chosen bank is not
initially sampled. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels of
significance.
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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Table 4.15: Industry classification used by the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel
No. Industry NACE Code Rev. 1
high-tech industries
1 cutting-edge technology manufac-
turing
23.30, 24.20, 24.41, 24.61, 29.11, 29.60, 30.02,
31.62, 32.10, 32.20, 33.20, 33.30, 35.30
2 high-technology manufacturing 22.33, 24.11, 24.12-4, 24.17, 24.30, 24.42,
24.62-4, 24.66, 29.12-4, 29.31-2, 29.40, 29.52-
6, 30.01, 31.10, 31.40, 31.50, 32.30, 33.10,
33.40, 34.10, 34.30, 35.20
3 technology-intensive services 64.2, 72 (without 72.2), 73.1, 74.2, 74.3
4 software supply and consultancy 72.2
non-high-tech industries
5 non-high-tech manufacturing 15 37 (without sectors 1 + 2)
6 skill-intensive services (non-
technical consulting services)
73.2, 74.11-4, 74.4
7 other business-oriented services 71.1, 71.2, 71.3, 74.5 74.8 (without 74.84.7),
90, 64.1, 61, 62, 60.3, 63.1, 63.2, 63.4
8 consumer-oriented services 55, 70, 71.4, 92, 93, 80.4, 65-67, 60.1, 60.2,
63.3
9 construction 45
10 wholesale and retail trade (without
trade agents)
50 52 (without 51.1)
Note: Cutting-edge manufacturing technology: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure ¿ 8.5% of total sales.
High-technology manufacturing: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure 3.5 8.5% of total sales.
Source: Grupp and Legler (2000), classification KfW/ZEW start-up Panel Fryges et al. (2010).
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